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ABSTRACT 
 
Nadine Kopp. The Influence of the War of 1812 on Great Lakes Shipbuilding. (Under the 
Direction of Dr. Bradley Rodgers) Department of History, January 2012. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the War of 1812 influenced ship 
construction techniques on the Great Lakes. During the War of 1812, much of the fighting in the 
North American theater of war primarily took place along the Niagara frontier and later along the 
St. Lawrence River. From the outset, both the Americans and British realized that gaining the 
upper hand in the conflict depended upon control of the Great Lakes. Critical to achieving the 
advantage was the development of a significant and powerful inland navy, which led to a 
shipbuilding race on both shores. The primary question raised surrounding Great Lakes ship 
construction in the early nineteenth century is whether or not this large scale event, the War of 
1812, permanently influenced the way in which ships were constructed once the war was over. 
To answer this question, this study examines diagnostic attributes of archaeologically 
examined wrecks from the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain from before, during and after the 
War of 1812 to find similarities and difference in their design and construction The three time 
periods have been defined as the period before the War of 1812, from the French and Indian War 
(1754 to 1763), when British sailing ships first appeared on the Great Lakes, up to 1811; the 
period of the War of 1812 itself (1812-1814); and the period after the war leading up to the 
opening of the Welland Canal (1829) and the widespread use of steam engines on the Great 
Lakes (1830s-1840s). By comparing the similarities and differences of construction traits 
between the three periods, it is possible to gain an understanding of the changes that took place 
in ship design and construction. 
The second aim of this thesis is to compare these diagnostic attributes with the Navy Bay 
Wreck, located in Kingston, Ontario, to attempt to determine when it was constructed. Tentative 
 
 
conclusions are drawn about the differences between ship construction techniques over time, that 
determined that the Navy Bay Wreck most likely was constructed in the period prior to the War 
of 1812. Historical research alongside the archaeological analysis aided in determining the Earl 
of Moira as the most likely candidate for the identity of this vessel.  
While the War of 1812 had significant political and social implications, the impact on 
ship construction on the Great Lakes was not as substantial. The War of 1812 did not completely 
revolutionize or transform ship construction on the Great Lakes but did have a minor impact on 
ship construction techniques employed during the early 19th century. 
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CHAPTER 1 : RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF DIAGNOSTIC 
SHIPBUILDING CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The War of 1812 has often been called a forgotten conflict. Two reasons exist for the 
previous lack of attention paid to this significant event in North American history. First, the war 
that took place from 1812-1814 between the United States and Great Britain resulted in a 
stalemate that restored the status quo ante bellum. Secondly, the end of the war was considerably 
overshadowed by the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. Fortunately, since the 
1980s, there has been a resurgence of scholarly research intended to expound the details of this 
military and naval conflict (Hickey 2001). Synchronous with the later historical research is the 
initiation of archaeological investigations. While much was known about the naval operations of 
the War of 1812, these sites have only been investigated archaeologically within the last century. 
In the past three decades, fifteen vessels from the War of 1812 have been recorded from Lake 
Champlain and the Great Lakes (Crisman 1983, 1987, 1989; Emery 1995, 2003; Washburn 1996, 
1998; Sabick 2004; Moore 2006, 2008; Walker 2006; Cassavoy 2005; Gordon 2009).  
During the War of 1812, the North American theater of war was determined by the 
geography of the region. Much of the fighting in the north primarily took place along the Niagara 
frontier and later along the St. Lawrence River. From the outset, both the Americans and British 
realized that gaining the upper hand in the conflict depended upon control of the Great Lakes 
(Malcomson 1998: 16). Crucial to achieving ascendancy upon the Great Lakes was the 
development of a significant and powerful inland navy. By necessity, this had to be built in 
place, as ships could not be brought in from the Atlantic due to the shallows and rapids along the 
St. Lawrence River. This led to a shipbuilding race on both shores in a region where supplies 
were not always guaranteed, since they needed to be transported from the eastern seaboard. In 
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addition the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy converted and upgraded for use some commercial ships 
from the earlier period (Malcomson 2001: 112). After the War of 1812, naval restrictions were 
informally set in place by the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817. Yet, conflicts continued 
throughout most of the 19th century that required both sides to use naval vessels in excess of 
Rush-Bagot, until after the U.S. Civil War (Stacey 1950: 3-6).  
Research Questions 
The aim of this research is to determine diagnostic attributes of vessels used on the Great 
Lakes and Lake Champlain from before the War of 1812, during the war, and after the war in an 
attempt to determine whether the War of 1812 influenced shipbuilding developments on the 
Inland Lakes. The three periods in question include the period before the War of 1812, which has 
been defined as the period from the French and Indian War (1754 to 1763), when British sailing 
ships first appeared on the Great Lakes, up to 1811; the period of the War of 1812 itself (1812-
1814); and the period after the war leading up to the opening of the Welland Canal (1829) and 
the widespread use of steam engines on the Great Lakes (1830s-1840s). By examining 
archaeologically excavated wrecks from these three periods it will be possible to identify 
construction traits specific to each period and if or how these changed with the exigencies of 
war. 
Archaeologically documented vessels from the pre-War of 1812 period include the 16-
gun sloop Boscawen (Crisman 1985) built on Lake Champlain in 1759 and the Defence (Morris 
1991), an 18th century merchant vessel lost during the Penobscot Expedition (1779). Several 
vessels have been studied that were built prior to the War of 1812 and subsequently used during 
the war. These include the schooner Nancy, a merchant vessel built in 1789 and pressed into 
British service during the War of 1812 on Georgian Bay (Sabick 2004). The Southhampton 
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beach wreck, now identified as the General Hunter, was built by the Provincial Marine in 1807 
at Amherstburg and used throughout the war (Cassavoy 2005). Ships pressed into the service of 
the U.S. Navy include Hamilton, built in Oswego, New York in 1809, and Scourge, built at 
Niagara, Ontario in 1811, which both remain preserved and unexcavated at a depth of 300 feet in 
Lake Ontario (Cain 1983; Nelson 1983). 
 Archaeologically documented warships from the War of 1812 period include the U.S. Brig 
Eagle (Crisman 1987), U.S.N. Row Galley Allen (Emery 1995 and 2003), HMS Linnet 
(Washburn 1996 and 1998) and U.S. Ticonderoga (Crisman 1983) on Lake Champlain, although 
this vessel was originally constructed as a steamer and so has different characteristics than a 
sailing vessel; HMS St. Lawrence (Moore 2006), HMS Prince Regent (Moore 2006), and HMS 
Princess Charlotte (Moore 2006; Walker 2006) have been identified and studied in the Kingston 
area of Lake Ontario; and U.S. Brig Jefferson on Lake Ontario (Crisman 1989). Two other War 
of 1812 era wrecks, located in Kingston, have not yet been identified or studied. They are known 
as Wreck Charlie (Moore 2006) and Guenter’s Wreck (Moore 2008).  
 Archaeologically recorded wrecks from the post-War of 1812 era include the Tecumseth 
and Newash (Gordon 2009) built at the Penetanguishene Naval Yard on Lake Huron at the close 
of the War of 1812 prior to the Rush-Bagot Agreement and the gunboat Radcliffe built on Lake 
Ontario in 1817 and laid up in ordinary in 1820 (Amer 1986). Other archaeologically 
documented post-War of 1812 wrecks include the Millecoquins wreck (Whitesides 2003) 
discovered in the Millecoquins River, approximately 1.5 miles from Naubinway, Michigan; and 
the Griffon Cove Wreck (Hundley 1980) discovered in a small cove on Russel Island in Lake 
Huron, within the boundaries of Fathom Five National Marine Park, Canada. 
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The second aim of this thesis will be to compare these diagnostic attributes with the Navy 
Bay Wreck, located in Kingston, Ontario, to attempt to determine when it was constructed. J. 
Richard Steffy stated that one of the main obligations of ship reconstruction was the 
identification of important features and the functions of hull design. He further asserted that 
scholars should be able to identify shipwrecks “according to nationality and period by 
interpreting their construction features and hull curvatures” (Steffy 2006: 11). The identity of the 
Navy Bay Wreck is unknown, however due to its location in Navy Bay, the former location of 
the base for vessels on Lake Ontario and headquarters for the Royal Navy on the Great Lakes 
and Lake Champlain during the War of 1812, it is believed to relate to these former naval 
facilities. The wreck may relate to the pre-war period of the Provincial Marine, the War of 1812, 
or the post-war era. Indeed, the career of the vessel might have straddled all of these periods. 
Possible candidates for the identity of this ship based on its length and breadth include the snow 
Duke of Kent (launched in 1802 at Kingston), the brig Charwell (ex-Earl of Moira) (launched in 
1805 at Kingston), and the schooner Brock (launched in 1817 at Kingston) (Moore 2008: 39; 
Malcomson 2001: 45, 139).  
To determine in which period the Navy Bay Wreck was constructed, it is necessary to use 
the method of multiple working hypotheses. This involves the development of several 
hypotheses to be tested in order to arrive at a result. The function of multiple working hypotheses 
is to suggest various lines of inquiry by which the facts are obtained in order to make inductive 
conclusions. For these hypotheses, the word ‘working’ is stressed, indicating their tentative 
nature, as many will prove to be false, including the possibility that none of the explanations are 
correct and that a new possibility may emerge. A benefit of this type of research is that an 
occurrence may be the result of several causes, not just one, and the method of multiple working 
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hypotheses makes it more likely to envision the interaction of several causes. Developing several 
hypotheses prior to conducting the research, avoids creating a ruling theory, whereby the facts 
are sought in order to support the theory (Chamberlain 1998: 147-150). The multiple working 
hypotheses used in this thesis include whether the War of 1812 influenced ship construction on 
the Great Lakes, or whether merchant vessels returned to the pre-war construction traditions. 
Multiple working hypotheses applied to the second part of this thesis include whether the Navy 
Bay Wreck was built before the war, during the war, after the war, or whether it straddled these 
three periods. Likewise it is possible that the Navy Bay Wreck is completely unrelated to War or 
1812 and the periods before and after the war. 
Definitions of Diagnostic Shipbuilding Characteristics  
In order to evaluate the diagnostic attributes of Great Lakes vessels from before, during, 
and after the War of 1812, it is necessary to understand how a ship was constructed. Since North 
American shipyards and methods diverged little from those in Europe, it is natural that 
similarities would exist between American construction techniques and British built vessels on 
the Great Lakes (Bamford 2007: 132). 
The first step in constructing a vessel was the cutting and shaping of the keel. The keel was 
typically made from oak for its sturdiness. When a single long straight grained timber was not 
available, the keel was fashioned from several timbers about 25 ft. in length that were joined 
together by a joint called a scarf. These scarfs were along the horizontal plane, and the most 
common types were plain, hooked, or tabled with square rectangular inserts called coaks 
(Longridge 1955: 7). To tighten the scarf and repel water traveling along the seams in order that 
it did not enter the hull, a hole was drilled across the seam and a softwood dowel, called a 
stopwater, was driven in. In larger vessels, if the molded dimension of the keel was not deep 
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enough, the keel would be made of two laminated timbers. The scarfs on these two timbers were 
always staggered to increase the strength of the vessel. A false keel was usually attached on the 
underside of the keel after the frames and keelson were in place. The false keel was tenuously 
attached to the keel allowing it to break off the vessel if it struck bottom and thus served to 
protect the keel from damage (Bamford 2007: 146-147). Along the length of the keel an angular 
groove, or rabbet, was notched out of the upper edge to take the lowest or garboard strake of the 
exterior planking (Longridge 1955: 9).  
The stern post was the next piece to be put into position. It was a single timber that was 
vertically mortised to the keel, tapered in the athwardships direction, and raked aft. A rabbet was 
cut along its forward edge to accept the planking. An inner stern post was then bolted to the 
forward side of the sternpost, and did not extend past the upper end of the sternpost. Filler 
timbers, called deadwood, were laid over the keel and fastened with treenails, a wooden peg that 
swelled when wet to produce a tight seal, or bolted to the keel and sternpost to form one solid 
mass. Deadwood served as an extension of the keel upwards as the vessel curved at its 
extremities (Longridge 1955: 11-13). 
The stem assembly was fashioned next. The stem post consisted of several timbers that 
were scarfed together and attached to the keel with a forward rake. The joint between the stem 
and the keel was referred to as the ‘boxing’. Laid on top of this joint were several timbers scarfed 
together, known as the apron, which continued up the inside of the stem. The rabbet for the 
planking was cut on the stem post forward of the joint with the apron. On the after side of the 
apron was a third timber known as the stemson. Due to the bluff shape of the bow, there was no 
need for as much deadwood in the stem, but the three timbers of the stemson, apron, and stem 
post acted like deadwood to attach the heels of the frames. On the forward face of the stem post 
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were placed the gripe and knee of the head, which were fashion pieces used to give the vessel a 
graceful appearance rather than that of a very bluff bow (Longridge 1955: 13-14).  
After the stern and stem were attached to the keel, the frames were cut, shaped, and 
assembled. Two framing methods were used throughout a vessel: square frames that were placed 
perpendicular to the keel, and cant frames that were placed at an angle to the keel. Each square 
frame was composed of overlapping timbers, which generally consisted of: one floor timber, two 
first futtocks, two second futtocks, and two top timbers. These were also known as double frames 
as the floor and second futtocks were next to the associated first and third futtocks. The floor was 
laid perpendicular across the keel, then the futtocks were scarfed or joined together by chocks. 
The midship frame was the first frame secured to the keel as it was the beamiest location on the 
vessel, and the other frames tapered inwards towards the stem and stern. Generally, frames 
located forward of the midship frame were constructed with the first futtocks fastened to the 
forward faces of the floor timbers, while frames aft of the midship frame were assembled with 
their first aft forward of the floors. There were approximately ten cant frames at the both ends of 
the vessel as it tapered towards the stem and stern posts. They were sharply angled from the keel 
to present a flat surface for planking. The cant frames of the stern had no floors but their heels 
abutted notches in the deadwood (Longridge 1955: 18-21).  
The keelson was laid over the frames and served to lock them in place. Similar to the keel, 
several timbers were scarfed together to form the keelson if a single timber could not be located 
that stretched the length of the vessel. The masts were stepped into the keelson either with a 
simple mortise cut into the keelson, a longitudinal step atop the keelson, or an athwartships step 
known as a saddle type step. Saddle mast steps were a type common to 18th-century British and 
British colonial-built vessels. Saddle mast steps were notched over the keelson and attached to 
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the frames using four bolts. The outer edges of the step were angled to fit the lateral shape of the 
ship as well as the deadrise (Longridge 1955: 23). 
Once the exterior planking was put on, it was made as watertight as possible by hammering 
oakum between the seams. The seams were not perfect and water would collect between each 
frame like a sort of gutter. In order to remove this stagnant bilge water to a central well to be 
pumped from the vessel, limber holes were drilled fore and aft through every floor. These holes 
would weaken the structure of the floors and filling pieces were often added to strengthen the 
assembly. When the floors, filling timbers, and keelson were bolted together, the interior or 
ceiling planking could be added. The first strake beside the keelson was known as the limber 
board, which could be lifted to clear debris from the limber passage (Longridge 1955: 23-24). 
On the inner side of the frame ends were deck clamps, which served to longitudinally 
reinforce the hull above the waterline and support the ends of the deck beams. In large vessels 
the deck beams consisted of two or three lengths of timber scarfed together and were supported 
by stanchions that were mortised to the keelson. The end of the deck beam was secured by knees, 
which were timbers that naturally curved at a right angle. Such naturally curving timbers were 
known as compass timbers. Knees were used to strengthen the joint between two timbers on 
different planes, and consisted of a variety of forms including hanging knees, lodging knees, and 
dagger knees (Steffy 2006: 274). A hanging knee was located beneath the deck beam and 
supported the ends of the deck beams while a lodging knee fastened the forward side of the deck 
beam to the ship's side. The waterway was a timber located above the deck beam ends at the 
junction of the deck and bulwark. The clamp and waterway locked the deck beams in place, 
preventing lateral movement (Longridge 1955: 25-26). This created a rigid skeleton for the ship.  
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In the majority of the examples that are presented in this thesis, the hull is the only 
remaining portion of these vessels, since the upperworks and rigging did not survive. It is from 
these remains that this thesis will evaluate the diagnostic attributes of vessels used on the Great 
Lakes and Lake Champlain from each of these three periods to attempt to determine shipbuilding 
developments influenced by the War of 1812 and how these affected shipbuilding after the war. 
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CHAPTER 2 : INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY OF GREAT LAKES SHIPBUILDING 
The Great Lakes – Ontario, Erie, Huron, Michigan, and Superior – form more than 
10,500 miles (17,000 km) of coastline that spans the United States of America and Canada and 
flows outward towards the Atlantic Ocean via the St. Lawrence River (Figure 2.1). Often 
referred to as the inland seas, the Great Lakes are the largest system of fresh water on earth. 
Samuel de Champlain, the first European to enter the Great Lakes in 1615 at Lake Huron via the 
Ottawa and French Rivers, at once realized the vast potential of this commercial avenue. The 
early development of commerce on the Lakes required that small vessels and goods be portaged 
around impassable rapids since many natural barriers originally prevented a continuous voyage 
from the Atlantic Ocean to the western end of Lake Superior (Grady 2007: 8-9, 21). The Lachine 
Rapids in the St. Lawrence River prevented navigation upstream from Montreal until the opening 
of the Lachine Canal in 1825 (Kelton 1888: 5); Niagara Falls obstructed sail travel to the upper 
lakes until the opening of the first Welland Canal in 1829 (Jackson 1997: 25); and the rapids of 
the St. Marys River, which prevented passage from Lake Michigan to Lake Superior, were 
finally passable with the opening of the Sault Locks in 1855 (Desloges and Gelly 2002: 22), 
completing a navigable waterway from the interior of the continent to the Atlantic Ocean. The 
aim of this chapter is to summarize the development of Great Lakes shipbuilding, since it is 
essential to understand the history in order to recognize how events influenced ship construction.
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The French first adopted the Native birchbark canoe as it was lightweight, making it 
easily portaged through the rugged wilderness yet maneuverable and stable for navigating 
turbulent white water in order to access the fur trade of the Northwest Territory. Two types of 
canoes that were larger in size than those used by Native Americans were employed by the 
coureurs des bois and voyageurs1, who travelled the interior of North America transporting furs. 
The canoe used on the route from the St. Lawrence River to the head of Lake Superior was the 
canot du maître, or Montreal canoe, which measured approximately 12 m long and carried a 
payload of about four tons. Ten to twelve paddlers crewed the canoe and it could easily be 
portaged by four men. The smaller canot du nord of about 7 m long with a crew of six to eight 
men was used in the west. Twenty canot du nord were required to carry the load of twelve canot 
du maître (Wheeler 1972: 284). While canoes remained the primary means of transportation of 
the fur trade, eventually more substantial vessels were required for transportation of men and 
supplies along the lakes as New France expanded westward. 
In 1675, the French under the command of Robert Cavalier, Sieur de La Salle established 
Fort Frontenac, the first fur trade depot on the Great Lakes. Strategically placed at Cataraqui 
(present day Kingston) the fort was located at the confluence of Lake Ontario with the Cataraqui 
and St. Lawrence Rivers. A shipyard was established and by 1677 shipwright Moïse Hillaret had 
constructed four barques pontées, or decked barques. These were the first European style vessels 
constructed on the Great Lakes. Two of these vessels were of 25 tons, one of 30 tons, and the 
largest named Le Frontenac was 40 tons. All four vessels were completed by August 1677, only 
20 months after their keels were first laid. These vessels carried trading goods and furs to and 
from the Iroquois villages around the lake and as far up the St. Lawrence River as Ogdensburg 
                                                 
1 By 1681, French authorities recognized the need to licence the fur trade. The voyageurs were those involved in the 
fur trade that held permits (congés) or were employed by a Montreal merchant who held one, while the coureurs des 
bois were unlicensed fur traders (Pilleul et al. 2008: 146). 
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where they met the canoe flotillas that carried goods to Montreal (Calnan 2002:196). Le 
Frontenac became the first historic Great Lakes shipwreck after it wrecked 8 January 1679, near 
Old Orchard Creek, 20-30 miles east of the Niagara River (Cruikshank 1926: 3). In 1679, 
Hillaret started construction on another barque of 60 tons, the well-known Le Griffon, on Lake 
Erie near Niagara Falls, New York. Le Griffon was lost somewhere on its return voyage to the 
Niagara River after dropping La Salle and his party at Green Bay to explore the head of Lake 
Michigan. The remaining barques at Fort Frontenac were burnt by the French in 1689 to prevent 
their use by the Iroquois when the fort was abandoned due to the escalating conflict during the 
French and Iroquois Wars (also called the Beaver Wars, 1642-1698) (Calnan 2002: 198-203). 
British sailing ships first appeared on the Great Lakes during the French and Indian War 
(referred to the Seven Years’ War in Canada, 1754–1763). In 1755, the British planned to attack 
Fort Niagara at the confluence of the Niagara River and Lake Ontario to interrupt the French 
supply line between the Great Lakes and the Ohio valley. To support the military, the British 
needed vessels on Lake Ontario, and the Admiralty requisitioned Commodore Augustus Keppel, 
“to cause proper Vessels to be built and fitted upon the Boarders of the Lake in the most frugal 
manner” (Admiralty to Keppel, 1754, in Malcomson 2001: 8). Keppel transported rigging, guns, 
and stores from his station in Virginia to Oswego for the construction of a 60 ton vessel. In 
spring of 1755, Keppel was supplied with two lieutenants to supervise construction, who arrived 
accompanied by Major General William Shirley’s army. As the governor of Massachusetts, 
Shirley obtained shipwrights from Atlantic seaports for the new shipyard at Oswego. In July, the 
first schooner, Oswego, entered the lake followed by the sloop Ontario in August. The following 
year, the British squadron on Lake Ontario increased with the launch of the sloop Mohawk, the 
brigantine London, and the snow Halifax (Malcomson 2001: 9-11). 
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 In 1759, the British finally captured Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario. With the fort, the 
British acquired two French vessels, which they renamed Mississauga and Farquhar. The British 
relocated their shipyard to this site to take advantage of the excellent harbor and large supply of 
oak in the surrounding forests. In the summer of 1759, Peter Jacquet, a shipwright from 
Pennsylvania, and a small crew arrived at the site to commence the construction program. They 
set to work quickly and launched the snow Mohawk in autumn 1759. In August 1760, Jacquet 
completed the second snow on the lake, Apollo, however, the name changed to Onondaga in an 
attempt to solidify the recently settled alliance with the local Native populations. These two 
vessels accompanied General Amherst’s army in the attack and capture of Fort Lévis on Île 
Royale in the St. Lawrence River later that year (Malcomson 2001: 17-20). After this attack, 
Amherst’s army continued on to Montreal in batteaux for the attack on Montreal and surrender 
of New France to the British on 9 September 1760. The French and Indian War formally ended 
10 February 1763 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris (Dale 2004: 76, 80). 
When the war ended in 1763 the British weakly held control of the upper lakes, while 
their vessels maintained complete command on Lakes Ontario and Champlain. The French and 
Indian War necessitated the construction of armed sloops, brigs, and snows, where previously 
there were only a small number of French transport vessels, bateaux, and canoes. In September 
1761, the British introduced a decree that limited the rights of the Native populations to trade 
only with licensed agents at assigned posts. The effectiveness of this policy depended upon 
increasing British presence in the region, as such the garrisons at Detroit and Mackinac were 
manned (Malcomson 2001: 20). As communication between these areas naturally depended upon 
water transportation, since interior roads were poorly developed, this policy necessitated the 
construction of vessels to provision these frontier bases on the upper lakes (Hitsman 1999: 104-
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106). Later, during the War of 1812, Lieutenant James Richardson of the Provincial Marine 
commented on the continued lack of overland access that “the importance of such services 
[Provincial Marine] in the then uninhabited state of the country, and the lack of land conveyance 
owing to the badness of the roads, must be obvious” (Malcomson 1997: 23).  
In March 1761, General Amherst planned to construct a shipyard above Niagara Falls. 
Lieutenant Charles Robertson arrived with John Dies on Lake Erie and selected Navy Island 
located above the falls on the Niagara River as the new location for the dockyard. Later that year 
Dies completed the schooner Huron, the first sailing vessel on the upper lakes since Le Griffon. 
The next year the sloop Michigan set sail on the lake. The British attempted to establish a regular 
sail up the St. Clair River to Lake Huron in 1763 to provision the frontier posts, but encountered 
problems caused by the uprising of Native populations led by Pontiac (Malcomson 2001: 20-21).  
The American Revolutionary War (1775-1783) forced the British to improve their vessels 
to protect their Canadian Colonies, since their forces had been greatly reduced during peaceful 
times. Few British government vessels sailed the lakes during the period between 1763-1775. In 
1767 the British repaired and maintained only four vessels in the northern theater controlled by 
John Blackburn, an army contractor. These were the Musquelongy on Lake Champlain, the 
Brunswick on Lake Ontario, the Charlotte on Lake Erie, and the Gladwin on Lake Huron. The 
rest of the vessels constructed for combat during the French and Indian War rotted at their 
moorings. In the early 1770s, the British constructed a handful of vessels in the dockyards at Fort 
Niagara, Oswegatchie, on the St. Lawrence River, and Detroit, which the British preferred to 
Navy Island for its proximity to Lakes Erie and Huron (Malcomson 2001: 23-24). These vessels 
served principally as transports along the Great Lakes and were not equipped for war. In 1773, 
the commander of the General Gage on Lake Erie bemoaned that vessel’s “defenceless state 
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having on board only eight useless Muskets without Pistol, Sword or pike and only about two 
pounds of Powder, for the carriage guns” (Andrews to Basset, 17 June 1773 in Malcomson 2001: 
24). 
The state of the British forces on the Great Lakes changed in late August 1776, when 
Major General Sir Guy Carleton took control of operations. He banned the use of private decked 
vessels on the lakes. To avoid restricting commerce, he instructed his commanders to transport 
private shipping in government vessels. This limited the movement of goods to military depots 
as these were the destinations of the naval vessels. Merchants were then required to ship any 
goods intended for purely civilian destinations by bateaux or Durham boat. These 
accommodations resulted in complaints from captains since they were “having extraordinary 
trouble in carrying Merchandise, and [were] almost always crowded with Passengers, of 
Merchants, traders, Clerks, and others not employed in His Majesty’s Services” (Memo by 
Carleton, 21 October 1777 in Malcomson 2001: 26). Carleton also hired private craft, which then 
became the King’s ships, to transport supplies to the British garrisons on the frontier 
(Malcomson 2001: 25). Carleton’s improvements were intended to prepare the British force on 
the Great Lakes for war, although no consequential events took place in that arena (Douglas 
1979: 4). Consequently, little shipbuilding took place (Malcomson 2001: 37).  
In order to prepare the frontier for a spillover of hostilities from the American 
Revolution, Carleton appointed Lieutenant John Schank2 in 1778 to manage the various naval 
bases of the lakes. He received the title Commissioner of all His Majesty’s Naval Yards or 
Docks upon the Lakes. As Schank believed that the naval force on the lakes should be an 
autonomous unit, Carleton had him transferred from the Royal Navy and posted under his 
                                                 
2 John Schank, introduced the sliding or drop keel to the Admiralty in 1791. It was a centreboard that could be raised 
in shallow water under oars, or when sailing before the wind. In deeper water it could be dropped to make the vessel 
weatherly when sailing to windward (Woodman 2002: 128). 
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command at Quebec. This creation of an independent naval authority represented the birth of the 
Provincial Marine. Schank was only in command for a few months before Carleton resigned in 
and Sir Frederick Haldimand replaced him June 1778. Haldimand promoted the restructuring of 
the naval force on the lakes and created three separate divisions: Lake Champlain, commanded 
by Lieutenant William Chambers; Lake Ontario under Master and Commander James Andrews; 
and, Lake Erie and the upper lakes commanded by Lieutenant Alexander Grant. Each division 
reported to the senior military officer of the region, with final control retained by Schank at the 
Quartermaster General’s Department at Quebec (Malcomson 2001: 36). 
Schank modeled his reforms of the lakes’ naval department upon the Royal Navy 
(Douglas 1979: 5). One of the largest changes was the relocation of the shipyard at Oswegatchie 
closer to the opening of Lake Ontario. Haldimand selected the location of Cataraqui, where Lake 
Ontario meets the St. Lawrence River. In 1778, Haldimand sent Schank with a small force to 
prepare the site. On their way to Cataraqui, the detachment visited Buck Island, located ten miles 
southeast of Cataraqui in the middle of the St. Lawrence River (Malcomson 2001: 37). Upon 
touring the island it was determined that this was not the island that the French called Isle aux 
Chevreuiles (Buck Island) and, to avoid confusion, the British changed the name to Carleton 
Island (Lt William Twiss, R.E. to Haldimand, 17 August 1778, in Preston 1959: 6). Schank 
determined that this island presented a much better location for the construction of a dockyard. 
Among the advantages were deep well sheltered harbors and plenty of good timber unlike 
Cataraqui Bay which could not accommodate large vessels and timber needed to be transported 
to the site from other locations (Preston 1959: 7-8). The construction of a large garrison on the 
island acted as an impediment for American plans to build a base at Oswego and attack the 
British (Malcomson 2001: 37).  
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During this period, the Provincial Marine consisted chiefly of British personnel. Most of 
the shipwrights and laborers employed at the bases spread across the inland waterways arrived 
from British dockyards, and by 1783 there were over 300 seamen from Royal Navy vessels 
serving on the lakes. Although the crews were well qualified, none of the officers under 
Schank’s command were professional naval seamen (Douglas 1979: 5-6). Naval records from 
1779 indicate a total of 171 officers and men employed on Lake Ontario and 118 men at Detroit 
(Library and Archives Canada [LAC] 1779: RG 8, 722a: 32, 34). Along with the Royal Navy 
seamen employed were many French Canadians. In 1777, the snow Seneca had an entirely 
French Canadian crew under Captain Jean-Baptiste Bouchette (Malcomson 2001: 37). 
In 1782, preliminary peace terms with the newly formed United States prompted the 
reduction of the naval force in anticipation of the war’s end. Slightly more than half, 266 of 468, 
of the officers and men stationed on the lakes were discharged. Three vessels remained in service 
on both Lake Ontario and the upper lakes. The 1783 Treaty of Paris determined the boundary 
between the United States and British North America which extended through the middle of 
Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario and partially along the St. Lawrence River (Malcomson 2001: 
39). Haldimand feared that Carleton Island would fall into American territory and had the site of 
Cataraqui resurveyed for consideration as the future location of the Provincial Marine on Lake 
Ontario. Major John Ross of the 34th Regiment of Foot conducted this survey and notified 
Haldimand that he had “surveyed the Harbour in Haldimand Bay, where there is Water 
sufficient: Point Frederick being subjected to an Advantageous Canonade from the West Side of 
Cataraqui Harbour, may I then take the liberty to say (altho [sic] no Town can be placed here 
secure from Bombardment) that the Land or East Side of Haldimand Cove is preferable for a 
Town” (Ross to Haldimand, 3 September 1783, in Preston 1959: 34). After this, the garrisons at 
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Oswego and Oswegatchie, now in American territory, moved to Cataraqui, while the Provincial 
Marine headquarters remained at Carleton Island. During the summer of 1783, some of the first 
United Empire Loyalists settled on the west bank of the Cataraqui River. Schank left his 
command in North America in 1784, and the entire command of the Provincial Marine fell to the 
Quartermaster General’s Office in Quebec. At this time the Provincial Marine consisted of fewer 
than 100 individuals and its sole function was that of transporting provisions along the lakes. 
More vessels remained on the lake than during the reductions witnessed after the French and 
Indian War only because of the increase in population caused by the flood of United Empire 
Loyalists leaving the new American republic (Malcomson 2001: 38-39).  
The end of the American Revolution in 1781 brought economic depression, and many 
merchants in the growing settlements along the lakes went bankrupt. Those who remained in 
business requested the government to lift the ban of 1777 that restricted private vessels upon the 
lakes. While the limitation of private vessels along the lake was beneficial during the war (as it 
checked contraband trade and limited espionage), during times of peace it was devastating, 
requiring the King’s ships to carry merchandise for private individuals. The lack of merchant 
vessels resulted in a pile up of goods in Kingston warehouses that had been transshipped from 
Montreal and food rotted on Cartwright’s quay since the King’s ships, with their strict schedules 
and policy of safety first, were unable to handle the traffic (Roy 1952: 41). In response to this 
and the uproar raised by merchants, the Inland Navigation Act was established in 1788. This act 
lessened the transport duties of the Provincial Marine, as more private vessels now plied the 
lakes. As private individuals and companies were now allowed to build their own vessels, 
although with some restrictions, the problem of the bottleneck at the warehouses was effectively 
solved. This act required the creation of supervision districts, the establishment of ports of entry 
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and Customs houses, vessel registration, clearance papers and dues. The main ports of Upper 
Canada were the garrison towns of Kingston and Niagara and the provincial capital York 
(present day Toronto) (Cain 1983: 24).  
In 1788, there was only one registered merchant vessel of 15 tons on Lake Ontario, the 
Good Intent (Cruikshank 1926: 6). The following year, Lady Dorchester, of approximately 90 
tons, was launched at Kingston (Roy 1952: 41). Amongst the first merchant vessels constructed 
on Lake Ontario was York, a 66 ton schooner built in 1794 at the mouth of the Niagara River for 
merchant Francis Crooks. Around the same time, two smaller vessels were built at Niagara, 
Genesee and Polly. Shipbuilding on Lake Ontario quickly expanded, and the eastern end of the 
lake near Kingston was the forerunner in maritime development, where larger vessels such as the 
Governor Simcoe of 137 tons were constructed (Cain 1983: 26). Artist George Heriot observed 
that “the rapid advancement of the country in population and improvements of every description 
have proportionately extended the commerce; the number of vessels in the employ of merchants 
is considerable.” He further stated that “the timber used for their construction is red cedar or 
oak” (Heriot 1807: 132).  
Navigation was primarily pilotage, as Deputy Surveyor-General John Collins noted in a 
letter to Lord Dorchester in 1788 that “vessels sailing on these waters being seldom for any 
length of time out of sight of land, the navigation must be considered chiefly as pilotage to which 
the use of good natural charts is essential, and therefore much wanted” (Ross to Lord Dorchester, 
1788, in Robertson 1896: 821). As such, Collins recommended the best rig as fore-and-aft, and 
this schooner rig became common on the lake for the next century and a half. Great Lakes 
vessels were also characterized by the great amount of sail carried since the lakes are typically a 
light air region during the navigable season. However, carrying a lot of sail could be dangerous 
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as the Lakes are also subject to sudden, fierce storms (Cain 1983: 24-25). This was not improved 
by the fact that sailors on the lakes were usually inexperienced. In 1792, Elizabeth Simcoe, wife 
of John Graves Simcoe, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, noted that “the men who 
navigate the Ships on this Lake have little nautical knowledge and never keep a logbook. This 
afternoon we were near aground” (Innis 1965: 74). 
The trading activities on the northern shore of Lake Ontario after the American 
Revolution remained unchanged from previous times in that  furs and supplies for the British 
Army were the primary goods shipped. As populations increased along the shore, however still 
small and widely dispersed, settlers’ produce, such as potash, salt, salt-meat, and wheat, were 
traded with more frequency. The population of York in 1801, the year it was designated a 
Customs port, was 336. By 1809, the population had grown to 577. Kingston was the most 
important community along the eastern end of the lake, which acted as a transshipment point 
between Lake Ontario and Montreal. In 1792, there were approximately fifty houses in Kingston, 
three years later, there were about 130 houses (Cain 1983: 28).  
John Graves Simcoe noted that the construction of these merchant vessels was excellent. 
At the same time, he was shocked when he visited the government yards by their clumsy and top 
heavy construction and the use of green wood, which caused them to only last a few years before 
their need of replacement (Roy 1952: 41). In the late 1780s and early 1790s, the Provincial 
Marine constructed new vessels upon the lakes, many of which replaced the older vessels built 
before or during the American Revolution. By 1793, nine Provincial Marine vessels sailed the 
lakes: the Maria and Royal Edward on Lake Champlain; the Onondaga, Mississauga3 and 
Caldwell on Lake Ontario; and the Ottawa, Dunmore, Chippewa, and Felicity on Lakes Erie and 
Huron (LAC 1793: MG 11, CO 42/97: 170). 
                                                 
3 The Onondaga and Mississauga were both the second vessels to sail Lake Ontario with those names. 
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In 1789, the Provincial Marine offices and dockyard on Lake Ontario moved from 
Carleton Island, now located in disputed British and American territory, to Point Frederick, 
across the bay from the town of Kingston (Malcomson 2001: 42). Cataraqui became Kingstown 
in 1788, but the name Kingston was already in use later that year. The earliest court records 
referring to Kingston date from March and April 1789 (Preston 1959: lviii). Upon arrival in 
Kingston, the Provincial Marine immediately constructed a wharf and storehouses upon the 
peninsula of Point Frederick and anchored ships east of the town in Haldimand Cove, later Navy 
Bay. Between the establishment of the dockyard and 1807, seven vessels were launched at 
Kingston: the cutter Mohawk, the gunboats Catherine and Sophia, the schooners Swift and 
Speedy, the snow Duke of Kent, and the ship Earl of Moira (Malcomson 2001: 42, 45). 
In the 1790s, the boundary between the United States and the British Territories was 
finally imposed. With Jay’s Treaty of 1795, the British withdrew from the posts they occupied in 
the Northwest Territory of the United States. This caused the dockyard on Lake Erie to move 
from Detroit to the future site of Amherstburg at the mouth of the Detroit River in 1796. Before 
this move took place, the British had already considered relocating the dockyard at Detroit. In 
1794, Simcoe proposed the location of Chatham on the Thames River, which drained into Lake 
St. Clair. The assistant Master Builder at Detroit, William Baker, traveled to the proposed site to 
begin construction. The dockyard at Chatham, however, soon fell to disuse as the British 
determined a dockyard at the mouth of the Detroit River would be more beneficial (Garcia 
accessed 2000).  
In 1796, the British moved downstream to Amherstburg. The need to supply the vessels 
on the upper lakes designated the construction of the marine facilities of prime importance. In 
1799, shipwright William Bell arrived at Amherstburg (Garcia accessed 2000). In 1803, the 
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vessels that had been constructed at Detroit were condemned. These were the snows Ottawa and 
Chippewa, the sloop Francis, and the schooner Maria. By 1807, Bell had produced three vessels: 
the snow Earl of Camden, the schooner General Hope, and the schooner General Hunter that 
was later rigged as a brig (Malcomson 2001: 45). 
The year of 1807 marked a significant development in Great Lakes ship construction with 
the introduction of the centerboard schooner (Van Gemert 1972: 290). A centerboard is a 
moveable plank assembly that is contained within a watertight case near the centerline of the 
vessel that can be raised or lowered to allow for more lateral resistance to the water. The 
advantage of the centerboard was better control tacking in open water when lowered, but the 
ability to raise it permitted a shallow draft for entering port. By 1807, private merchant fleets 
dominated traffic on the Great Lakes. Approximately a dozen vessels operated on Lake Ontario 
and a few more on Lake Erie and the upper lakes. While the innovation of the centerboard would 
in time improve trade along the lakes, early century commerce became impeded by international 
events. In response to the British and French sanctions restricting American trade during the 
Napoleonic War, President Thomas Jefferson introduced the Embargo Act in 1807, prohibiting 
trade with these foreign powers. Instead of hurting British trade as this act intended, it created an 
economic collapse in the United States and encouraged the smuggling of exports to the British 
North American Territories (Cooper 1809: 32). By 1810, there were approximately 11 vessels 
under 90 tons involved in trade on Lake Ontario (Cain 1985: 5). This illegal trade created 
hostilities between the United States and Britain, almost erupting in war several times. These 
tensions caused both sides to launch warships upon the Great Lakes in anticipation of a conflict 
(Malcomson 2001: 54-55). 
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By 1808, war seemed an immediate threat as American military detachments arrived in 
Oswego and on Lake Champlain. Concerning the amassing of troops along the border, Richard 
Cartwright, a Kingston merchant, noted that “the ostensible object of all this, is more effectually 
to enforce the Embargo; but the vessel building at Oswegatchie is to carry eighteen guns besides 
a twenty-four Pounder in the Bow is much less adapted to this service than Armed Boats would 
be” (Cartwright to Gore, 5 November 1808 in Preston 1959: 261). To oppose the Americans’ 
naval threat, the British had a weak force: Earl of Moira, Duke of Gloucester, and Duke of Kent 
sailed on Lake Ontario. The latter was badly decayed. On Lake Erie, General Hunter and Earl of 
Camden lacked armament, however, when guns were eventually found for these vessels, Earl of 
Camden could not bear the weight of the heavy cannon due to its bad state of disrepair. Sir James 
Craig, governor-in-chief of British North America at the time, ordered the construction of one 
more vessel on Lakes Ontario and Erie (Malcomson 2001: 57). These were to be designed 
strictly as warships, and Craig suggested that a railing should continue “the whole length and 
breadth and fitted up strong for the reception of Guns when needfull [sic]” (Douglas 1979: 10). 
The assistant to the Quartermaster, General Captain William Robe, recommended that the ships 
should be fitted out with carronades instead of long guns, since these weighed much less and it 
was believed that long range guns were unlikely to be used on the Great Lakes (Douglas 1979: 
10). 
At Kingston, shipwright John Dennis directed a crew of fourty-three laborers in the 
construction of the new vessel. On 21 February 1809, construction began on the ship-corvette 
Royal George. This vessel marked a change in British ship design on the Great Lakes as it had a 
sharper hull than other ships operating on the lake at the time, ports for twenty 18 or 24 pounder 
carronades, and confined spaces for the officers to berth. This vessel was did not sail the lake 
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upon its launch, since Jefferson’s 1807 embargo was revoked in spring 1809 reducing tensions 
along the border. At this time, the Provincial Marine had in service the Earl of Moira and Duke 
of Gloucester on Lake Ontario, while the new ship-corvette remained in ordinary (Malcomson 
2001: 57-58). 
While Dennis completed Royal George in Kingston, Bell began construction of the vessel 
ordered by Craig at Amherstburg. Construction of the ship Queen Charlotte was delayed due to 
the shortage of supplies and shipwrights at the Lake Erie dockyard. Bell ordered supplies and 
materials to construct “a large stout Corvette Brig to carry sixteen guns upon one Deck with 
good quarters for the men…built exclusively for fighting and sailing and the navigation of Lake 
Erie, having at the same time as much accommodation as possible for the conveyance of Troops” 
(Kempt 1809). With the easing of hostilities across the border in 1809, Craig nevertheless 
ordered construction on the vessel to continue and it was completed in late 1810 (Malcomson 
2001: 58). This vessel also represented a change in Great Lakes shipbuilding, as it was a three 
masted, square rigged ship with full bulwarks able to carry sixteen cannon. This was a warship 
that could still act as a transport vessel (Garcia accessed 2000). With the launch of the Queen 
Charlotte, the badly deteriorated Earl of Camden was withdrawn from active duty. This meant 
that the General Hunter was now the only vessel with a shallow enough draft to sail up the St. 
Clair River to the upper lakes (Malcomson 2001: 58). Queen Charlotte was the largest vessel on 
Lake Erie until the launch of the Detroit at Amherstburg in 1813 (Garcia accessed 2000). The 
Provincial Marine for the first time had two vessels whose primary purpose was naval: the 
Queen Charlotte on Lake Erie and the Royal George on Lake Ontario. 
In 1811, relations between the United States and Britain worsened. Fears concerning the 
ensuing war led Colonel Alleyne Hampden Pye, Deputy Quartermaster General, to make several 
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suggestions as to the improvement of the Provincial Marine. His report on the state of the 
Provincial Marine listed a combined force of seven vessels on both lakes. Four vessels were in 
commission on Lake Ontario: the snow Duke of Kent, which was “incapable of repair” and used 
as a barrack during the winter; the ships Earl of Moira and Royal George; and the schooner Duke 
of Gloucester. The last vessel was in the best state of repair and most useful (Pye, Report on the 
Provincial Marine of the Canadas in Wood 1920: 242). Three vessels were in service on Lake 
Erie: the schooner General Hunter and the ships Camden and Queen Charlotte. Only the first 
was truly serviceable, while the Queen Charlotte was new but limited to the lake proper on 
account of its great draft, and Camden was so rotten that it could not even be used as winter 
lodgings. Pye recommended the construction of “schooners from 120 to 160 Tons burthen built 
on the corvette plan and calculated when armed to carry 10 to 14 guns and not exceed nine and a 
half feet of water,” believing that “vessels of that class would answer both the purposes of 
Transport or War” (Wood 1920: 241). Although the British now began to outfit a freshwater 
naval fleet, the mentality of the Provincial Marine remained that of a transport service first. The 
decades of mismanagement and languid transport duty it served on the lakes hindered British 
attempts for the timely creation of a naval force in preparation for war.  
Relations between the United States and Britain finally culminated in the outbreak of war 
on 18 June 1812. From the outset of the war, both the Americans and British realized that the 
upper hand in the conflict depended upon control of the Great Lakes. In January 1812, John 
Armstrong, former American ambassador to France, advised William Eustis in his preparations 
of the United States Army that, “resting, as the line of Canadian defence does, in its whole extent 
on navigable lakes and rivers, no time should be lost in getting a naval ascendancy on both 
for…the belligerent who is the first to obtain this advantage will (miracles excepted) win the 
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game” (Armstrong to Eustis, 2 January 1812, in Malcomson 1998: 16). Although the Provincial 
Marine was not equipped as a naval service prior to the war, its superior numbers allowed the 
British to command the lakes at the start of the 1812 sailing season. The original strategy 
outlined by Governor-in-Chief Sir George Prevost was of non-aggressive defense, in the hopes 
of not inciting anti-British feelings in case peace could still be negotiated. For this reason, the 
Provincial Marine did not initially exploit its command of the Great Lakes to organize attacks on 
the United States, but remained a transport service (Malcomson 2001: 61-63).  
When the United States entered the war, its navy consisted of seventeen vessels, only one 
of which operated on the Great Lakes, the brig Oneida (Hamilton to the Navy Department, 3 
December 1811, in Dudley 1985: 56). The United States Army controlled the sole armed vessel 
on Lake Erie, Adams. Similar to vessels in the Provincial Marine, this brig was primarily 
employed in transporting cargo to frontier ports and was crewed by the 2nd U.S. Infantry 
Regiment rather than skilled sailors. After the Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton received 
exaggerated news about the strength of the British fleet, he initiated procedures to improve the 
American position. In a letter to Lieutenant Melancthon Woolsey, the navy official in command 
of the Great Lakes, Hamilton ordered improvements to the base at Sackets Harbor in autumn 
1811. Woolsey opened an enlistment office and built new barracks to house the recruits. By the 
end of the year, Oneida was only short twenty-one crew members. In November 1811, President 
James Madison addressed to Congress the need to improve the navy and military in preparation 
for war, however, unwilling to raise taxes, the only finances allotted to the navy went towards 
fitting out three existing frigates on the Atlantic and nothing was done to improve the defenses 
on the Great Lakes (Malcomson 2001: 54-60). 
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Although the American government was unenthusiastic to support the preparations for 
the war effort along the northern frontier, Woolsey slightly improved his force in June of 1812. 
On 5 June, sailing the Oneida from Sackets Harbor, Woolsey captured the British merchant 
vessel Lord Nelson on the suspicion of smuggling goods from the United States to Upper 
Canada. In late June, the Americans confiscated the schooner Julia for similar reasons. After the 
declaration of war, Woolsey fitted the two captured schooners with cannon for service on Lake 
Ontario (Malcomson 2001: 62). Although Woolsey attempted to enhance his squadron in 
preparation for the ensuing conflict, the American navy entered the war with the disadvantage of 
a much smaller fleet, thereby relinquishing all hopes of gaining command on the lakes. 
Only after the first invasion of Upper Canada and the capture of Sandwich (present day 
Windsor, Ontario) on 12 July 1812 was the Provincial Marine employed as a naval power. 
Shortly after the American retreat caused by their supply line being cut by the British, Major-
General Sir Isaac Brock arrived at Fort Malden, Amherstburg, on 13 August, with 
reinforcements of 50 regulars and 250 militia. Through American dispatches that were captured 
by the native force that had attacked the supply train, Brock learned that American Brigadier 
General William Hull’s position at Detroit was vulnerable without reinforcements from 
Kentucky and Ohio. Consequently, Brock immediately planned for an attack on Detroit, 
abandoning the previous defensive strategy set out by Prevost. On 16 August, Brock’s force 
crossed the river under the cover of guns from Queen Charlotte and General Hunter. This was 
the first naval action that the Provincial Marine completed during the War of 1812. Hull 
surrendered his position when the shore battery at Sandwich found the correct range, firing an 
18-pound shell into the officers’ mess, killing four people. The Ohio militia were paroled to their 
homes, but Hull and 582 regulars marched to imprisonment at Quebec City. The only American 
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brig on Lake Erie, Adams, was also surrendered to the British, who fittingly renamed it Detroit 
(Hitsman 1999: 78-82). 
Awakened by this event, the American government realized changes were required to 
overcome the British forces in North America. President Madison received the news of the 
defeat on 28 August. The next day he organized a meeting with his cabinet officials. This 
meeting determined two things: an army would be dispatched to retake Detroit and a naval 
squadron would be created to gain control on the Great Lakes. Isaac Chauncey, commandant of 
the navy yard at New York, received the command of building the force on the Great Lakes 
(Malcomson 1998: 38). Chauncey’s official orders from Secretary of the Navy Hamilton stated 
that he was “at liberty to purchase, hire or build” (emphasis original) whatever necessary to 
obtain supremacy on the lakes (Hamilton to Commodore Isaac Chauncey, 31 August 1812, in 
Dudley 1985: 297). 
Chauncey readily accepted the staggering assignment of fashioning a fleet from the 
negligible force that already existed on the lakes. Upon receiving his post, Chauncey 
communicated three objectives to Lieutenant Woolsey: to acquire any available merchant vessels 
for conversion into gunboats; to select a construction site for a 300-ton vessel at Sackets Harbor; 
and to build barracks for 400 men (Malcomson 2001: 65). On 5 September, Chauncey ordered 
forty shipwrights to that location for the purpose of converting merchant vessels into warships 
and to build new vessels (Chauncey to Hamilton, 26 September 1812, in Dudley 1985: 316). 
Shortly after, another party of one hundred shipwrights arrived under the direction of Henry 
Eckford, a shipwright and friend of Chauncey from New York. In addition to the 300-ton vessel 
Madison constructed on Lake Ontario were plans for three gunboats. A naval base on Lake Erie 
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was also organized at Black Rock commanded by Lieutenant Jesse Elliot, where there were plans 
for two 300-ton vessels and three gunboats (Malcomson 1998: 43, 47). 
Within the following weeks, the naval base at Sackets Harbor began to take shape as men 
and supplies arrived. Everything that arrived at this site was to be divided equally between Lakes 
Ontario and Erie (Malcomson 1998: 47). Dispatched to the Great Lakes were 600 naval officers 
and seamen along with 100 U.S. Marines (Malcomson 2001: 65). Over 100 pieces of ordnance 
ranging in size from 32-pounder long guns to 12-pounder carronades arrived at Sackets Harbor 
along with the equipment, shot, and powder necessary for firing the guns. All the supplies 
required to build and outfit a fleet of ships also needed to be shipped to the Great Lakes, 
including sails, rigging, blocks, cables and anchors. Only food supplies did not need to be 
transported, as Woolsey made arrangements to obtain enough provisions for all the troops. All 
supplies were transported north along the Hudson River to Albany, and then carted to 
Schenectady, where the cargo was transported west by riverboat along the Mohawk River to 
Rome. At Rome a canal allowed transport to Lake Oneida and up the Oswego River. From 
Oswego supplies were shipped along the shore of Lake Ontario to Sackets Harbor. Low water 
levels in the canal often delayed the transportation of supplies, requiring them to be carted 
overland from Rome (Malcomson 1998: 45-46). 
On 6 October, Chauncey arrived at Sackets Harbor. In addition to Lord Nelson and Julia, 
Woolsey had acquired the schooners Genessee-Packet, Collector, and Experiment, which were 
being prepared for service. The U.S. Navy was unable to procure merchant vessels on Lake Erie, 
limiting the force on that lake to the two planned brigs. Although meeting the enemy on Lake 
Ontario that season remained a possibility, this was not the case on Lake Erie. Since supplies 
could not be transported to Black Rock overland at that time of the year, Chauncey directly 
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stated to Hamilton that “we could not arm our vessels upon lake Erie, before winter, even if they 
were ready” (Chauncey to Hamilton, 8 October 1812, in Dudley 1985: 337). 
Although the early British victories of the war depended upon the aid of the Provincial 
Marine, by November 1812, the general public believed that this force was “worse than nothing” 
(John Strachan to McGill, November 1812, in Spragge 1946: 28). British citizens expected that 
with the outbreak of war, the Provincial Marine would suddenly perform like the Royal Navy 
rather than the transport service that it was. Opinions of the inefficiency of the Provincial Marine 
were fostered by the fact that the industrious Americans constructed an entire fleet to capture the 
command of Lake Ontario by the end of the 1812 sailing season. American command of the lake 
was solidified on 10 November, when Oneida and six converted merchant vessels chased the 
Provincial Marine flagship Royal George into Kingston harbor, nearly capturing the vessel. 
Subsequently, the commercial vessel Governor Simcoe eluded Commodore Chauncey on its way 
to Kingston on 11 November. The following day, the Provincial Marine ship Earl of Moira also 
slipped into Kingston harbor (Malcomson 2001: 68). Chauncey maintained a blockade of 
Kingston, effectively cutting off supply lines to York and other western positions. Chauncey 
noted that “we have now the command of The Lake and that we can transport Troops and Stores 
to any part of it without any risk of an attack from the Enemy” (Chauncey to Hamilton, 13 
November 1812, in Dudley 1985: 346). Chauncey’s control of the lake was guaranteed for the 
1813 season with the launch of Madison on 26 November 1812. This corvette was bigger and 
stronger than the British Royal George (Malcomson 1998: 56). On the north shore of the lake, 
there was great concern over Chauncey’s efficient reform of the U.S. Navy; consequently, the 
British began devising their own improvements for 1813. 
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The assessments of Captain Andrew Gray of the Provincial Marine in December 1812 led 
to recommendations for several improvements to Prevost (Malcomson 1998: 59). Gray was 
appalled by the deficiency he uncovered within the Provincial Marine and found the officers 
“destitute of all energy and spirit and are sunk into contempt in the eyes of all who know them.” 
Furthermore, he stated that “the want of seamen is so great that the Royal George has only 
seventeen men on board who are capable of doing their duty and the Moira ten” (Gray to 
Prevost, 3 and 11 December 1812, in Cruikshank 1916: 167). Gray suggested that attempts be 
made to match the building program at Sackets Harbor. He proposed construction of a ship of 
thirty 32pd. carronades at York, and one vessels of the class of the Royal George built at each 
Kingston and Amherstburg (Cruikshank 1916: 169). Prevost accepted Gray’s proposition and 
began assigning shipwrights to all three locations, unfortunately not realizing the difficulties that 
would arise by not focusing on maintaining only one shipyard on each lake. Moreover, Prevost 
thought to introduce new ship building ideas to the Great Lakes, hiring builders from Lower 
Canada rather than using John Dennis, the Provincial Marine shipwright for the past decade, who 
was acutely familiar with local materials and personnel. Thomas Plucknett from Quebec City 
was assigned to York, but designed the vessels at both locations, and James Morrison from 
Montreal was to supervise in Kingston (Malcomson 2001: 70).  
Problems arose at both shipyards on Lake Ontario, hindering the development of the 
fleet. In Kingston, Morrison was soon fired, due to incompetence, and Daniel Allen, the foreman 
of the yard was promoted to the master shipwright. After encouraging the shipwrights to strike 
one month into his new role Allan was replaced by George Record. Nevertheless, by March, the 
vessel was nearly complete, Earl of Moira was repaired and overhauled from a ship to a brig, 
and Governor Simcoe refitted from a merchant vessel to a warship (Malcomson 2001: 70). At 
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York, construction of the new vessel progressed at a much slower rate, as Plucknett refused to 
build at the site Gray had selected. After consultation with Major-General Roger Hale Sheaffe, 
who took command after Brock’s death at the Battle of Queenston Heights, Plucknett was able to 
continue at a site of his own choosing. The vessel at York, Sir Isaac Brock, named to honor the 
deceased general, had only eleven planks on one side by April, and Gray admitted that “as 
matters now stand it is very doubtful when [Brock] will be ready” (Gray 1813 in Malcomson 
2001: 73).  
Although improvements were made to the British forces on the Great Lakes during the 
winter, the fleet still lacked in ships, crew, and proper organization. The harsh criticisms that the 
Provincial Marine received led Prevost to denounce this force to his superior in Britain, Henry 
Bathurst, the secretary for war and the colonies, stating that the “officers are deficient in 
experience and particularly in the energetic spirit which distinguishes British seamen.” He 
requested replacements of “tried officers of the rank of lieutenants and trusty men from the 
Royal Navy” (Prevost 1812 LAC MG 11, CO42/147: 215). Bathurst responded by detaching 200 
seamen and officers from the Royal Navy (Malcomson 1998: 62). Commander Robert Barclay 
and the rest of the reinforcements arrived in May of 1813 to take command of the lake. The 
arrival of the Royal Navy to command on the Great Lakes displaced the officers of the Provincial 
Marine. Prevost had guaranteed that the officers would “be suitably provided for without 
dimunition [sic] of their salaries” (Baynes 1813 LAC RG8, I, 1170: 177). Nevertheless, all but 
three officers quit the service, as Barclay commented that they appeared “to feel the loss of their 
commands more sensibly than was expected” (Barclay 1813 LAC RG8, I, 729: 83).  
Barclay was to assess the situation before the arrival of Sir James Lucas Yeo, who would 
take over complete control of the lakes squadron, while Barclay was reassigned to command on 
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Lake Erie (Malcomson 1998: 112). Barclay was not distressed by the situation that he 
encountered on Lake Ontario, reporting to Captain Noah Freer that “the Ships are I think as fine 
vessels of their kind as I have ever seen. The Moira is small, it is true, but she is by no means so 
despicable as was represented” (Barclay 1813 LAC RG8, I, 729: 183). Prior to Barclay’s arrival, 
the small squadron was enhanced with the launch of the Sir George Prevost on 28 April 1813, 
which was larger than the Royal George. It was shortly renamed Wolfe by request of the modest 
governor-in-chief (Malcomson 2001: 76). Not all the Royal Navy officers agreed with Barclay’s 
optimistic view of the Provincial Marine. Midshipman David Wingfield believed that the vessels 
on the lakes were “in such a wretched state with regard to discipline and furniture, that they 
would have reflected disgrace upon a maritime power of the third grade.” He further stated that 
the squadron was “officered and manned by provincials, men of no experience whatever in naval 
tactics” (Wingfield 1813 in MAlcomson 2001: 77). 
Barclay’s inspection identified the lack of many supplies that were needed to maintain a 
fleet, including cables; various sizes of rope; compasses; more than 5,500 yards of canvas; white, 
black and yellow paint; and pitch and tar. He recommended the construction of between six and 
ten gunboats and also believed that there was enough wood stored at Kingston to build a ship to 
replace the one burned at York after the American attack on 27 April 1813 (Malcomson 1998: 
114). 
Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo arrived in Kingston on 15 May to take control of the 
Lake Ontario fleet from Barclay. With him arrived 465 Royal Navy officers, far too many to take 
command of the few vessels on the Great Lakes (Malcomson 2001: 77). Prevost, however, was 
confident that “this most seasonable reinforcement will I hope enable us to regain an ascendancy 
on Lake Ontario” (Prevost 1813 LAC RG8, I, 678: 216). With Yeo’s arrival, Barclay relocated to 
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Lake Erie on 20 May to organize the Provincial Marine squadron along with three lieutenants, a 
surgeon, a purser, a master’s mate, and nineteen seamen (Malcomson 1998: 122). Building upon 
the reorganization begun by Barclay, Yeo continued to prepare the fleet at Kingston for an 
encounter with the Americans.  
On the Niagara Peninsula, the presence of the British and American military forces 
remained in a standoff. Both Yeo and Chauncey were requested by their respective superiors to 
seek a battle to resolve the question of command on Lake Ontario (Malcomson 2001: 81). At 
4:30 a.m. on 7 August 1813, the British force sailed into view of the Americans anchored at Four 
Mile Creek, east of the Niagara River. The American fleet consisted of the General Pike, 
Madison, Oneida, Governor Tompkins, Conquest, Ontario, Fair American, Asp, Pert, Hamilton, 
Scourge, Julia, and Growler. The British squadron consisted of the Wolfe, Royal George, Earl of 
Moira, Lord Melville, Lord Beresford, and Sir Sidney Smith (Malcomson 1998: 168-169). Not 
only did the Americans have the advantage of more vessels, they were able to commence battle 
at a further distance with their long guns, as the British preferred the short carronades. This 
forced Yeo to maneuver close to Chauncey’s squadron in order to balance the contest 
(Malcomson 2001: 82). Midshipman Wingfield commented that “the object of Sir James [Yeo] 
was to engage them at close quarters and board, which would, in all human probability, have 
insured success” (Wingfield 1813-1816 LAC MG 24, F18: 16). Chauncey, however, attempted 
to maintain his advantage by keeping the distance.  
Another significant difference that existed between the two fleets related to their sailing 
abilities. Noted by both parties was the superiority of the British vessels. Arthur Sinclair of the 
U.S. Navy commented that Yeo was “a judicious cautious and skillful commander,” and that the 
British fleet consisted of “six regular built vessels of war, all sailing alike and able to support 
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each other in any weather – capable of keeping the sea and acting efficiently when our Gunboats 
dare not cast their guns loose” (Sinclair to John Cocke, 25 August 1813, in Malcomson 1997: 
48). Yeo deemed the American navy unfit; of the General Pike, he stated that it was “a very fine 
large ship, but appears to be very unwieldy and unmanageable” and inferred from the way it was 
sailed that the vessel did not carry a complete crew (Yeo 1813 in Malcomson 2001: 83). Even 
Chauncey agreed with these statements, bemoaning his “dull Sailing Schooners” that, along with 
the Oneida, he was required to tow to keep up with his force (Chauncey to Jones, 19 August 
1813, in Dudley 1985: 541).  
During the night, both fleets anchored near Twelve Mile Creek on the British side of the 
Niagara River. Myers reported that the British fleet was “so near, indeed, that we could almost 
count their ports…Our object was to get together lest the enemy should cut off some of our small 
vessels during the night” (Cooper 1843: 78). It was not the British, however, that caused the loss 
of two of the American schooners that night, but a severe and sudden squall. Myers recalled that 
“a flash of lightening almost blinded me. The thunder came the next instant, and with it a rushing 
of winds that fairly smothered the clap” (Cooper 1843: 81). The Hamilton and Scourge both 
foundered in this unexpected squall. Only sixteen crewmembers from these ships survived. This 
was unfortunate for Chauncey, who related that “this fatal accident, deprived me at once of the 
Services of two valuable officers and two of my best Schooners, mounting together 19 guns – 
this accident giving to the Enemy decidedly the Superiority” (Chauncey to Jones, 13 August 
1813, in Dudley 1985: 538). 
The British understood the greater strategic importance of Lake Ontario compared to that 
of Lake Erie. The loss of control of Lake Erie would not obligate the capture of Upper Canada, 
however; Lake Ontario was essential to controlling the British territory. Accordingly, the British 
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allocated the majority of their resources to Lake Ontario, essentially forfeiting Barclay’s Lake 
Erie fleet for the larger objective. Nevertheless, the shipbuilding race on Lake Ontario prevented 
both Yeo and Chauncey from providing essential support to Lake Erie. Furthermore, the 
American capture of Fort George interrupted the transport of supplies from the Niagara 
Peninsula to Amherstburg. These events also allowed the vessels constructed at Black Rock to 
enter Lake Erie unmolested by the British formerly stationed on the Niagara Peninsula (Skaggs 
and Altoff 1997: 53). While historians, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan, 
censure Chauncey’s program on Lake Ontario during the 1813 season, it is evident that these 
actions allowed the American naval forces on Lake Erie a substantial advantage (Roosevelt 
1887: 221-237; Mahan 1905: ch. 10; Skaggs and Altoff 1997: 53). 
Although Barclay tried to avoid the American fleet by staying at Amherstburg, lack of 
supplies caused by the American control of Fort George on the Niagara River, eventually led him 
to set sail. Barclay hoped to meet and defeat Perry’s fleet. With control of the lake, Barclay could 
then re-provision with supplies awaiting him at the other end (Dale 1990: 53). Although the 
gamble was great, Barclay planned “to sail and risk every thing” since “in the present state of 
this place, without provisions, without stores – and without Indian Goods (which last is a matter 
of the highest importance,) it is necessary” (Barclay to Yeo, 6 September 1813, in Hitsman 1999: 
170). On 9 September, Detroit, Queen Charlotte, Lady Prevost and three armed schooners left 
Amherstburg. Since the guns intended for Detroit were lost at York, Barclay armed his newly 
completed flagship with the long guns from Fort Malden (Hitsman 1999:171).  
The two fleets met near Put-in-Bay, Ohio on 10 September 1813. The battle began 
around noon when Barclay opened fire with his long guns. Perry had the advantage of the wind 
and was able to easily close the gap between the two fleets. Although Perry’s fleet was much 
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larger, consisting of nine vessels compared to Barclay’s six, his flagship, Lawrence, was not 
properly supported by the rest of the line, especially Niagara. After two hours of firing, both 
flagships were badly damaged with many casualties aboard, including Barclay, who was 
seriously injured and carried below decks (Hitsman 1999: 171). At this point, the Lawrence was 
severely damaged, since Niagara had failed to come up in time to assist and it, therefore, 
received the concentrated barrage from the Detroit and Queen Charlotte. Since Lawrence was no 
longer serviceable, Perry was rowed through the heavy gunfire to take control of the Niagara 
from Commandant Jesse Elliott. When asked at his court martial why the British did not take 
possession of the damaged Lawrence, Barclay replied: “We had only one boat, and that was cut 
to pieces; and the Niagara, another large brig, being to-windward, came down too quickly upon 
us” (Extracts from the court martial on Captain Barclay, in James 2004: 324). The nearly 
undamaged Niagara, along with the gunboats, forced the British surrender (Malcomson 2001: 
95-96). 
The Americans gained command of all the British vessels on Lake Erie. The vessels were 
anchored and repaired when Perry composed his now famous letter to William Henry Harrison, 
commander of the Army of the Northwest, stating: “We have met the enemy and they are ours. 
Two ships, two brigs, one schooner and one sloop” (Perry to Harrison, in Dudley 1992: 553). 
Within the next few weeks, Perry prepared the least damaged of the prizes for service in his 
squadron. Perry now commanded Lake Erie, however, the issue of who controlled the upper 
lakes was undecided and, on account of the advanced season and Perry’s request to leave Lake 
Erie, it would not be resolved until 1814 (Malcomson 2001: 96). 
The dockyards on both shores of Lake Erie were dormant during the winter of 1813-1814 
as neither the British nor the Americans constructed new vessels for the remainder of the war. 
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The British considered arming a fleet at Long Point on Georgian Bay, off Lake Huron, but this 
was never realized. Rumors of a shipyard at Penetanguishene on Georgian Bay and the persisting 
American zeal to recapture Mackinac led to the development of a campaign on the upper lakes 
for spring. The instructions for this campaign assigned to Captain Arthur Sinclair stated that  
the enemy, it is understood, is making efforts to create a force on Lake 
Huron, and the moment is at hand when our Squadron on Lake Erie must 
be actively employed, not only in keeping secure possession of that Lake, 
but a part of the Squadron must immediately proceed into Lake Huron, in 
order to rout the enemy, retake Michilimackinac, take St. Joseph, and thus 
secure the entire command of the Upper Lakes (Navy Department to 
Sinclair, 15 April 1813, in Gough 2002: 84).  
 
Sinclair failed in his task to gain control of the upper lakes. Although he burned two merchant 
vessels, the attack on Mackinac did not succeed. Furthermore, Lieutenant Miller Worsely, on a 
supply mission to Mackinac, captured the American Scorpion and Tigress. These schooners were 
respectively renamed Surprise and Confiance and employed as supply vessels to Mackinac for 
the rest of the season. After this, Sinclair returned to Erie, ending the naval campaigns on the 
upper lakes (Gough 2002: 82-102). 
The events on Lake Erie in 1813 helped to stimulate Yeo and Chauncey to attempt to find 
some sort of resolution to the conflict on Lake Ontario in 1814. Consequently, both commanders 
directed large shipbuilding programs, producing increasingly larger ships. Over the winter of 
1813-1814, three new vessels were ordered to be constructed at Kingston. Likewise three vessels 
were constructed at Sackets Harbor and launched in the spring. Yeo believed that the launch of 
the frigates Princess Charlotte and Prince Regent in April 1814 would be pivotal in the outcome 
of the war on Lake Ontario and if the vessels that Chauncey had produced during the winter 
(Jefferson, Jones, and Superior) outmanned the British fleet, Yeo would wait until the launch of 
the third vessel St. Lawrence to take to the lake (Moore 2006: 11; Malcomson 2001: 102-107). 
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With the launch of St Lawrence on 10 September 1814 Yeo did indeed command the lake, 
although late in the war (Malcomson 2001: 115-116). This first rate ship was the largest on the 
lake, and has been compared in power to the HMS Victory (Hitsman 1999: 251). Yeo did not 
attempt an attack on Chauncey’s fleet at Sackets Harbor, but with his control of the lake was able 
to transport troops and provisions to the army on the Niagara Peninsula. After two such voyages, 
St Lawrence docked for the winter. Effectively, the rivalry that took place in the shipyards 
affected a stalemate on the lakes, as no battle took place between the two fleets since both 
Chauncey and Yeo were unwilling to risk the defeat of their squadron until they were certain the 
victory was theirs. Although both the British and Americans formulated plans for the 1815 
sailing season, 1814 was the end of the naval conflict on the Great Lakes. The signing of the 
Treaty of Ghent on 24 December 1814 ended the War of 1812 (Malcomson 2001: 116).  
In 1815, the United States had sixteen warships on Lake Ontario, twelve on Lake Erie 
and three on Lake Champlain (Rodgers 1985: 6). At Sackets Harbor, Henry Eckford was already 
constructing New Orleans, the rival for the British St. Lawrence, while brothers Adam and Noah 
Brown commenced construction on Chippewa. The economy of the United States could not 
support such a large fleet during peace time; and Chauncey was ordered to cease construction on 
the new vessels at Sackets Harbor. (Malcomson 2001: 134). Likewise, reductions to the fleet 
were enacted so as only the schooner Lady of the Lake remained on Lake Ontario, the schooners 
Porcupine and Ghent on the upper lakes, and the row galley Allen on Lake Champlain (Rodgers 
1985: 6-7). The sale of several U.S. Navy vessels and reuse by local merchants helped to re-
establish shipping on Lake Ontario that had been severely disrupted by the war (Van Cleve 
1877:100). 
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 The Royal Navy initially had no intention of disarming the Great Lakes fleet. The British 
were concerned for renewed hostilities along the border and wished to obstruct any future 
American attempts to capture British North American territories. These concerns were 
aggravated by the fact that British North America’s population was substantially smaller than 
that of the United States, access to resources was less developed, and the St. Lawrence River was 
not navigable for Royal Navy ships from the Atlantic. Therefore, the British thought that 
disarmament on the lakes would be to their disadvantage (Rodgers 1985: 7). 
 In 1815 the Americans were busy “laying up in ordinary” the majority of their ships. 
However, the British continued to increase their navy on the inland lakes during the early part of 
1815 (Figure 2-2) (Rodgers 1985: 7-8). In 1815, plans for constructing two first rates, Canada 
and Wolfe, that were to be very similar to St. Lawrence were made. Three gunboats, Blazer 
Mosquito, and Boxer were launched along with a transport vessel named Beckwith (later named 
Charwell). By the summer of 1815, the only vessels still in use with reduced crews were Prince 
Regent, Niagara, Montreal, Star, and Netley. Psyche (a vessel sent in frame from Britain to be 
reconstructed in Canada in 1814), Princess Charlotte, St. Lawrence, and Charwell were in 
ordinary (Malcomson 2001: 135-136). 
The chances of a renewed arms race compelled the Americans to approach the British 
government with a proposal from President Madison to reduce the number of armed vessels on 
the lakes (Rodgers 1985: 7-8). This lead to the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817. The agreement 
stated that forces be reduced on Lake Ontario to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons 
burden, and armed with one eighteen pound cannon; on the upper lakes to two vessels, not 
exceeding like burden each, and armed with like force; and on Lake Champlain to one vessel not 
exceeding like burden, and armed with like force. The agreement further stated that all other 
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vessels were to be unrigged and no other vessels constructed. There was no requirement for the 
vessels to be destroyed however, and both sides laid them up in ordinary. Similarly, the 
agreement did not stipulate that the dockyards or naval depots were to be closed; and, 
accordingly, they remained active, more so on the British than the American side (Rush-Bagot 
Agreement 1818). 
After the Rush-Bagot Agreement, tensions on the lakes calmed. Of the four American 
ships which patrolled the lakes in 1815, none were fit for service by 1822. In March 1825, 
Congress authorized the president to sell all the vessels on Lakes Erie, Ontario and Champlain. 
The ships of the line New Orleans and Chippewa, now on the stocks at Sackets Harbor, were 
retained as insurance in the possibility of future outbreaks of hostility (Rodgers 1985: 15). 
During the summer of 1817, the Royal Navy had opened the naval base at Penetanguishene on 
Georgian Bay. Immediately, shipwrights set to work constructing three small schooners that 
were rigged without a topsail: Bee, Wasp, and Mosquito. With the limitations imposed in the 
spring, these vessels served only as transports. At Kingston, the British launched the two-gun 
gunboat Radcliffe and the schooner Brock (Malcomson 2001: 139). At the time that the 
agreement was signed, Commodore Sir Robert Hall commanded Kingston of 56 guns. These 
vessels were laid up in ordinary or anchored in Navy Bay and Hall bemoaned that “we are 
reduced to a Boat’s Crew on the civil establishment” (Hall to Bagot, 18 May 1817, in Stacey 
1950: 12). 
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Figure 2-2: “A Plan of His Majesty’s Naval Yard Kingston…1815” shows Point Frederick and the dockyard and the ships 
of the Royal Navy force moored in Navy Bay or anchored along the shore (United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, 
Taunton, England, 193 Ael in Moore 2006: 17). 
In 1818, command of the British naval forces on the Great Lakes passed from Hall to 
Captain Robert Barrie. Barrie arrived at Kingston in July 1819. At this time, the first rates 
Canada and Wolfe still remained on slips One and Two, awaiting completion. The sloop Star 
was on the Transport Slip. Niagara and Psyche were also hauled up, but the location was not 
listed. St. Lawrence, Burlington, Kingston and Netley were anchored in the middle of Navy Bay, 
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while Charwell and Montreal were docked alongside the naval wharf and used to barrack 
officers. Barrie also employed the yard boat Bull Frog in the bay (Brock 1967: 8). Barrie’s 
instructions were to repair vessels on the lakes in readiness of conflict “but in a manner least 
likely to excite public notice or comment,” consequently he had his officers complete regular 
inspections of the condition of the vessels at Kingston as well as the equipment located in the 
storehouses in order to evaluate needed repairs (Melville to Barrie in Preston 1958: 86; 
Malcomson 2001: 140). At least once a year Barrie also journeyed to the other depots in British 
North America to inspect the naval reserve (Brock 1967: 13).  
In 1831, Barrie was asked to detail “the number, size and power of the Canadian steamers 
operating on the lakes, and their suitability for war purposes in case of an emergency” (Melville 
to Barrie in Preston 1958: 86). Later that year Barrie received instructions to sell the old 
warships and close all the naval establishments on the lakes (Moore 2006: 28). The decision to 
terminate the presence of the Royal Navy on the Great Lakes coincided with the opening of the 
Rideau Canal in 1832, which greatly strengthened Canada’s defensive position by providing a 
secure transportation and communication route from Quebec to Kingston via the Bytown 
(present day Ottawa) (Stacey 1950: 13). While attempts were made to sell some of the now 
derelict vessels, the only definitive sale was that of St Lawrence which sold for £25 for use as a 
dock by a local brewer. After 1838, the remaining vessels were removed from the List of the 
Navy (Moore 2006: 28-29). Some ships were sunk in nearby Hamilton Cove (later named 
Deadman Bay) on the opposite side of Point Henry and, evidently, some rotten wreck remains 
lingered in Navy Bay. The dockyard was officially closed in 1853. In 1876, Point Frederick 
became the location of the Royal Military College of Canada. By this time, the dockyard 
structures and ships remained underwater or were lost to landfill operations (Moore 2006: 30). 
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 While naval operations slowly came to an end on the Great Lakes after the War of 1812, 
the unprecedented immigration to the region encouraged trade and commerce. The war had 
greatly hindered commercial activities along both sides of Lake Ontario, and especially across 
the lake. At the end of the war, there were few merchant vessels on the lakes, as many had been 
commandeered for naval use. However, the sale of several vessels by the U.S. Navy helped to 
increase trade along the lakes. The later attempt by the Royal Navy to auction the remainder of 
their fleet was not as successful as the ships were old and in disrepair, had they sold them 
immediately following the war merchants may have been encouraged to buy those vessels. With 
peace restored, trade routes were re-established along the lake as soon as the spring of 1815, and 
a packet between Kingston and Sackets Harbor was established as early as 1818 (Melish 1818: 
539). Traffic on the lakes was imbued with vigorous growth, first gaining in activity on Lake 
Ontario, where population size was rapidly growing within the permanency of older settlements. 
With the need for more ships for commercial use, shipbuilding moved away from the 
naval yards. During the commercial boom from 1820 to 1860, almost every port, river or bay 
along the Lakes had a shipyard (Van Gemert 1972: 292). Passenger and cargo vessels soon 
outnumbered military vessels. While the majority of shipwrights on the Lakes in the early 19th 
century were trained in naval yards, it had already been established that schooners were better 
suited to the lakes than the typically square rigged naval vessels. These post war ships typically 
carried approximately 150 tons, or 1,500 barrels of cargo with a crew of three or four men. The 
advantages of the fore and aft rig of the schooner allowed for better headway into the wind. This 
was of great importance on the lakes which have predominantly westerly winds, as a square 
rigged vessel would have greater trouble sailing against the wind. The fore and aft rig also 
allowed for the vessel to easily maneuver in restricted areas, which is important as the lakes 
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geography presents several restricted spaces where a captain’s ability to tack may be limited. 
Furthermore, schooners were built with shallower drafts which allowed them to bypass shoal 
waters. Other rigs existed on the Lakes that combined fore and aft square sails, such as 
brigantines and barkentines; however, schooners were the most prevalent vessel type on the 
Great Lakes during the 19th century (Ford 2009: 142). Brigantines became popular in the 1830s 
and 1840s and combined the best features of both square and fore-and-aft rigs. They operated 
with crews of eight to ten men and were not as maneuverable as schooners. Consequently, few 
brigantines were built after 1850 as they were too expensive to equip and operate compared to 
schooners. The most useful and profitable rig was the topsail schooner. It was designed for fast 
voyages with heavy freight and maneuverability with a small crew. Topsail schooners had the 
ability to sail close to windward, a characteristic of fore-and-aft rigged ships, and they added 
speed to otherwise slow schooners, particularly when running before prevailing westerly winds 
(Labadie et. al. accessed 2010). 
Amidst the increasing population along the Lakes and the improvement in relations 
between the U.S. and British North America, commercial shipping on Lake Ontario prospered. 
The period of 1830-1870 represented a golden age of sailing commerce for the lakes. The early 
commerce concentrated on trade within the Lakes, but eventually the Lakes served as a 
waterway for transporting goods from the interior of the continent towards the Atlantic and the 
rest of the world (Ford 2009: 142-3). 
Great changes in technology following the War of 1812 revolutionized ship construction 
on the Great Lakes. While sail vessels multiplied, steam transportation was introduced with the 
launch of the first steamer Frontenac in 1816 in Ernestown, Ontario, 18 miles west of Kingston 
(Cruikshank 1926: 40). Most of the early steam vessels were side-wheel steamers used primarily 
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for passenger and packet transportation. By the 1830s and 1840s steam propellers began to 
compete with sail for commercial trade. By the 1850s, most large vessels constructed were steam 
(Ford 2009: 176). Shipbuilding forever changed on the Great Lakes with the opening of the 
Welland Canal in 1829, which allowed for the first navigation between Lake Ontario and the 
upper lakes. The first purpose built vessel was launched in 1828, that became known as a canal 
schooner as it was constructed to fit within the dimensions of the locks (Monk 2003: 42). The 
Welland Canal was rebuilt in 1846, 1881, and 1932, each time increasing in size, until the 
present day version that accepts ocean-going vessels of up to 715 feet long (Ford 2009: 168-
169). Each increase in size has improved commerce along the Great Lakes and drastically 
changed the terrain, from the early 1700s when it was difficult to maintain regular sail on the 
upper lakes, to the present day, when large ocean-going bulk carriers are now regular traders as 
far as Lake Superior. 
  
CHAPTER 3 : PRE-WAR OF 1812 VESSELS 
A great deal of archaeological evidence exists for eighteenth century Anglo-American 
vessels from North American contexts. Documented wrecks include merchant vessels and 
warships that plied the inland lakes and rivers of the continent as well as ocean-going craft. The 
scope of recorded sites ranges from multi-year projects that encompass complete excavation to 
quick archaeological mitigative surveys prior to modern construction. This archaeological 
evidence has furthered our understanding of eighteenth century ship construction through 
comparison with historical records and other archaeologically excavated vessels from the period.  
Archaeologically documented vessels from the pre-War of 1812 period examined for this 
thesis include a selection of merchant and naval vessels constructed after the mid-eighteenth 
century in order to coincide with the first British sailing ships on the Great Lakes. 
Archaeologically documented vessels include the 16-gun sloop Boscawen (Crisman 1985 and 
1996) built on Lake Champlain in 1759; and the Defence (Morris 1991), an 18th century 
privateer lost during the Penobscot Expedition of 1779. Archaeological examples from the Great 
Lakes also include several vessels that were built prior to the War of 1812 and subsequently used 
during the war. These include the schooner Nancy, a merchant vessel built in 1789 and pressed 
into British service during the War of 1812 on Georgian Bay (Sabick 2004); the Southhampton 
beach wreck, now identified as General Hunter, built by the Provincial Marine in 1807 at 
Amherstburg and used throughout the war (Cassavoy 2005). As mentioned, schooners pressed 
into the service for the U.S. Navy include Hamilton, built in Oswego, New York in 1809, and 
Scourge, built at Niagara, Ontario in 1811, which both remain preserved and unexcavated at a 
depth of 300 feet in Lake Ontario (Cain 1983; Nelson 1983; Harris et al. 2009; Keyes and Moore 
2009; Lockhart et al. 2009). 
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Boscawen 
The warship Boscawen was built in 1759 for the British campaign on Lake Champlain 
during the French and Indian War (1754 to 1763). Colonial American shipwrights commanded 
by Royal Navy Captain Joshua Loring constructed the vessel in as little as three weeks 
(Malcomson 2001: 19). Prior to the vessel’s discovery in 1983, historical records only indicated 
that it was a 115 ton, 16-gun sloop which sank at its moorings at the Fort Ticonderoga dockyards 
in the 1760s, likely due to swift decay of a hull constructed of unseasoned wood. Excavation and 
documentation of the vessel occurred during the summers of 1984 and 1985 (Crisman 1985: 
356). 
The white oak keel of Boscawen measured approximately 65 ft. (19.8 m) in length and 
was cut from one or possibly two timbers. It was molded 14 in. (35.6 cm) and sided 10.5 in. 
(26.7 cm) at the stem and tapered at the stern to 9.5 in. (24.1 cm) sided. The stern consisted of a 
single white oak sternpost that was secured to the keel with a pair of iron dovetail plates. It was 
sided 6 in. (15.2 cm) and molded 19 in. (48.3 cm) at the base, which narrowed to 13 in. (33 cm) 
molded. The sternpost was reinforced with four deadwood timbers fastened one atop the other 
with iron drift bolts. This included the stern knee that was cut from a naturally curved part of a 
tree and measured 6 in. (15.2 cm) sided and 11 in. (27.9 cm) molded near the top of the upper 
arm. The stem was constructed of three large white oak timbers; the main stempost, gripe, and 
apron which were fastened with 1 in. (2.5 cm) iron bolts. Approximately 11 ft. (3.3 m) of the 
stempost was attached to the hull with a flat scarf and measured 5.5 in. (14cm) sided and 11 in. 
(27.9 cm) molded. The gripe was sided 3.75 in. (9.5 cm) and molded 6 in. (15.2 cm) at the keel 
scarf increasing to 11 in. (27.9 cm) molded. Less than 2 ft. (60.9 cm) of the apron survived, 
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though it was much larger than the other pieces of the stem and measured 16 in. (40.6 cm) square 
(Crisman 1985: 358-360). 
 The frames on Boscawen demonstrated the speedy construction of the sloop. The framing 
was composed of a total of 26 white oak floors, fastened to the keel with a single bolt, alternating 
with first futtocks. The spacing of the floors greatly varied, but their centers averaged 28 to 34 in. 
(71.1 to 86.4 cm). The floors averaged 5 to 10 in. (21.6 to 25.4 cm) sided and were molded 12 in. 
(30.5 cm) at the keel, decreasing to 7 in. (17.8 cm) molded at their heads. Every floor timber had 
two limber holes that permitted bilge water to pass under the frames to the pump well. The 
shipwrights that constructed Boscawen did not utilize a common method of frame construction 
during the eighteenth century whereby the floor and futtocks were fastened together to form a 
complete rib which was then mounted on to the keel. Instead, all the floor timbers were fastened 
to the keel, and the outside of the hull was planked (Figure 3-1). After several planking strakes  
 
Figure 3-1: A schematic view of Boscawen's frame construction (Crisman 1985: 362). 
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were fastened to the floors, the first futtocks were placed between the floors, with their heels 
approximately 10 in. (25.4 cm) from the keel, and attached to the outer hull planking with iron 
spikes and treenails. This method continued with the placement of the second futtocks, which 
were not connected to the first futtocks. As it was not important for the floors and futtocks to fit 
together tightly, they could be crudely shaped and some still displayed bark on their surfaces. 
The first futtocks were more crudely shaped than the floors and varied from 4 to 8 in. (10.2 to 
20.3 cm) sided and 7 to 10 in. (17.8 to 25.4 cm) molded. Two cant frames were recorded at the 
bow that butted against the sides of the keelson and the forwardmost floor timber instead of 
crossing over the keel, as if added later. Four to five half frames were found in the stern that 
butted against the stern deadwood and angled aft (Crisman 1985: 361-364).  
 The white oak keelson measured 53 ft. (16.2 m) long and was secured to every other floor 
timber by iron bolts. It consisted of two, or possibly three timbers flat-scarfed end to end. It did 
not extend all the way aft to the stern but stopped about 3 ft. (0.9 m) forward of the stern 
deadwood, or 10 ft. (3.5 m) from the sternpost. It is unclear if this gap was intended by the 
shipwrights or was the result of an error in construction. The keelson measured 10 in. (25.4 cm) 
sided and 6 in. (15.2 cm) molded near the bow and 11 in. (27.9 cm) sided and 10 in. (25.4 cm) 
molded towards the stern (Crisman 1985: 364). 
 The external and ceiling planking were all of white oak that measured 2 in. (5.1 cm) 
thick. The external planks varied from 11 to 15.5 in. (27.9 to 39.4 cm) wide and were fastened to 
the floors and futtocks with both iron spikes and treenails of white oak and white ash. The ceiling 
planking averaged 12 to 20 in. (30.5 to 50.8 cm) wide and were secured to the frames with iron 
spikes in a random pattern (Crisman 1985: 364-365). 
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 Boscawen had a single mast step on the keelson located one-third of the hull length aft of 
the stem (Figure 3-2). The step consisted of a large white oak block that was notched over the 
keelson. It measured 4 ft 3 in. (1.3 m) long, 18 in. (45.7 cm) wide, and 16 in. (40.6 cm) in height. 
Similar to a saddle mast step, it sat perpendicularly to the keelson and was secured in place by 
two wedges of wood on either side of the step, placed longitudinally along the keelson. To 
prevent the mast step from twisting, two chocks were attached to the ceiling forward of the step. 
The step’s mortise, which took the heel of the mast, was 16 in. (40.6 cm) long, 8.5 in. (21.6 cm) 
wide, and was cut completely through the block to the keelson (Crisman 1985: 365). 
 
Figure 3-2: Boscawen's mast step (Crisman 1985: 366). 
 
 Three white pine deck beams that measured from 5 to 7 in. (12.7 to 17.8 cm) in diameter 
were found. They were unfinished round logs that had been adzed on the upper surface to allow 
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the decking to lie evenly. Several pieces of white oak deck planking were found that measured 
0.75 in. (1.9 cm) thick (Crisman 1985: 365-367). 
 The archaeological documentation of Boscawen not only confirmed its identity, but 
revealed several construction shortcuts that were taken by the shipwrights in order to launch the 
vessel within three weeks. This was evidenced in the varying size and spacing of timbers, the 
unusual frame assembly method, and the lack of finishing as seen in the deck beams and frames. 
However, all the timbers were of sizable dimensions, were fashioned from strong white oak, and 
appeared adequately fastened with iron bolts and treenails, which made for a vessel that was 
hastily made but still a strong and durable warship (Crisman 1985: 368-370). 
Defence 
 The Revolutionary War privateer Defence is thought to have been built in Beverly, 
Massachusetts in 1779. Less than a year old, and possibly on its maiden voyage, Defence joined 
a fleet in July 1779, that included ships of the Continental and Massachusetts state navies, twelve 
privateers, and transport vessels for the army. Assembled by the State of Massachusetts and 
commanded by Dudley Saltonstall, the fleet’s purpose was to attack a British fort that was being 
built in Maine’s Penobscot Bay. The attack was a disaster as the arrival of a small number of 
British vessels caused an American retreat up the Penobscot River after two vessels were 
captured. The remainder of the fleet was scuttled or burned to prevent capture by the British. 
Defence sank in Stockton Harbor after an explosion on board, probably in the powder magazine 
(Sands 1996: 155). 
 Defence was discovered in 1972 during a sonar survey conducted by the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Maine Maritime Academy. Two seasons of preliminary 
inspections revealed artifacts from the eighteenth century, including a cannon made in 
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Massachusetts in 1778. A full excavation was organized in 1975 by the Maine State Museum 
with the Maine Maritime Academy, the Institute of Nautical Archaeology, and the Maine 
Historic Preservation Commission. The work was conducted in 1981 after the partially intact hull 
was recorded (Switzer 1981: 91; 1983: 44). The wreck remains stretched a total of 72 ft. (21.9 m) 
from stem to stern with a maximum breadth of 22 ft. (6.7 m). The vessel was made primarily of 
oak, including the frames, deck beams, deadwood, and planking. The masts, bulkheads and other 
internal structures were made of pine. Samples of larch were also found at the wreck site 
(Switzer 1981b: 92; 1983: 45). The ship was originally armed with 16 six pound cannon (Sands 
1996: 156). 
 The keel of Defence was 8 in. (20.3 cm) molded and 14 in. (35.6 cm) sided. The keel was 
notched for the floor timbers, which varied from 8 to 9 in. (20.3 to 22.9 cm) molded forward to 
15 in. (38.1 cm) aft. The first futtocks measured 8 in. (20.3 cm) square, and the rest of the 
futtocks averaged 8 in. (20.3 cm) molded and 4 to 5.5 in. (10.2 to 14 cm) sided at the preserved 
top section. The frame spacing was close, with only 5 in. (12.7 cm) gaps between the futtocks. 
Upon removal of a section of ceiling planking, it was discovered that articulated double frames 
were located every 4 to 5 ft. (1.2 to 1.5 m). They were fastened through the floors to the keel 
with ¾ in. (1.9 cm) diameter iron bolts. The other frames were like half frames as they did not 
have floors and were secured to the planking with octagonal treenails that measured 1.1 in. (2.8 
cm) in diameter. Bark still remained on some of the frames and numerous timbers appeared to be 
cut from green wood, suggesting cheap or hurried construction, although compass timbers were 
used for the floors, futtocks, and other curved timbers (Switzer 1981b: 94-5, 98; 1981a: 149; 
1983: 50; Wyman 1978: 5). The shape of the hull was very sharp in design, with a V-shaped 
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entrance forward, resulting in a speedy vessel. This is in contrast with the bluff bowed, surviving 
contemporary drawings (Sands 1996: 158). 
 The keelson was bolted through the frames and keel and measured 8 in. (20.3 cm) 
molded and 11.5 in. (29.2 cm) sided. Both fore and main mast steps were made of simple 
mortises cut into the keelson which were reinforced with oak chocks that were placed on either 
side of the keelson and secured to the floors with iron bolts. The stumps of both masts were 
present in the mast steps. They were made of white pine and measured 18 in. (45.7 cm) in 
diameter (Switzer 1981b: 95-6). A similar mast step was located on the Phinney Site, an 
American armed vessel scuttled during the Penobscot Expedition of 1779. The similarity occurs 
at the main mast step assembly of this vessel. Two mast chocks and an angled buttress or crutch 
were also observed on the Phinney Site that would have prevented the lateral movement of the 
mast step (Hunter 2004: 71-72). 
 The outer hull planking averaged 2 to 2.5 in. (5.1 to 6.4 cm) in thickness. The four lowest 
strakes of outer planking measured 12 in. (30.5 cm) wide, while the remainder averaged 8 in. 
(20.3 cm) wide. The planking was fastened to the frames using 1.1 in. (2.8 cm) diameter 
octagonal treenails. The heads of the treenails had been cut with 1.5 in. (3.8 cm) deep square 
mortises in order to wedge them into place. The ceiling planning was attached to the frames with 
square spikes that measured 0.4 to 0.5 in. (1 to 1.3 cm) in diameter. In the bow, the ceiling 
planking was nailed to every other frame. Further aft, only single nails were used in every third 
or fourth frame, which also indicates hasty construction (Switzer 1981b: 93-5). 
 Some of the internal fittings of the vessel were preserved including the shotlocker, bilge 
pump, and cookstove. The shotlocker and pump well were constructed of heavy pine boards. The 
mainmast was contained within the locker and the pump well was located in an unusual place, 
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forward of the mainmast. The structure of the locker and pump measured 5 ft. (1.5 m) in length 
and 2.5 ft. (0.7 m) in width and was preserved to a height of 4 ft. (1.2 m). The placement of this 
structure around the mainmast on top of the keelson and ceiling planking suggests that it was 
built after the vessel was launched (Switzer 1981b: 95-6). The brick cookstove was carefully 
constructed and built on a platform of heavy oak planks laid across the keelson and ceiling 
planning. It measured 5 ft. (1.5 m) high and contained a 68 gallon (257.6 liter) copper cooking 
pot (Switzer 1981b: 93, 96-7). 
 Defence was built specifically as a privateer in which speed was essential; this is 
supported by its sharp bow. This may also explain the hasty construction of the vessel, although 
some of the details demonstrate extra attention. Several of the timbers, including the keelson, the 
chocks reinforcing the mast steps, and the upper deadwood, were chamfered along the edges to 
remove sharp corners on the interior of the vessel. Furthermore, some of the timbers had 
decorative trim and other ornamental details (Switzer 1981b: 97-8). From these features on the 
interior and the care taken in the construction of the cookstove, it is clear that the appearance of 
the interior of the vessel was important to the builders; however, the presence of bark on some of 
the timbers also indicates financial prudence. As a privateer, the owner likely wished to have an 
attractive looking ship although he knew that it would likely have a short lifespan. 
Nancy 
 The schooner Nancy was built in Detroit in 1789 for the trading company Forsyth, 
Richard and Co. as a transport vessel used in the fur trade on Lakes Erie and Huron. Although 
Detroit was officially part of America following the 1783 Treaty of Paris, the British were slow 
to surrender the location due to its importance in controlling the upper lakes. With the outbreak 
of the War of 1812, Nancy was pressed into service by the Provincial Marine and later the Royal 
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Navy. The schooner was primarily used for supply trips between the Nottawasaga River, which 
empties into Georgian Bay on Lake Huron, and Mackinac. Nancy was burned to the waterline by 
Lieutenant Miller Worsley on 15 August 1814, on the Nottawasaga River, to prevent capture by 
an attacking American force. In 1927, the remains of the schooner were excavated and removed 
from the banks of a small island in the Nottawasaga River to be displayed at the Nancy Island 
Historic Site. The hull timbers were not properly documented until 1997 (Sabick 2004).  
 Nancy was constructed of high quality old growth timbers of oak and red cedar. The 
construction methods display high workmanship as the timbers are tightly fitted and well 
fastened. The frames were shaped from naturally curved compass timbers with few knots. The 
remaining hull of Nancy measures 68 ft. (20.7 m) in length and 22 ft. (6.7 m) in beam, had a hold 
depth of 7 ft. 6 in. (2.3 m) and measured 100-120 tons. After almost a century on display without 
conservation, the majority of the timbers show signs of drying and cracking (Sabick 2004:84). 
 Nancy’s keel was made from a single timber which measured 59 ft. 9 in. (18.2 m) in 
length. The dimensions of the keel varied from 14.75 in. (37.5 cm) molded and 9.5 in. (24 cm) 
sided forward to 13 in. (33 cm) molded and 8.75 in. (22.2 cm) sided amidships to 12 in. (30.5 
cm) molded and 8 in. (20 cm) sided near the stern. At the stern the keel was mortised for the 
sternpost and inner sternpost, both of which are missing. Shallow mortises on either side of the 
keel reveal impressions for a pair of fish plates that would have added strength to the juncture of 
the keel and sternpost. The rabbets run from the stem to a place 14 in. (35.6 cm) from the keel’s 
aftermost end (Sabick 2004: 85).  
The underside of the keel was cut with 25 holes that appear to have contained treenails at 
some point. In several cases, the treenails have fallen out and were replaced with iron bolts 
recessed into the keel, 22 of these holes correspond with bolts that attached floors to the keel 
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(Sabick 2004: 85). This feature seems to be unique to this vessel, as it appears that the holes were 
augured into the bottom of the keel and the bolts driven in from below in order to secure the 
floors in these locations. By recessing the heads of the bolts, they would be protected from 
damage in the case that the vessel ran aground. Wooden plugs were then used to seal the holes 
and protect the bolts. This may be an indication of a later addition to the vessel in order to 
provide strength when the vessel was pressed into service by the Provincial Marine, or this may 
indicate that a false keel was fixed to the vessel at one point and later removed (VanHorn 2004: 
119).  
The stem assembly consisted of the stempost, apron, and gripe. The stempost was made 
from a single compass timber that measured 23.5 in. (59.7 cm) molded at its maximum and 7.25 
in. (18.4 cm) sided. The stem of the vessel was hook scarfed to fit the keel and strengthened with 
two pairs of iron fishplates that were fastened through the sides of the keel-stem assembly. A 1 
in. (2.5 cm) diameter stopwater was located at the after end of the scarf. On the starboard surface 
of the stempost, the Roman numerals IV and V are faintly visible. These were the draught marks 
that informed the crew how much water the vessel was drawing. The apron, keelson, and gripe 
were fastened to the stempost with iron bolts (Sabick 2004: 87). The apron measured 13 ft. (3.9 
m) in length, 7 in. (17.8 cm) molded, and 15 in. (38.1 cm) sided and was cut from a single 
compass timber (Figure 3-3). It was notched on its sides and top to receive five floors, and on its 
upper end for cant frames (Sabick 2004: 91). 
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Figure 3-3: Plan and profile view of Nancy's apron (Sabick 2004: 91). 
 
The sternpost and inner sternpost did not survive, but mortises in the keel indicate their 
positions. They were fastened with a pair of iron fishplates. The inner sternpost would have 
measured approximately 4 in. (10.1 cm) molded by 8 in (20.3 cm) sided. The main sternpost 
would have been approximately 12 in. (30.5 cm) molded and 8 in. (20.3 cm) sided, to match the 
dimensions of the keel. It is impossible to estimate the height of these timbers. A single 
deadwood timber buttressed the stern assembly (Figure 3-4). The timber was bolted to the top of 
the keel and notched to seat eight of the aftermost floors. It extended along the keel for 17 ft. 9 
5/8 in. (5.4 m) ending 16 in. (40.6 cm) from the after end of the keel. Partway through the length 
of the timber, it was trapezoidal in section to form the rabbet for the garboard strake (Sabick 
2004: 89-90). 
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Figure 3-4: Plan and profile view of Nancy's stern deadwood (Sabick 2004: 90). 
 
The lower framing on Nancy was well preserved, with the exception of the frames in the 
stern of the vessel, several of which are missing. Framing consisted of square frames in the hull 
and cant frames in the bow as well as additional timbers used as filler pieces, which may have 
been added later to reinforce the aging hull or to support taller bulwarks and frame gunports 
when the vessel was equipped as a Provincial Marine vessel. The vessel originally had 28 floor 
timbers, 25 of which remain, spaced an average of 25 in. (63.5 cm) apart on their centers. The 
floors varied in size from 7.5 to 9 in. (19 to 22.9 cm) molded and 8 to 9 in. (20.3 to 22.9 cm) 
sided. The frames are notched underneath to fit on top of the keel to form a strong join. 
Triangular limber holes were cut into the floors on each side of the centerline. The first futtocks 
were offset from the keel by 7 to 10 in. (17.8 to 25 cm) and averaged 8 in. (20.3 cm) molded and 
sided. Ten of the frames were articulated master frames, that had the floors and first futtocks 
closely fitted and fastened together. They are fastened together with iron bolts that were driven in 
at an angle, although Sabick suggests that these were originally joined with horizontal treenails 
and the iron bolts were a later reinforcement. The rest of the first futtocks were separated from 
the floors with a space of 5 to 8 in. (12.7 to 20.3 cm) and were fastened to the hull planking. For 
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all the frames, the first futtocks were placed aft of floors forward of midships and forward of the 
floors aft of midships. The only exception is located at Frame 1, which does not have a first 
futtock related to it. This does not follow ship construction techniques laid out in treatises of the 
time. The upper futtocks were diagonally scarfed to the lower timbers. A total of 15 filler frames 
were placed near midships and the bow (Sabick 2004: 92-97). 
The remains of four pairs of cant frames were present in the bow. One pair of cant frames 
rested in notches on the side of the apron, the remaining heels of the cant frames abutted it. The 
heels of the aftermost bow cant timbers formed a triangular wedge that filled the gap between the 
forwardmost square frame and the first radial cant frame. Many of the frame timbers have holes 
that would have contained fasteners for attaching the hull planking. The ½ in. (1.3 cm) size of 
the holes and the lack of iron staining, suggests that the hull planking was fastened with treenails. 
These holes do not appear on the filler pieces, which may further indicate that they were a later 
addition (Sabick 2004: 99-101). 
The keelson was composed of two timbers fastened together with a 7 ft. (2.1 m) long 
hook scarf for an overall measurement of 53 ft. (16.2 m) in length, 12 in. (30.5 cm) molded, and 
9 in. (22.9 cm) sided. It was notched to fit over the floors and bolted with ¾ in. (1.9 cm) diameter 
iron bolts through most of the floors and into the keel. Notching the keelson would have been 
time consuming for the shipwrights, but provides further evidence of the high quality 
craftsmanship of the schooner. A semicircular notch on the port side of the keelson aft of 
midships likely represents a cut for the pump well. There is no evidence of stanchion mortises on 
the top of the keelson, which would have acted as additional support for the deck (Sabick 2004: 
101-102). 
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Nancy had two mast steps. The foremast step was a simple mortise cut directly into the 
keelson. As this area was heavily damaged and eroded, it was impossible to determine its 
dimensions. The mainmast step consisted of a large, semicircular saddle mast step type that was 
placed perpendicular to the centerline and notched to fit over the keelson just forward of the 
pump well (Figure 3-5). The mortise to take the squared off heel of the mast was cut into the top 
of the step and measured 13 in. (33 cm) wide by 5 in. (12.7 cm) long by 4.75 in. (12.1 cm) deep 
and did not pass completely through the timber. The main mast step was not secured in place, 
which may indicate that it was not in its original location (Sabick 2004: 102).  
 
Figure 3-5: Image of Nancy's mainmast step (Sabick 2004: 103). 
The hull planking of the vessel averaged 2 in. (5 cm) in thickness and each strake was 
composed of two planks that varied in width from 6 to 10 in. (15 to 25 cm). It was fastened to the 
frames with 0.5 in. (1.3 cm) diameter iron spikes, although it is suggested that treenails were 
originally used as fasteners. The external planking contained numerous repairs, which suggests 
that the vessel was somewhat old at the time of its sinking. The ceiling planking is well 
62 
 
preserved and averages 1.5 in. (3.8 cm) in thickness and 7 to 9 in. (17.8 to 22.9 cm) in width. It 
was attached with iron spikes that measured 0.5 in. (1.3cm) in diameter. Four limber boards were 
present along each side of the keelson. These were not fastened to the floors to allow access to 
the bilge for cleaning. The ceiling planking does not show evidence of repair or patching (Sabick 
2004: 104-105).  
Nancy was fitted with an elaborate figurehead depicting a lady dressed from the waist up 
in then current fashion with a hat and feather. It was made by a carver in New York and shipped 
to Detroit (Sabick 2004: 23). The figurehead indicated the name of the vessel in non-verbal terms 
and demonstrated the wealth and status of the owner since it was not a functional piece but 
purely ornamental.  
Nancy was a typical Great Lakes merchant vessel with a shallow draft to maneuver 
through shoal waters into ports. The hull’s shape emphasized carrying capacity and stability 
under sail rather than speed, demonstrated by the bluff bow and rather flat floors. It was later 
armed with cannon, when it was pressed into service by the British, and the hull shows evidence 
of the reinforcement required for this purpose. The vessel was well built with good quality 
timber and high quality craftsmanship as evidenced by the fact that Nancy traveled the Great 
Lakes for 25 years, with a long career as a merchant vessel and ending as a naval vessel. 
The Southampton Beach Wreck (General Hunter) 
In 2001, low lake levels and a heavy spring ice scour uncovered about a dozen ship 
frames sticking up through the beach sand near Southampton, Ontario on the shore of Lake 
Huron. Excavations during 2001 and 2002 uncovered two adjacent wrecks, one of which was a 
small work barge from the late 19th century, and the other was a two masted ship from the early 
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19th century, later identified as HMS General Hunter. In 2004, the General Hunter was 
completely excavated and recorded (Cassavoy 2005: 2). 
 Master builder William Bell built General Hunter in the Navy Yard for the Upper Great 
Lakes at Fort Malden, Amherstburg, in 1805 or 1806. Historical references indicate that the 
vessel was designed to be 54 ft. along the keel, 18 ft. in breadth, of 70 to 74 tons burden and to 
carry up to 10 guns. Early references describe the vessel as schooner rigged; but by the War of 
1812, it was rigged as a brig. The vessel was named after Peter Hunter, late commander of the 
British forces and Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada (1799-1805). After its launch in 1806, 
General Hunter, armed with six cannon, joined service with the Provincial Marine squadron 
engaged in transport and patrol of the upper lakes. In 1810, the ship Queen Charlotte replaced 
the Earl of Camden, thus leaving General Hunter as the only naval vessel with a shallow enough 
draft to clear the shallows of the St. Clair River and enter Lake Huron (Cassavoy 2005: 76). 
 During the War of 1812, General Hunter took part in several actions on Lake Huron and 
Lake Erie. On 10 September 1813, the British were defeated at the Battle of Lake Erie and the 
Americans gained command of all the British vessels on Lake Erie. The British vessels likely 
remained idle for the duration of the war, although General Hunter possibly participated in the 
failed American attempt to retake Fort Mackinac on 4 August 1814 (Cassavoy 2005: 77).  
After the war, General Hunter was sold by the U.S. Army to John Dickson of Presque 
Isle (present day Erie), Pennsylvania on 8 July 1815. The vessel’s name was shortened to Hunter 
and, for the remainder of the summer it made at least three or four voyages between Buffalo, 
Detroit, and Mackinac carrying private merchandise and American military stores and troops. At 
some point in the late fall or early winter of 1815, the U.S. Army purchased Hunter for use as a 
transport vessel. In the spring and summer of 1816, the vessel transported military supplies, 
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troops and passengers to Mackinac. It was on a return voyage from Mackinac to Detroit that 
Hunter was caught in a severe storm, blown across the lake to the vicinity of the Saugeen River, 
and wrecked on the shore of Lake Huron on 19 August 1816 (Cassavoy 2005: 77, 80). 
 The remains of General Hunter consist of the full length of the keel, preserved to a total 
length of 53 ft. 10 in. (16.41 m) ( Figure 3-6). The starboard side is preserved to the turn of the 
bilge in some sections, while the port side is not as well preserved. At the midship frame, the 
width is 16 ft. 10 in. (5.14 m). The exterior of the vessel was not excavated except near the stern. 
The keel was molded 15 in. (38.1 cm) and sided 10 in. (25.4 cm). The keel was not notched for 
the frames (Cassavoy 2005: 27). 
  
Figure 3-6: The exposed hull of General Hunter on Southampton Beach (From 
http://www.chantryisland.com/Summary%20Weazell%20March%202nd,%202004.htm Accessed September 2008). 
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Framing consisted of square frame pairs in the hull and cant frames in the bow. The 
vessel had 24 frame sets, 10 forward of the midship frame, and 13 aft of it. The frames were 
spaced an average of 25 in. (60 cm) apart on their centers with a 5 to 6 in. (12.7 to 15.2 cm) in 
between. The frames varied in size from 6 to 7 in. (15.2 to 17.8 cm) molded and 8 to 10 in. (20.3 
to 25.4 cm) sided. The first futtocks were attached to the floors with treenails that were driven 
sideways, indicating that the frames were likely assembled prior to lifting them into place on the 
keel. The first futtocks started approximately 9 in (22.9 cm) away from the keelson edge. A 
rough, split piece of wood was used as a spacer between the frame sets along the top of the keel 
and keelson, which were left in place during construction and found in situ. The first futtocks  
were located on the aft side of the floors aft of the midship frame, and forward of the floors 
forward of the midship frame. The keelson was notched in. (1.9 cm) to fit over the frames and 
measured 10 in. (25.4 cm) sided and 7.5 in. (19 cm) molded. Only every second frame set was 
secured with two iron drift bolts driven down through the keelson (Cassavoy 2005: 27, 34, 36). 
 Up to 7 ceiling plank strakes remained on the port side, and 10 strakes on the starboard 
side. The ceiling planks varied in size; the widest strake measured 13 in. (33.2cm) wide, and the 
longest plank was 29 ft. 9 ½ in. (9.1 m). On average the ceiling planks measured 2 in. (5 cm) 
thick. Many of the joints between the planks were still tight and uniform. The limber boards and 
first ceiling planks were beveled to facilitate easy lifting, and fit tightly when in place. The 
limber boards measured 1 ¾ in. (4.4 cm) thick and had notches cut out so that they could easily 
be lifted out. Sections of the exterior planking that could be measured were between 2 to 2 ½ in. 
(5-6.3 cm) thick. Atop the ceiling planking on the portside was a breasthook made from compass 
timber (Cassavoy 2005: 36). A rectangular burned area on the ceiling planking near the foremast 
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was located on the starboard side. What resembled parts of a stove were also located in this area, 
indicating that the stove was located in this area (Cassavoy 2005: 29). 
 Two mast steps were located along the keelson of the vessel. The foremast consisted of a 
simple mortise cut into the keelson, which showed evidence of breakage and erosion. The main 
mast consisted of a saddle type mast step that was notched over the keelson and held in place 
with two large blocks (Figure 3-7). The two blocks were spiked into place with two round, and 
three square spikes. The step itself was not fastened to the keelson, which would have allowed 
for easy repositioning of the step for location or angle of the mast (Cassavoy 2005: 29-30). 
 
Figure 3-7: Saddle-type mainmast step of General Hunter that is held in place with two blocks (Cassavoy 2005: 30). 
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 Excavation on the exterior of the vessel did not reveal the rudder or any of the associated 
hardware. Exterior excavations revealed Roman numeral draft marks located on both the stern 
and stem posts. They were located only on the port side on the stempost and the starboard side 
on the sternpost. Several types of fasteners were observed throughout the vessel, but the 
mitigative nature of the excavations did not allow time for determining their pattern. An 
assortment of iron nails, iron bolts, and treenails were employed (Cassavoy 2005: 38-39). 
 Great care and attention to detail was employed in the construction of General Hunter. 
This is demonstrated in the time consuming labor of notching the keelson to fit over the floors 
and the use of treenails for fastening the vessel. The craftsmanship of the shipwright is noted in 
the fact that the joints between the planks were still tight and uniform nearly two hundred years 
later. The use of limber boards to access the bilge water ensured that water would not pool in the 
hull and cause rot. All of these factors indicate that the vessel was intended to have a long career 
on the upper lakes. 
Hamilton (Diana) and Scourge (Lord Nelson) 
The Lord Nelson, later named Scourge, was a merchant vessel constructed in Niagara, 
Ontario and launched 1 May 1811 (Cain 1983: 36). While shipping goods across Lake Ontario, 
the schooner was stopped by U.S. Navy Lieutenant Woolsey. Upon suspicion of smuggling 
goods from the States to Canada, the schooner was confiscated and eventually ended up in the 
American fleet at Sacket’s Harbor (Cain 1983: 54-55). The Diana, later renamed Hamilton, was 
a merchant schooner built at Oswego, NY in 1809 (Cain 1983: 27). On 12 October 1812, the 
schooner was purchased by the U.S. Navy for service in the Lake Ontario squadron (Cain 1983: 
65). The converted merchant ships had their bulwarks raised and heavy guns added, making 
them very top heavy vessels. The heavy weight of these guns ultimately led to their sinking 
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during a squall near present day Port Dalhousie, Ontario on 7 August 1813 (Nelson 1983: 290). 
The account of the night was later recorded in detail by one of the survivors, Ned Myers (Cooper 
1843).  
During the night, both the British and American fleets anchored near Twelve Mile Creek 
on the British side of the Niagara River. Myers reported that the British fleet was “so near, 
indeed, that we could almost count their ports…Our object was to get together lest the enemy 
should cut off some of our small vessels during the night” (Cooper 1843: 78). As mentioned 
earlier, it was not the British that caused the loss of the two American schooners that night, but a 
severe and sudden squall. Myers recalled that “a flash of lightening almost blinded me. The 
thunder came the next instant, and with it a rushing of winds that fairly smothered the clap” 
(Cooper 1843: 81). The Hamilton and Scourge both foundered in this unexpected squall. Only 
sixteen crewmembers from these ships survived.  
Searches for both wrecks began in 1971 by Dr. Daniel Nelson, an avocational 
archaeologist from St. Catharines, Ontario, using the logbook of HMS Wolfe to pinpoint the 
location. In 1972, magnetometer and side-scan sonar searches were conducted, and likely targets 
were revealed in 1973. In 1975, researchers used deep-tow side-scan sonar to gain the first views 
of the vessels, upright on the lakebed with their masts still intact, as if they had peacefully 
floated to the bottom (Cain 1983: 130-131). The Royal Ontario Museum (ROM), which had 
collaborated with Dr. Nelson in the search for the schooners, persuaded the U.S. Navy to sign 
over the rights of the vessels in 1979. For the rights, the ROM agreed to study the wrecks with 
the goal of determining if they could be raised and displayed. Also, any human remains 
uncovered would be returned to the United States. These are the only U.S. naval vessel that have 
been released from American ownership. After a few months, the ROM gave responsibility of 
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the vessels to the City of Hamilton. In the early 1980s, Jacques Crousteau, and then National 
Geographic filmed the schooners, bringing a great deal of publicity to the wrecks. This publicity 
led John Lehman, American naval secretary at the time, to offer to help raise the wrecks in 
exchange for the Hamilton and its artifacts (Cain 1983: 131-132). The City of Hamilton declined 
and, until recently, no detailed archaeological studies have been conducted.  
In the past decade, evidence has been uncovered that divers have recently been visiting 
the site (Moore and Keyes 2009: 148). Diving visitation was not a problem at the time of 
discovery, as they lay in 300 feet of water, well beyond the range of sport diving equipment, but 
modern technology has now allowed divers to explore these underwater graves. The City of 
Hamilton has installed a radar system to warn against unauthorized divers; however, with 
sophisticated breathing apparatus, this system can be eluded and these sites are now in danger of 
being looted. These wrecks are the most complete and intact examples of converted 
merchantmen on the Great Lakes. As such, they are extremely significant sites. 
 In 2008 and 2009, a site condition survey was conducted of the two wrecks, initiated by 
the City of Hamilton working with Parks Canada and other partners. A remotely operated vehicle 
(ROV) was utilized to inspect the ships for quagga and/or zebra mussel growth and to carry out 
further archaeological recording (Keyes and Moore 2009: 129; Moore et. al. 2011). In 
preparation for the ROV survey, two multi-beam sonar surveys were conducted by the Canadian 
Hydrographic Service in 2004 and 2005. Parks Canada conducted a week long side scan sonar 
survey in 2007. The aim of these surveys was to obtain more images of the wrecks and their 
debris fields to support planning for the ROV inspection (Harris et al. 2009: 141-143). 
The original construction of the Diana and Lord Nelson and their conversion into the 
United States Navy armed schooners Hamilton and Scourge are poorly documented in the 
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historical record. Information about their construction, including lines plans, construction 
drawings and contemporary images are lacking. Some historic documents do provide glimpses of 
their construction, for instance an account book for the building of Lord Nelson (Scourge) and 
first hand operations of the Scourge by Ned Myers (Cain 1985; Cooper 1843). The 2008 site 
survey collected data that was used to determine the dimensions of both the vessels and to create 
a preliminary scaled site plan, unlike the previous not to scale rough sketched site plans 
(Lockhart et al. 2009). 
 During the 2008 survey, the ROV was only able to obtain interior views from the forward 
hatch of Scourge, since the aft hatch was blocked by fallen pikes. Views of the deck beam 
stanchions, the riding bitts, and the base of the foremast were observed from the forward hatch. 
A great deal of damage was evident since the last ROV dives in 1990. Damage was observed on 
the starboard stern quarter and at the transom where planking has separated from the counter 
timbers. The iron bowsprit cap has broken and the jib boom has separated from the vessel and 
lies on the lakebed (Moore and Keyes 2009: 152-153). Both dual-axis and sector sonar scans 
were conducted in order to accurately map the two wrecks. The length of Scourge from the 
taffrail to the knighstheads was determined to be 57.4 ft. (17.5 m). The overall length of the 
vessel could not be determined since the jib boom had separated from the rest of the vessel, and 
the end of the bowsprit was not captured in the scans. The maximum breadth at deck level was 
measured at 14.4 ft. (4.4 m), the midship breadth at 13.1 ft. (4 m), and the stern breadth at 12.8 
ft. (3.9 m). The distance from the foremast to the bow was 10.8 ft. (3.3 m), the distance between 
the two masts 21.3 ft. (6.5 m), and the distance from the mainmast to the stern was 25.6 ft. (7.8 
m). Interior deck beams were visible at the stern of the vessel through the stern gallery windows 
and were spaced 1.6 ft. (0.5 m) apart (Lockhart et al. 2009: 177-178). 
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 Video and photos of Scourge reveal that the planks are mostly intact and the hull appears 
to be in good condition, except for the transom. However, the dual-axis sonar data revealed that 
there is some warping of the hull as it is twisted from bow to stern. Furthermore, the sonar data 
revealed that the starboard bow bulwark was slightly caved in. This may have been caused 
during the wrecking, and is not observed below the bulwarks. The bulwarks were part of the 
modification of the merchant vessel to a warship, and video from 1982 suggests that they were 
roughly constructed. By comparing the 2007-2008 data with previous site plans, it is clear that 
these two schooners are smaller than previously believed (Lockhart et al. 2009: 178-179).  
 ROV inspection of Hamilton revealed that mussels now covered almost all of the 
surfaces of the vessel, more heavily on the horizontal surfaces and the ordnance. Interior video 
footage was taken at the open aft hatch and the forward hatch. At the aft hatch, a transverse 
bulkhead dividing the stern cabin was observed, which had two openings leading forward. At the 
foot of the ladder was a rack of approximately 10 muskets resting in place. Also a possible berth 
or low stowage box was seen against the starboard hull. Much of the cabin was filled with 
sediment and some mussel occupation; therefore, other interior features could not be 
distinguished. Through the forward hatch opening, two wooden steps nailed to a deck beam 
stanchion were observed. Some indistinct components of the lower hull could be seen projecting 
from the silt (Moore and Keyes 2009: 150-151). The sector-scan images revealed that 
Hamilton’s determined length from the taffrail to the knightsheads measured 65 ft. (19.8 m) in 
length. The midship breadth measured 18.7 ft. (5.7 m) and the stern breadth 15.7 ft. (4.8 m). The 
distance from the mainmast to the stern measured 30.2 ft. (9.2 m). Determined length for 
Scourge was 57.4 ft. (17.5 m), measured from the taffrail to the knightshead. The midship 
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breadth measured 13.1 ft. (4 m). The distance from the mainmast to the stern measured 25.6 ft. 
(7.8 m) (Lockhart et al. 2009: 177-8). 
Both vessels demonstrated elaborate figureheads that embellished their bows. Scourge 
(originally Lord Nelson) displayed the striding figure Admiral Horatio Nelson on the prow of the 
vessel (Figure 3-8). Nelson died at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 and was the most celebrated 
contemporary naval hero. Although it was a well-known fact that Nelson lost his right arm in 
1797, the figurehead was depicted with both arms. The striding pose of the figurehead is 
common in the 19th century (Cain 1983: 55). The figurehead of Hamilton (originally Diana) 
represented the classical goddess of the hunt and motherhood, Diana. On her left side, the 
goddess is portrayed with only her quiver and its strap, while she is portrayed in Empire dress on 
the right. Her hairstyle is suggestive of an ancient warrior’s helmet. Partially-clad goddess 
figureheads were common throughout the 19th century, though typically in classical rather than 
contemporary dress (Cain 1983: 40). 
 
Figure 3-8: Figure of Lord Horatio Nelson on the prow of the Scourge (originally Lord Nelson) (Cain 1983: 55). 
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Since in depth archaeological recording of these wrecks has not been completed due to 
the limiting factors of their location, it is difficult to determine their specific construction details 
and techniques. It is clear from their excellent preservation more than two hundred years later 
that they were sturdy and well-constructed vessels. Desire for ornamentation on these vessels 
demonstrates that attention to detail was important to the owners of the vessels and that these 
were schooners that were intended for use over a considerable length of time. These vessels do 
present a remarkable understanding of what merchant craft at this time resembled since they 
remain intact. It is possible to understand their modification from merchant vessels to warships 
by observing the addition of the upper works and deck layout of these two vessels. Further study 
of these two vessels will yield a great deal of information about merchant craft from the early 
19th century. 
Pre-War of 1812 Vessel Attributes 
The Anglo-American vessels built in North America from the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century demonstrate differences between freshwater and ocean going vessels as well 
as merchant and naval vessels through their hull shapes and construction techniques. Defence 
exhibited a very sharp design, with a V-shaped entrance forward. This was critical in its role as a 
privateer, where speed was essential. The other vessels operated on the inland lakes where a 
shallow draft was advantageous for navigating the shoals of the lakes. These vessels displayed 
flat floors that reduced their draft at the expense of speed. While speed may have been desired in 
the warship Boscawen, the ability to duck into shallow harbors was of greater value. For the 
merchant vessels Nancy, Lord Nelson, Diana, as well as General Hunter, whose primary role in 
the Provincial Marine was that of a transport vessel, the full shape of their hulls allowed for 
increased hold space for transporting goods, and stability, which were more important than 
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speed. These vessels also demonstrated very bluff bows, which allowed for more cargo capacity 
at a reduction in speed. The following table presents the features of the wrecks that have been 
discussed in order to compare their various characteristics. The label ‘unknown’ in the table 
indicates that this information was unavailable due to lack of investigation and/or excavation, 
while the term ‘not listed’ indicates that that information was not supplied in the report. 
Pre-War of 1812 ship construction demonstrates deliberate craftsmanship, the use of 
good quality timber, and attention to detail in construction. The majority of the vessels’ framing 
components appear to have been carefully fashioned from strong white oak. White oak’s 
physical properties made it a favored timber for ship construction. The wood is heavy, hard, 
strong and durable. Oak has large rays that prevent it from shrinking radially during seasoning, 
meaning that it will only shrink slightly and warping should be negligible. The wood holds 
fasteners well; but, it is known to react with iron, meaning that iron fasteners may be 
disadvantageous due to tangential shrinking (Mitchel 1994: 84). Shipwrights in North America 
during this period benefitted from the advantage of sizeable untouched forests, and an abundance 
of good quality timber, allowing them to build sturdy vessels, unlike British shipwrights who 
were already experiencing the depletion of English forests (Hall 1884: 243).  
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Table 1: Characteristics of Pre-War of 1812 Vessels 
 
 Boscawen Defence Nancy General Hunter Hamilton Scourge 
Date 1759 1779 1789 1805 or 1806 1809 1811 
Nationality British American British British American British 
Vessel function Warship Privateer Merchant, converted warship Provincial Marine Merchant, converted warship Merchant, converted warship 
Length overall Not listed 72 ft. 68 ft. Not listed 65 ft. 57.4 ft. 
Beam Not listed 22 ft. 22 ft. 18 ft. (historical sources) 18.7 ft. 13.1 ft. 
Keel length 65 ft. Not listed 59 ft. 9 in. 53 ft. 10 in. (preserved length) Unknown Unknown 
Keel molded 14 in. 8 in. 12-14.75 in. 15 in. Unknown Unknown 
Keel sided 10.5 in. 14 in. 8-9.5 in. 10 in. Unknown Unknown 
Keel wood type Oak Oak Oak Not listed Unknown Unknown 
Keel notched Not listed Yes Apron, stem and stern deadwood 
notched (floors notched to fit over keel) 
No Unknown Unknown 
Keelson length 53 ft. Not listed 53 ft. Not listed Unknown Unknown 
Keelson molded 6 in.-10 in 8 in.  12 in. 7.5 in. Unknown Unknown 
Keelson sided 10 in.-11 in.  11.5 in. 9 in. 10 in. Unknown Unknown 
Keelson wood type Oak Oak Oak Not listed Unknown Unknown 
Keelson notched No No No Yes Unknown Unknown 
Floor avg. molded 12 in. 8-15 in. 7.5-9 in. Not listed Unknown Unknown 
Floor avg. sided 5-10 in. Not listed 8-9 in. Not listed Unknown Unknown 
Futtock avg. molded 7-10 in. 8 in. 8 in. 6-7 in. Unknown Unknown 
Futtock avg. sided 4-8 in. 8 in. 8 in, 8-10 in. Unknown Unknown 
Frame spacing Various 5 in. 5-9 in. 5-6 in. Unknown Unknown 
Frame wood type Oak Oak Oak, red cedar Not listed Unknown Unknown 
Frames notched No No Yes No Unknown Unknown 
External planking thickness 2 in. 2-2.5 in. 2 in. Not listed Unknown Unknown 
External planking wood type Oak Oak Not listed Not listed Unknown Unknown 
Ceiling planking thickness 2 in. Not listed 1.5 in. 2 in. Unknown Unknown 
Ceiling planking wood type Oak Oak Not listed Not listed Unknown Unknown 
Number of masts One Two Two Two  Two Two 
Mast step type Saddle type Simple mortises Fore mast: simple mortise 
Main mast: saddle type 
Fore mast: simple mortise 
Main mast: saddle type 
Unknown Unknown 
Compass timbers Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Fasteners Iron, treenails Iron, treenails Mostly iron, some treenails Iron, treenails Iron Iron 
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White oak’s elasticity also made it an ideal wood for the construction of frames and other 
curved timbers; likewise, it provided a large quantity of both straight and compass timbers 
(Mitchel 1994: 84). The use of compass timbers is seen throughout these vessels for various 
strengthening timbers such as the stern knee on Boscawen; the floors on Defence; the frames, 
sternpost, and apron on Nancy; and the breasthook on General Hunter. It is likely that compass 
timbers were also employed in the construction of Lord Nelson and Diana. The use of treenails 
alongside iron fasteners in the construction of Boscawen, Defence, Nancy, and General Hunter 
ensured tight fitting joints, since treenails swelled when wet. This also indicates care in 
construction, since they were time consuming to shape and install. Further study of Lord Nelson 
and Diana, including wood species analysis, may show that oak was utilized in their construction 
and that treenails were also employed on these schooners.  
The merchant vessels Nancy, Lord Nelson and Diana as well as the privateer Defence, all 
demonstrated additional craftsmanship in the form of ornamental details such as decorative trim 
and figureheads. The Provincial Marine vessel Earl of Moira launched from the Kingston naval 
yard in 1805, was also planned to carry an elaborate figurehead that depicted the vessel’s 
namesake, a prominent British soldier and government official, pointing the way with a telescope 
in hand. Several different views of the figurehead were drawn and proposed; however, it is 
uncertain if the ornamentation ever adorned the bow (Malcomson 2001:50). These details were 
unnecessary additions for the sailing qualities of the vessels; however, they did serve to easily 
identify a vessel. Chiefly, these ornamentations to the vessels demonstrate the pride that the 
original owners had for their vessels and the craftsmanship of the builders.  
The size and shape of the keel would have influenced a vessel’s sailing ability. A deeper 
keel would have prevented lateral draft, while a shallow keel would have allowed for access to 
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shoal waters (VanHorn 2004: 178). As expected of an ocean going vessel, the Defence 
demonstrated the deepest keel, although somewhat narrow. The Boscawen, Nancy, and General 
Hunter were all vessels that sailed on the inland lakes. Likewise all had keels of similar 
dimensions. These keels were deeper than they were wide, which may have improved their 
sailing qualities despite shallow drafts expected of vessels of the inland lakes. Nancy’s keel was 
slightly smaller, which may be accounted for by travel within the shallows of Georgian Bay. The 
shallow draft of General Hunter is important, considering it was the only naval vessel with 
enough clearance to cross the shallows of the St. Clair River and enter Lake Huron at the time of 
its construction. Typically the keels of these vessels were made from one or two timbers, and 
evidence from Nancy and Boscawen of the use of fishplates to secure the stem and keel joint 
suggests that this method was employed in both merchant and naval contexts.  
 The average size of the frames was comparable between the vessels, although the floors 
of Boscawen were slightly larger, and the futtocks of the General Hunter were slightly larger. 
The frame spacing, on average, was a minimum of 5 in. distance, while the largest spacing was 
up to 9 in. Boscawen demonstrated an unusual framing pattern: the futtocks were not joined to 
the floors to create continuous frames, rather they were secured to the external planking with 
spaces of up to 10 in. between the floors and first futtocks, continuing on with the second 
futtocks. On Defence, mold frames were placed evenly along the keel, but half frames and 
futtocks were employed as intermediate frames. Nancy demonstrated articulated timbers at every 
third frame, with filler futtocks located between them. General Hunter demonstrated double 
frames throughout the hull of the vessel. Boscawen had definite mold frames that were placed 
every fourth frame. Both Nancy and General Hunter demonstrated cant frames in the bow. 
Boscawen employed the use of cant frames in both the bow and stern sections of the vessel. 
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The keelsons of these vessels generally measured approximately the same dimensions as 
that of the keel, or slightly smaller. In the case of Boscawen, the keelson was not as wide as the 
keel, but just as thick. The keelson of Defence was the same width as the keel, but not as thick. 
The keelson of Nancy was smaller in both dimensions than its keel. In the case of General 
Hunter, the keelson was just as wide as the keel, but half the thickness. 
Notching of the keel, floors, or keelson was a labor intensive process; however, it ensured 
additional strength and stiffness in the hull. The first major treatise on ship construction during 
the eighteenth century was completed by William Sutherland, a Master Carpenter for the Royal 
Navy. Although his experience was with naval vessels, the treatise was intended for shipwrights 
of naval and merchant craft alike. His third essay, on marine architecture, indicated that the 
keelson should be notched to fit over the floors and bolted through every other floor (Sutherland 
1711: 26). Evidence from colonial contexts in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries 
indicates that, while notching was considered important for strengthening the hull, shipwrights 
did not necessarily follow convention. Notching of the keelson over the floors is only 
demonstrated on General Hunter, whereas the keel of Defence was notched to accept the frames. 
While the apron and deadwood of Nancy were notched for the floors, it was the floors 
themselves that were notched to fit over the keel. Neither the keel nor keelson of Boscawen 
demonstrated notching to secure the frames. It is interesting to note that this purposely built 
British warship did not follow Sutherland’s treatise. This may be due to the short amount of time 
in which the vessel was constructed and similarly coincides with the unusual frame construction 
method. 
Mast steps on these vessels consisted of either a simple mortise cut directly into the 
keelson or athwarships ‘saddle type’ step. The simple mortise cut mast step was employed as a 
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forward mast step on Nancy, General Hunter, and the fore and main mast steps on Defence. This 
type of mast step appears to be typical of small to medium sized vessels constructed during the 
mid- to late-18th century. One of the problems associated with this type of mast step was that it 
significantly weakened the keel of the vessel. The Reader’s Point vessel, a pre-1765 sloop 
excavated in Jamaica, demonstrated a longitudinal crack in the keelson at the location of the 
mortise cut mast step that was repaired with a reinforcement timber and two sister keelsons 
(VanHorn 2004: 193). The oak chocks located on either side of both mast steps on Defence may 
have been pre-emptive measures, as the shipwrights may have been aware of the strain that the 
mast would put on the keelson. The forward mast step on Nancy was severely damaged; this may 
have been from use during the vessels career or from poor preservation. 
The saddle type mast step represents a stronger step type since the wood grain ran 
perpendicular to the forces placed on the mast and it did not compromise the strength of the 
keelson itself. VanHorn suggests that this type may represent a later development in mast step 
construction (2004: 195). Saddle mast steps were employed as the main mast step on Nancy, 
General Hunter, and the single mast step on Boscawen. Another advantage of this type of mast 
step was that it could easily be repositioned since it was secured to the keelson with bolted 
chocks on either side.  
 Construction shortcuts in the design and assembly of Boscawen and Defence may be 
indicative of their purpose as warship and privateer, which ensured that the vessels were 
launched quickly to compensate for their potential loss. Boscawen demonstrated varying size and 
spacing of frames, an unusual frame assembly method, and roughly hewn deck beams and 
frames. Defence exhibited irregularly spaced frames and fastener patterns and a lack of finishing 
on the floors and futtocks.  
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 The construction details of these vessels indicates that their purpose dictated the amount 
of care and precision that was employed in their creation. Merchant vessels were intended for 
many years of service and so were built with good quality timbers and attention to detail. The 
warship Boscawen and privateer Defence were constructed quickly in order to be launched in a 
short time, but the short cuts exhibited did not compromise the strength of the vessels. All of 
these vessels exhibited traditional English ship building techniques and benefited from the ample 
forests of North America with the abundance of preferred white oak and compass timbers. 
  
  
CHAPTER 4 : WAR OF 1812 VESSELS 
During the War of 1812, the North American theater of war was determined by the 
geography of the region. Much of the fighting in the north primarily took place along the Niagara 
frontier and later along the St. Lawrence River. From the outset, both the Americans and British 
realized that gaining the upper hand in the conflict depended upon control of the Great Lakes. 
Crucial to achieving ascendancy upon the Great Lakes was the development of a significant and 
powerful inland navy. By necessity, this had to be built in place, as ships could not be brought in 
from the Atlantic due to the shallows and rapids along the St. Lawrence River. This led to a 
shipbuilding race on both shores in a region where supplies were not always guaranteed, since 
they needed to be transported from the eastern seaboard. In addition, the Royal Navy and U.S. 
Navy converted and upgraded for use some earlier commercial ships. The isolation of the Great 
Lakes from the ships of the Atlantic, the different sailing requirements of the lakes, and the 
shortage of supplies led to the development of some unique and innovative ship construction 
techniques.  
Archaeologically documented warships from the War of 1812 period include the U.S. 
Brig Eagle (Crisman 1987) and HMS Linnet (Washburn 1996 and 1998) on Lake Champlain; 
U.S. Brig Jefferson on Lake Ontario (Crisman 1989); HMS St. Lawrence (Moore 2006), HMS 
Prince Regent (Moore 2006), and HMS Princess Charlotte (Moore 2006; Walker 2006) have 
been identified and studied in the Kingston area of Lake Ontario. 
U.S. Brig Eagle 
The U.S. brig Eagle was built by New York shipwrights Adam and Noah Brown at 
Vergennes, Vermont as part of Thomas Macdonough’s Lake Champlain fleet during the War of 
1812. The brig was constructed in record time in a frontier region where supplies were often 
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unavailable. The hull was launched 19 days after the keel was laid on 11 August 1814 with the 
name Surprise (Crisman 1987: 42). On 6 September 1814, the name of the brig was changed to 
Eagle (Crisman 1987: 61). In the Battle of Plattsburgh (11 September 1814), the brig played a 
major role in the decisive victory over the British fleet. After the war, the brig, along with the 
rest of the Lake Champlain fleet, was laid up in ordinary at Whitehall, New York. The vessels 
were in such a poor state of preservation that the Board of the Navy Commissioners declared the 
Lake Champlain squadron unworthy of preservation on 20 January 1821. On 13 September 
1825, the Navy sold the squadron for $6,632.83, likely to merchants or shipbuilders to salvage 
the iron fittings from the hulls. Eagle likely sank not long after its sale to the salvors (Crisman 
1987: 105-110). The brig was rediscovered on the bed of the Poultney River in the Champlain 
Valley between New York and Vermont on 23 July 1981, along with the remains of the U. S. 
row galley Allen and HMS Linnet (Crisman 1987: 117-118). Three consecutive years of 
fieldwork (1981-1983) and historical research provided a great deal of information for 
reconstructing naval design and construction from this period. 
The keel of Eagle was composed of three timbers that were flat scarfed together for an 
overall length of 106 ft. 5 in. (32.43 m) and averaged 18 in. (45 cm) molded and 12 in. (30 cm) 
sided. Flat scarfed to the stempost was a timber of hard maple that measured 37 ft. (11.2 m) in 
length, and at the extreme forward end, it was sided 8 in. (20.3 cm). The remainder of the 
keelson measured 78 ft. (23.7 m) and was covered by several feet of mud. It was determined 
from wood species analysis that this part of the keelson actually consisted of two separate 
timbers; the central timber was of hard maple and the aft timber of white oak. The aftermost 24 
ft. 8 in. (7.5 m) of the keel was molded only 10 in. (25.4 cm) as it was cut down for the lowest 
deadwood timber. The keel timbers were fastened together with iron fish plates and drift bolts. 
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The keel was further strengthened with iron drift bolts driven through the keelson, frames, and 
keel; and the ends were not fastened (Crisman 1987: 136-137).  
The two exposed keel scarfs were fitted with 1 ¼ in. (3.1 cm) dowel stopwaters driven 
into holes drilled across the scarf seam. A rabbet was cut into each side of the keel approximately 
2 in. (5 cm) below its top surface. There was no evidence of a shoe or false keel (Crisman 1987: 
137-138). A keel spur, a wedge-shaped projection on the keel in order to protect the forward 
edge of the rudder, was present (Crisman 1987: 140). 
The white oak sternpost, survived to a length of 6 ft. 10 in. (2 m) above the keel. It was 
molded 20 in. (50.8 cm) at the base, 14 in. (35.5 cm) at the top, and sided 8 in. (20.3 cm) (Figure 
4-1). The sternpost was secured to the top of keel with a pair of iron fish plates. A rabbet was cut 
into each forward corner for the exterior planking. Two iron gudgeons were attached to the 
sternpost. The lower gudgeon was attached 6 in. (15.2 cm) above the keel. It was fastened to the 
sternpost and lower deadwood timber by six riveted bolts. The second gudgeon was attached to 
the sternpost with four bolts 48 ½ in. (1.2 m) above the keel (Crisman 1987: 140). 
 
Figure 4-1: The stern of Eagle (Crisman 1987: 140). 
84 
 
There were four pieces of stern deadwood, the lowest of which measured 23 ft. (7 m) in 
length. The white oak timber was molded 14 in. (35.5 cm) at its forward end and increased to a 
maximum height of 19 in. (48.2 cm). It was sided the same dimensions as the keel: 12 in. (30.4 
cm) at its forward end that tapered to 8 in. (20.3 cm) at its after end. The keel rabbets extended 
onto each side of the lowest deadwood timber and gradually rose where it met the sternpost. The 
second deadwood timber was 13 ft. (3.9 m) in length, molded 13 in. (33 cm), and sided 10 in. 
(25.4 cm) at its forward end, narrowing significantly at the aft end directly above the rabbet. The 
third and fourth deadwood timbers were wedges that angled upward from the keel to the 
sternpost. The four deadwood timbers were fastened to the keel and sternpost by several iron 
drift bolts driven in from above. Round wooden plugs filled the drift bolt holes on the after end 
of the sternpost. The sides of the deadwood timbers were notched to receive the heels of the 
futtocks and half frames (Crisman 1987: 141). 
The stempost assembly consisted of three components: an inner and outer stempost, of 
which the lower 10 ft. (3 m) remained; and the entire lower apron (Figure 4-2). The inner 
stempost consisted of a white oak compass timber that extended 12 ft. 6 in. (3.81 m). It was flat 
scarfed to the keel and fastened by drift bolts and a pair of iron fish plates. It was molded 6 in. 
(15.2 cm) at the after end of the keel scarf and 22 in. (55.8 cm) at the forward end of the keel. It 
was sided 8 in. (20.3 cm) on its forward surface and widened to 10 in. (25.4 cm) on its after 
surface. Two drift bolts at the top of the inner post indicated where the second inner stem timber 
was once located. The after corners of the inner post formed rabbets for the outer planking. The 
outer stempost was also of white oak and was fastened to the inner post by three 1 ¼ in. (4.4 cm) 
diameter drift bolts that were driven through the forward face of the post, that was further 
strengthened with a pair of iron fish plates at the lower end of the post. The outer stempost had a 
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maximum molded dimension of 12 in. (30.4 cm) and was sided 6 in. (15.2 cm) on the forward 
face and 8 in. (20.3 cm) on the after face (Crisman 1987: 138-139).  
 
Figure 4-2: The stem of Eagle (Crisman 1987: 138). 
The curved stem apron measured 9 ft. (2.7 m) in length and was carved to fit two cant 
frames as well as the port and starboard garboard strakes. It was molded 3 in. (7.6 cm) on its 
after end and widened forward to a maximum of 11 in. (27.9 cm). The aft 6 ft. (1.8 m) of the 
timber was notched on top to fit three floor timbers that were likewise notched on the bottom to 
form an interlocking join. The lower corners of the forward portion of the apron were sloped to 
form a rabbet that met that on the inner stempost. Iron bolts driven into the aft face of the upper 
portion of the inner stempost that protruded 15 in. (38 cm) indicated that a second apron timber 
originally existed above the first (Crisman 1987: 139). 
A total of 55 frames were present on Eagle, in various states of preservation: two cant 
frames at the stem, 44 square frames, and 9 half frames at the stern. The floor timbers were 
fastened to the keel by an iron drift bolt that was usually offset from center in order to allow for 
86 
 
the drift bolt that would later d fasten the keelson, floor, and keel. The floors averaged 11 in. 
(27.9 cm) molded between the keel and keelson, 12 to 13 in. (30.4 to 33 cm) molded at the 
rabbet, to 10 in. (25.4 cm) at the end of the floor. The sided dimensions averaged between 8 and 
10 in. (20.32 to 25.4 cm). From the keel centerline to the outermost end of the floor averaged 4 
to 6 ft. (10.2 cm to 15.2 cm) in length. From the site plan, it appears that the frame spacing 
average about 6 in. (15.2 cm). The first futtocks had the same molded and sided dimensions as 
the floors and were fastened to them with 1 in. (2.5 cm) iron bolts. The heels of the first futtocks 
abutted over the centerline of the keel. The starboard first futtocks were broken off at the keel; 
however, the intact first futtocks on the port side averaged 11 to 12 ft. (3.3 to 3.6 m) in length, 
with two that survived to the level of the cap rail. Limber holes were cut into the floors and first 
futtocks of every frame (Crisman 1987: 142). 
The second futtocks abutted the heads of the floors and were bolted to the first futtocks. 
These timbers averaged about 9 ft. (2.7 m) in length. The third futtocks were attached in a similar 
fashion to the second futtocks and averaged 10 to 11 ft. (3 to 3.3 m) in length. The heads of the 
third futtocks formed the tops of the frames. Top timbers, which averaged 7 to 8 ft. (2.1 to 2.4 m) 
in length, were added that abutted the heads of the second futtocks and were bolted to the third 
futtocks in order to complete the square frame assembly. The 17th floor timber aft of the stem 
was the midship frame. Frames forward of the midship frame were constructed with the first 
futtocks fastened to the after faces of the floor timbers, while frames aft of the midship frame 
were assembled with their first futtocks forward of the floors. Eight pairs of half frames were 
positioned into the sides of the stern deadwood. These frames were severely damaged on the port 
side, while only stumps remained on the starboard side (Crisman 1987: 143).  
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The white oak keelson was constructed of four timbers that were flat scarfed and 
extended from the apron to the uppermost stern deadwood. Its dimensions were 14 in. (35.5 cm) 
molded and 12 in. (30.4 cm) sided and was fastened to the frames and keel with 1 ½ in. (3.8 cm) 
diameter iron drift bolts on alternating frames. Care was taken by the shipwrights to drive the 
drift bolts through the floors and not the first futtocks. The foremast step was no longer present 
but represented by four bolt holes drilled into a rectangular pattern. Likely these secured a saddle 
type mast step. A similar arrangement was found for the mainmast step. Nine rectangular slots 
were also located along the top of the keelson between frames 1 to 8 for the stanchions posts to 
support the deck beams. They were between 2 in. (5.1 cm) and 4 in. (10.2 cm) wide, and ranged 
in length from 6 in. (15.2 cm) to 23 in. (58.4 cm). Each sloped in a forward or aft direction to a 
depth of about 1 in. (2.5 cm) (Crisman 1987: 147). 
A large portside clamp was found that was composed of three or four flat scarfed timbers 
that extended 112 ft. 3 in. (34.2 m). The top of the clamp was notched to fit the ends of the deck 
beams. There was a large degree of variation in the spacing of the deck beams. Thirty notches for 
deck beams were counted on the port side; there were likely one or two more at the stem and 
stern which would account for a total of between 32 and 34 deck beams. The deck beams were 
not reinforced by lodging, hanging, or dagger knees. A waterway fastened the deck beam ends 
that survived to a length of 115 ft. (35 m) and was composed of four or five abutted timbers. The 
lower surface of the waterway was notched to fit over the deck beams. Bolts were driven from 
the top of the waterway through the deck beams and clamp. There was one bolt per deck beam 
(Crisman 1987: 149). 
Most of the ceiling planking on the portside was intact. The limber boards were missing, 
but the space between the keelson and the first ceiling plank indicated that they measured 15 in. 
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in width. The first several ceiling planks consisted of wide, thin planks made from white pine 
that averaged 15 ft. (45 m) in length, 9 to 15 in. (22.8 to 38 cm) wide, and 1 ½ in. (3.8 cm) thick. 
Outboard of these first four to five planks were white oak planks that averaged between 7 and 17 
½ in. (17.7 to 44.5 cm) wide and 2 to 3 in. (5 to 7.6 cm) thick. These likely served as footwales, 
heavy planks that reinforced the frames at the turn of the bilge. The final three planks before the 
clamp consisted of long spruce or white oak timbers between 7 and 11 in. (17.7 to 27.9 cm) wide 
and 2 to 4 in. (5 to 10 cm) thick. A single spruce plank extended below the clamp. The ceiling 
planking was fastened to the frames with iron spikes (Crisman 1987: 156-157). 
The external planking on Eagle was not accessible, as most of the portside planking was 
underneath the wreck and only five severely eroded starboard strakes could be analyzed. The 
garboard strake on the starboard side measured 13 in. (33 cm) wide and expanded aft to 15 in. 
(38.1 cm). Its inboard edge was carved to a point to fit into the keel rabbet. It measured 1 ½ in. 
(3.81 cm) thick, but likely originally measured closer to 2 in. (5 cm). The strake thickness of the 
external planking was taken from below the gunports, and measured between 3 ½ and 4 in. (8.8 
cm to 10 cm) thick (Crisman 1987: 151, 155). 
Suggestive of hurried construction were chocks, wedges, and other filler pieces that were 
added to compensate for insufficient molded or sided dimensions. Many of the frame timbers 
were unfinished, with edges or entire faces that were the original tree surface. Other evidence of 
hasty construction included some interesting shipbuilding shortcuts. These included frame 26, 
that combined the floor timber and first futtock in one piece as a means of saving time and 
timber (Crisman 1987: 146). The frames were constructed of an assortment of different types of 
wood including white and red oak, American elm, white ash, American chestnut, white pine and 
spruce, which also serves to indicate the hasty construction since hard woods were not the only 
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type chosen (Crisman 1987: 146). These shortcuts were what enabled Eagle to be launched in 
only 19 days. Clearly the vessel was only intended for upcoming battles rather than long term 
use. 
HMS Linnet 
 HMS Linnet was built at Ile-aux-Noix, Quebec, the British base in the Richelieu River 
close to Lake Champlain, by William Simons, a shipwright from Kingston, Ontario. A dockyard 
was built during the winter of 1813-14 to commence construction on the brig in the spring. The 
brig, initially named Niagara, was launched in April 1814 and the name was changed to Linnet 
when the Royal Navy took command of all naval matters from the army in January (Washburn 
1998: 22, 25). Linnet was the first large warship built on Lake Champlain during the War of 
1812 (Washburn 1996: 14). That summer, Linnet sailed the lake harassing Americans along its 
shore until the American fleet reappeared on the lake and the British returned to the Richelieu 
River. The British squadron, which consisted of the new flagship frigate Confiance, the sloops 
Chub, Finch, and Icicle, the brig Linnet, and 13 gunboats, re-emerged 11 September for the 
Battle of Plattsburgh. The British were defeated after a battle that lasted only two hours and 
twenty minutes. Linnet was the last major warship to surrender to the Americans on Lake 
Champlain (Washburn 1998: 40-41). The British squadron was taken to Whitehall, New York, 
where it was laid up in ordinary in a channel below the town. In 1825, the British squadron was 
moved to the mouth of the Poultney River with plans for auction; however, no bids were 
received and the brig eventually sank at its moorings (Washburn 1998: 47-48). 
 HMS Linnet was first discovered in 1949 and raised via tractor by a small group of 
farmers. The wreck was dragged from New York to the Vermont side of East Bay. Various 
artifacts were recovered from the wreck, and it was falsely identified as a Revolutionary War 
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period wreck. In the process of raising the wreck the bow broke apart and spun around to face 
down the Poultney River, unlike the other wrecks from the fleet on the opposite side of the bay 
(Washburn 1996: 17). After the salvage in 1949, the hull of the vessel settled back into the river 
and listed severely to port. On 23 July 1981, Linnet was rediscovered and identified by Kevin 
Crisman and Arthur Cohn during an archaeological survey of the Poultney River. Linnet was 
eventually excavated as part of the 1995 Lake Champlain Nautical Archaeology Field School, 
which also excavated the U.S.N. row galley Allen. Linnet was poorly preserved after the salvage 
attempt in the 1940s. Little of the bow remained and the stern was incomplete; all the frames 
from the stern section are missing and only three futtocks remain on the starboard side 
(Washburn 1998: 54-55).  
 The remaining 58 ft. (17.7 m) of the keel survives from the base of the sternpost to just 
forward of amidships. The missing 27 ft. (8.2 m) comprised a small portion of the stern and the 
majority of the bow. It was made of a single piece of white oak that was molded 13 ½ in. (34.3 
cm) and the sided dimensions narrowed aft from 8 ¼ in. (21 cm) to 3 ¾ in. (9.5 cm). A single 
rabbet along the keel was estimated based on dimensions taken at frame sections that were loose. 
The sternpost and stem assembly were missing from the remains of the wreck. The one piece of 
white pine stern deadwood was attached to the keel with three iron bolts that had become loose. 
It measured 9 ½ ft. (2.9 m) in length, molded 10 in. (25.4 cm) and sided 3 to 7 in. (7.6 to 17.8 
cm) (Washburn 1998: 60-61). 
 A total of 23 white oak floor timbers and three white oak first futtocks were observed on 
the starboard side. A midship frame was not identified during recording of the wreck. Frames 
were spaced rather evenly, ranging from 18 to 24 in. (45.7 to 61 cm) center to center. The 
average dimensions of the floor timbers were 9 to 10 in. (22.9 to 25.4 cm) molded and 7 to 9 in. 
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(17.8 to 22.9 cm) sided and varied in length from 3 to 8 ft. (0.9 to 2.4 m). They were all made 
from compass timbers, sawn along the grain and bolted to the keel. Limber holes were not 
always present, and not all were cut square; but where they were present, there were two per 
floor that were 3 in. (7.6 cm) square and were approximately 3 in. (7.6 cm) outboard of the keel. 
The first futtocks were placed on the aft side of the floor timbers with their heels roughly 1 ft. 
(30 cm) from the keelson. They were bolted laterally to the floor timbers with iron drift bolts 
(Washburn 1998: 61-63). 
 The white oak keelson survives to a length of 44 ft. (13.4 m) and is made from a single 
timber. It is well preserved except for the upper surface under the mast step. It varied in molded 
dimension from 11 ¼ to 12 ½ in. (28.6 cm to 31.8 cm) and 6 to 8 ½ in. (15.2 to 21.6 cm) sided. 
Rough notches that varied in depth and were not always present were cut on the underside of this 
timber to fit over the floors. These notches were not present directly under the mast step. The 
keelson was fastened to the floor timbers at alternating frames along the centerline of the keelson 
(Washburn 1998: 64). 
 The main mast step was a 3 ft. 8 ½ in. (1.13 m) long by 1 ft. (30.5 cm) wide block of oak 
that was located a third of the vessel’s length forward of the stern (Figure 4-3). It was secured to 
the keelson with six 7/8 in. diameter (2.2 cm) iron bolts and four spikes. A rectangular mortise 
was cut into this block to receive the mast and was reinforced with an iron bar on each side that 
were fastened to the step with two bolts per side (Washburn 1998: 65). There was no discussion 
of the foremast step.  
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Figure 4-3: The mainmast step of Linnet with a reconstructed view in the upper left (Washburn 1998: 154). 
 
 The ceiling planking was missing, but the iron spikes and treenails that were used to 
attach it were still present on the floors and futtocks. Some external planking was still attached to 
the starboard frames. These pine planks were all 2 in. (5.1 cm) thick, but varied in width from 10 
in. (25 cm) to 22 in. (56 cm). These were fastened to the frames with iron spikes. Seven strakes 
were present between the keel and the turn of the bilge. The garboard strakes were fastened to 
the floor timbers and rabbeted into the keel (Washburn 1998: 65-66).  
 A degree of craftsmanship is apparent in the construction of Linnet from the use of 
primarily white oak timbers to the use of compass timbers for the floors. Likewise, the use of 
notches on the base of the keelson over the floors suggests care for detail in construction. 
Although the vessel only served one sailing season on Lake Champlain, it was likely constructed 
with the intent of more. 
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U.S. Brig Jefferson 
 The U.S. Brig Jefferson was built at Sackets Harbor, New York on Lake Ontario by 
Henry Eckford. It was launched 7 April 1814 and was rigged and ready to join the squadron by 
19 April. Commodore Chauncey assigned Master Commandant Charles G. Ridgely and a crew 
of 160 men to crew the vessel (Crisman 1989: 70-73, 97). After three months of inactivity, 
Jefferson first sailed with the U.S. squadron on Lake Ontario towards the head of the lake to 
blockade the Niagara River and intercept supplies intended for the British in the Niagara frontier. 
After a month of blockade duty at the mouth of the Niagara River, Jefferson sailed to rejoin 
Chauncey. During the passage, the vessel nearly foundered during a severe storm, and was only 
saved by throwing ten of the brig’s sixteen 42-pounder carronades overboard (Crisman 1989: 
129-130). Jefferson rejoined the American fleet on 17 September for the remainder of the 
navigation season. At the end of November the American squadron was laid up in ordinary for 
the winter, and remained that way after peace was declared (Crisman 1989: 144, 151). The 
American fleet was housed over in 1816 and Commodore Woolsey attempted to maintain and 
repair the vessels, but dry rot was inevitable. By 1818 Jefferson had sunk. The official navy list 
for 1822 listed all the large warships at Sackets Harbor as sunk and decayed (Crisman 1989: 169, 
172-173). In 1825, the American fleet at Sackets Harbor was sold to Robert Hugunin, an Oswego 
shipper and businessman, who raised and converted at least four of the hulls for commercial use. 
Hugunin did not raise Jefferson from its resting place inside Navy Point, as its frames were 
irreparably cracked from when it settled on its portside. Thus it remains the sole vessel of the 
eight large warships that Henry Eckford built whose final resting place is known and has been 
preserved in its original form (Crisman 1989: 175-176). 
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 Several attempts were made to raise Jefferson throughout the mid-1900s, as it was visible 
during periods of low water (Crisman 1989: 181-186). Renewed interest in the wreck was 
generated in the 1980s with the discovery of Eagle on Lake Champlain, and the wreck was 
relocated in 1984 (Figure 4-4). Just under half of the original hull was intact and well preserved. 
A four year archaeological study of the wreck was initiated under the direction of Kevin Crisman 
and Arthur Cohn (Crisman 1989: 191-200). 
 
Figure 4-4: The 1984 site plan of Jefferson (Crisman 1989: 197). 
 The white oak keel of Jefferson measured a total of 108 ft. 9 in. (33.14 m) in length. It 
was broken amidships and only the aftermost 60 ft. (18.2 m) was still present. It was molded 1 ft. 
11 in. (5.8 m) and sided 11 ½ in. (29.2 cm) and narrowed to 7 in. (17.7 cm) sided at the after end. 
The aftermost 3 ft. 9 in. (1.14 m) of the keel was cut down to allow for the attachment of three 
sternposts. Photographs from the 1930s of the missing forward section show that this section had 
a 3 in. (7.6 cm) molded shoe that was added to make the forward half equal the after end. No 
scarfs were located on the after end of the keel, and none seemed apparent in the photographs of 
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the forward portion, indicating there was only one scarf along the keelson. The stempost was 
attached to the forward end of the keel with a hook scarf and secured with a pair of iron dovetails 
(Crisman 1989: 271-273). 
 A rabbet was cut into each side of the keel several inches below the upper surface. The 
dimensions of the rabbet differed over the length of the keel. Amidships, the rabbets were 2 in. (5 
cm) below the top of the keel and 2 in. (5 cm) deep. Aft of the main mast step, the starboard 
rabbet was 4 ½ in. (11.4 cm) below the top of the keel, 3 ½ in. (8.8 cm) wide, and 2 in. (5 cm) 
deep. Between the forward end of the deadwood and the sternposts the rabbet gradually sloped 
down the side of the keel (Crisman 1989: 273). 
 Jefferson’s stern assembly was well preserved and consisted of three white oak timbers: 
the inner, main, and false posts. The posts were bolted together with several square iron bolts and 
position on the keel. The inner sternpost had a molded dimension of 18 in. at the base and 14 in. 
(35.5 cm) at the uppermost deadwood timber. Its forward face was sided 10 in. (25.4 cm). The 
remaining length of the inner sternpost measured 12 ft. 6 in. (3.81 m). On the upper end were 
two notches in its forward face to fit transoms. The after ends of the external planking were 
attached to the inner post with spikes, and sat in the groove between the inner and main posts. 
The remaining portion of the main sternpost measures 11 ft. 10 in. (3.6 m) in length was molded 
18 in. (45.7 cm) at its base and 14 in. (35.5 cm) at the level of the uppermost deadwood, and was 
sided 7 in. (17.7 cm). It was secured to the keel with a set of iron dovetails. Likely the inner and 
false sternposts were fashioned in this way, but this could not be confirmed. The false post was 
molded 8 in. (20.3 cm) at its base and 5 in. (12.7 cm) at the upper gudgeon, and was sided 7 in. 
(17.7 cm). Above the upper gudgeon, the false post was broken. Two iron gudgeons were 
fastened to the false post as well as an iron pintle stop (Crisman 1989: 276-278). 
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 The deadwood consisted of six horizontal timbers that were stacked above the keel. The 
piece of deadwood that lay directly over the keel and measured 21 ft. 8 in. (6.6 m) in length and 
was 16 in. molded and approximately 11 in. (27.9 cm) sided. It appeared to maintain the same 
molded dimensions over its length, but it was the least accessible of the timbers and, therefore, 
the hardest to record. It narrowed in sided dimension to correspond with the tapering of the stern. 
The next two timbers extended all the way back to the inner sternpost. The three uppermost 
timbers tapered down at their forward ends to form an almost continuous slope. Rectangular 
mortises were cut into the deadwood timbers to accept the heels of the stern half frames, which 
were fastened in place with a single iron bolt (Crisman 1989: 278-280). 
The only evidence of the stempost assembly came from photographs taken in the 1930s 
and 1950s. These photos indicate that the stem was composed of an apron, stempost, and gripe. 
The apron was badly eroded; two iron bolts once fastened the upper end of the apron to the inner 
face of the stem post. Three long iron bolts also project forward that once fastened the apron and 
stempost to the forward end of the keelson. The stempost was hook scarfed to the forward end of 
the keel, extended forward and up 12 ft. 2 in. (3.7 m) and terminated in a scarf for an upper 
stempost. The gripe was badly deteriorated, and its upper end is eroded, likely from ice damage. 
It was estimated from the photograph that the gripe measured on average 13 in. (33 cm) molded 
and was similar to the stern false post, which was sided 7 in. (17.7 cm). The numerous 
photographs of the Jefferson’s stem show a pronounced forward rake, suggesting the vessel had 
a sharp bow (Crisman 1989: 275-276). 
 Photographs show that Jefferson’s frames survived nearly intact until the 1960s. 
Construction of a marina in the 1960s caused damage to the wreck. It is estimated that Jefferson 
originally had between 62 and 66 frames: 45 square frames, between 4 and 8 stem cant frames, 
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and 13 stern half frames (Crisman 1989: 281). The square frames were spaced along the keel 
between 1 ft. 9 in. to 1 ft. 10 in. (5.3 to 5.5 m) on their centers, meaning there was a 5 in. (12.7 
cm) space between the frames. Over three years of excavation, four of the vessel’s frames were 
uncovered and recorded, all of which were aft of the midship frame. The first frame that was 
examined consisted of a floor timber of hard maple that was molded 13 ½ in. (34.2 cm) between 
the keel and keelson, 16 in. (40.6 cm) at the rabbet, and 9 ½ in. (24 cm) at its head. It was sided 9 
in. (22.8 cm) at the keel and increased to 9 ½ in. (24 cm) at its head. It was notched to fit over the 
keel and fastened with a single iron drift bolt. It was laterally fastened to the first futtock with 
square iron bolts (Crisman 1989: 283). 
 The portside white oak first futtock was fastened to the forward face of the floor timber, 
and initially abutted the starboard side first futtock. It was molded 16 in. (40.6 cm) and sided 7 
1/8 in. (18 cm) at the rabbet; at the head it was 8 ½ in. molded and 7 ½ in. (19 cm) sided. The 
first futtock was almost straight due to the sharp deadrise of the hull. Limber holes were not cut 
into the base of the frames. The portside second futtock was also of white oak and was molded 9 
½ in. (24.3 cm) and sided 7 in. (17.7 cm) at the heel, molded 4 in. (10 cm) and sided 4 ½ in. 
(11.4 cm) at the head. It abutted the head of the floor timber and was laterally bolted to the first 
futtock. The second futtock was also a top timber, as the top 5 ft. (1.5 m) of its length was also 
part of the portside bulwarks. The top timber was made of spruce and molded 8 ½ in. (21.5 cm) 
and sided 7 in. (17.7 cm) where it abutted the first futtock, and narrowed upwards to 4 in. (10 m) 
molded and 6 in. (15.2 cm) sided (Crisman 1989: 284-285). The frames of Jefferson displayed a 
high level of craftsmanship. They were made of durable hardwoods, such as white oak, for the 
timbers and futtocks. To minimize the weight near the bulwarks, white pine, hemlock, and 
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spruce were used. The timber faces were smooth and showed evidence of a skilled carpenter 
(Crisman 1989: 288). 
 The keelson of Jefferson was broken 10 ft. (3 m) forward of the mainmast step and only 
the after 57 ft. (17.3 m) remained. The original length of the keelson is estimated to be 109 ft. 3 
in. (33.2 m). The keelson consisted of two levels of white oak that were bolted atop one another 
and flat scarfed end to end. It measured 21 in. (53.3 cm) molded and 10 to 10 ½ in. (25.4 to 26.6 
cm) sided. Originally, three timbers that were molded 11 in. (27.9 cm) comprised the lower row 
of the keelson, but only one remains. The keelson was fastened to the frames and keel with iron 
drift bolts. Along the upper surface of the keelson were four rectangular mortises that sloped 
downward from back to front to accept stanchion posts (Crisman 1989: 289). 
 Only approximately 50 ft. (15.2 m) of the portside shelf clamp was exposed. It was made 
from white oak and measured 11 in. (27.9 cm) molded and sided, and was shaped to fit the inside 
of the frames below the gunports. It was attached to the frames by 1 in. (2.5 cm) iron drift bolts 
at random. On the top surface of the clamp were cut 1 in. (2.5 cm) deep by 16 in. (40.6 cm) wide 
notches to accept the ends of the deck beams at 42 to 46 in. (1 to 1.1 m) intervals. The deck 
beams were placed so that there was one deck beam located beneath every gunport and one beam 
in between every gunport. The white oak beams were molded 10 in (25.4 cm) and the sided 
dimensions varied between 10 and 14 in. (25.4 to 35.5 cm). On each end was a shallow notch, 1 
in. (2.5 cm) deep on the sided dimension that allowed the deck beam to fit between the clamp 
and waterway. The deck beams were fastened with square iron bolts driven down through the 
waterway. The waterway was made from white oak and was 10 in. (25.4 cm) square (Crisman 
1989: 290-292). 
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 The sizes of the external planking strakes varied; the lower planks were larger, about 10 
to 15 in. (25.4 to 38.1 cm) in width. These strakes ranged from 1 ½ in. to 2 in. (3.8 to 5 cm) in 
thickness. At the turn of the bilge the planks measured between 8 and 9 in. wide and outside the 
bulwarks, the planks were between 3 and 4 in. (7.6 to 10 cm) thick. The lower strakes were 
predominantly of white oak, while those near the bulwarks were composed of lighter timbers 
such as white pine. The external planking was fastened to the frames with iron spikes. The 
ceiling planking was rather uniform in size, ranging between 10 and 13 in. (15.4 to 33 cm) wide 
and 2 and 2 ½ in. (5 to 6.3 cm) in thickness. A total of 17 strakes were counted from the keelson 
to the clamp. The four uppermost strakes were of white oak and were slightly thicker. The lower 
strakes were a combination of oak and white pine, with two strakes of thick oak directly beside 
the keelson. These strakes were fastened to the frames with one or two 5 to 6 in. (12.7 to 15.2 
cm) long iron spikes per frame. An unusual feature employed by Eckford in the construction of 
Jefferson was the use of riders or large fore-and-aft diagonal reinforcing timbers placed from the 
keelson to the clamp. Their presence indicates that there was a concern of the ability of the clamp 
to support the weight of the deck with heavy guns mounted on top. It is likely that the hull 
contained ten riders, and possibly eleven, that varied from 7 to 10 in. (17.7 to 25.4 cm) in length 
and were fastened to the ceiling and frames with iron drift bolts (Crisman 1989: 293).  
 The mainmast step was completely excavated and studied. Historical evidence indicated 
that the mast was re-stepped from its original location, and this was seen in the form of two 
adjacent steps. The original step was made of two large pieces that extended across the keelson 
and two smaller timbers that fit between them and parallel to the keelson. When the mast was re-
stepped, a third cross piece was simply added aft of the original step. It was notched to fit over 
the keelson like a saddle-type mast step (Crisman 1989: 296-298).  
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 A great deal of care and attention to detail was employed in the construction of Jefferson. 
Timbers were fitted with great precision, and few spaces needed to be filled with chocks. All of 
the longitudinal timbers were made of sturdy white oak, while soft woods were used where 
strength was not as important. While Eckford attempted to build the best possible ship, some 
short cuts were taken to allow for the short period of construction. Iron fasteners were used 
throughout the vessel, which were much faster to secure although not as durable as treenails 
implying that the vessel was intended only for immediate use. The absence of limber holes may 
also indicate hurried construction and lack of concern over the longevity of the vessel, since this 
would have made it very difficult to remove bilge water leading to rot. The absence of knees also 
indicates hurried construction (Crisman 1989: 304-305). 
HMS Princess Charlotte and HMS Prince Regent 
In the fall of 1813, two frigates were commissioned to be built at the Royal Naval 
Dockyard at Kingston. The frigate Princess Charlotte was to be built under the command of 
George Record, and the Prince Regent under the command of John Goudie. Discord over the 
higher wages of Goudie’s crew eventually caused the Admiralty to enter into a private contract 
with Record for the construction of the vessel. On 14 April 1814, Princess Charlotte was 
launched and, only a half hour later that same day, Prince Regent was sent down the slipway. By 
1 May 1814, both vessels were ballasted, rigged, provisioned, armed, and ready to begin their 
service on Lake Ontario. The launching of these two frigates gave the Royal Navy uncontested 
control of Lake Ontario early in the navigation season. Princess Charlotte and Prince Regent 
took part in attacks on Fort Oswego and Sackets Harbor (Walker 2006: 33-35). With the peace 
after the War of 1812, the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 limited the number of active armed 
vessels on the Great Lakes and all other vessels were to be put up in ordinary. In 1832, the 
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decision was made to terminate the presence of the Royal Navy on the Great Lakes. On 15 
March 1832, instructions were issued to sell all vessels and naval stores on the Lakes. While 
attempts were made to sell some of the vessels remaining in the dockyard, only the St. Lawrence, 
was definitely sold. Princess Charlotte and Prince Regent were later sunk in Hamilton Cove 
(later named Deadman Bay) on the opposite side of Point Henry (Moore 2006: 23). 
It was not until 1938 that the two wrecks in Deadman Bay were first investigated. Ronald 
Way, the Director of Fort Henry, built a platform over the wrecks in February of that year to 
enable a hard-hat diver to recover artifacts from the wrecks (Figure 4-5). In 1952, Dr. Richard 
Preston of the Royal Military College (RMC) wrote a paper on the vessels in Deadman Bay 
based on several dives by a RMC diver. At that time, the wrecks were so well preserved that the 
diver could enter below the lower deck of the Prince Regent. In 1987-1988, Preserve Our 
Wrecks, an organization dedicated to the preservation of the shipwrecks in the Kingston area, 
revisited the site and surveyed the wrecks. Between 1995 and 1998, a photographic survey of the 
wrecks was conducted by Jonathan Moore with stimulus from the introduction of zebra and 
quagga mussels to the Great Lakes (Moore 1998). By 2000-2001, Jonathan Moore had integrated 
historical research with data collected from further survey of the wrecks conducted by himself 
and Daniel Walker a Texas A&M graduate student, along with detailed measurements of the 
mast steps removed from Princess Charlotte by Ronald Way, now held by Fort Henry National 
Historic Site and the Marine Museum of the Great Lakes at Kingston, in order to establish the 
identities of the wrecks (Moore 2006).  
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Figure 4-5: Photograph of the 1938 salvage operations, hoisting a gun from Princess Charlotte through the ice (Fort Henry 
Museum, Kingston, Ontario). 
HMS Princess Charlotte 
In 2000, a non-disturbance survey of Princess Charlotte was conducted by a team of 
three Texas A&M graduate students under the direction of Daniel Walker, whose MA thesis 
assembled the research from the survey. During the 2000 field season, the stem and stern 
assemblies were recorded, the full length of the keelson, the cross chocks, 13 frame sections, and 
various other disarticulated timbers (Walker 2006: 53). 
The wreck lies in approximately 14 ft. of water with zebra and/or quagga mussels 
completely covering the hull and obscuring construction details. The bottom shell of the wreck is 
intact from stem to stern, the frames on the starboard side are intact to the turn of the bilge and 
have mostly broken away from the keel and keelson. The frames on the portside continue past 
the turn of the bilge and are mostly still attached to the keelson since the wreck is listing to the 
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portside. Many timbers from the upper works of the ship now lie detached in the hold, which 
made recording frame assemblies in these sections impossible. A debris field around the wreck 
includes disarticulated futtocks and a transom timber abaft of the stern post (Walker 2006: 58). 
The white oak keel of Princess Charlotte was 121 ft. 4 in. (36.97 m) in length, 16 in. (40 
cm) molded, and 12 in. (30 cm) sided. The upper surface of the keel was notched for the floors 
on average 4 in. (10 cm). The rabbet for the garboard strake measured 3 in. (7.62 cm) wide along 
the face of the keel and 1.5 in (3.8 cm) deep and was located about 1 in. (2.54 cm) below the 
bottom of the cross chocks. The scarfs on the keel were buried in the sediment and, therefore, not 
visible, although they were likely similar to those found on the keelson. A false keel was visible 
for less than 6 in. (15 cm) at the stern. During recording it was evident that the keel had broken 
where the deadwood begins to rise towards the sternpost. The sternpost was fastened to the keel 
with fishplates, and the keel terminated in a skeg to protect the rudder (Walker 2006: 59). 
Most of the stern deadwood construction was obscured from view by the exterior 
planking (Figure 4-6). The white oak stern post measured 13 1/8 in. (36 cm) molded, 12 in.(30 
cm) sided, and rose 13 ft. 9 in. (4.2 m) from the keel. The inner sternpost was molded 15 in. (38 
cm) and sided 12 in. (30 cm). It was notched at a height of 12 ft. 2 in. (3.7 m) for the first 
transom that was held in place with a 1 in. (2.5 cm) bolt. A deadwood knee rose to a height of 11 
ft. 2 in. (3.4 m) on the inner sternpost and abutted the keelson on its forward edge. Two wrought 
iron gudgeons are intact on the sternpost at a height of 3 ft. 9 in (1.14 m) and 10 ft. 6 in. (3.2 m) 
from the base of the keel. Both gudgeons are 8 in. wide, though the straps of the lower one 
extended 5 ft. (1.52 m), while that of the upper one extended only 3 ft. 6 in. (1.07 m). A 
triangular pintle stop was located 7 in. (17.8 cm) beneath the upper gudgeon. The rudder is no 
longer present (Walker 2006: 61-62). 
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Figure 4-6: The stern assembly of Princess Charlotte, which is mostly obscured by the exterior planking (Walker 2006: 
61). 
 
The stem was assembled from eight large white oak timbers that were fastened with 1 in. 
(2.5 cm) diameter iron bolts (Figure 4-7). The gripe, stem post, knee of the head, and a wedge 
were fastened with a pair of circular iron bands bolted from opposite sides of the gripe. This 
band served a similar purpose to a horseshoe plate. Two apron timbers and a large stemson 
timber were present on the inner portion of the stem. Cant frames were fastened directly to the 
apron using 1 in. (2.5 cm) bolts. Compass timbers were not used in this assembly, but straight 
timbers that were shaped and joined. The two inner stemposts were rabbeted for the ends of the 
planking (Walker 2006: 59-60). 
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Figure 4-7: The bow assembly of Princess Charlotte (Walker 2006: 60). 
 
As a purpose built warship, the vessel was heavily framed with less than 1.5 in. (4 cm) 
between the frames. The floors were constructed by fastening two frame timbers to a cross chock 
using three bolts per side. These fit together with vertical scarfs that extended from the centerline 
of the keel to the outer ends of the cross chock (Figure 4-8). At the keel, the floors averaged 16 
in. (40 cm) molded and 12 in. (30 cm) sided. This frame assembly was fastened to the keel with a 
1 in. (2.5 cm) diameter bolt driven through the keelson, cross chock and keel. The cross chocks 
differed in dimensions, and were clearly made to fit individual floors. The first futtocks were 
notched to fit over the keel and a triangular chock that was unfastened fit atop the heels to fill the 
space between the frame and keelson. This system would have compensated for the lack of 
compass timbers and provided a fast construction technique (Rodgers 2001, pers. comm.).  The 
top surface of the keel was notched to fit the floors. Forward of the midship frame, the cross 
chocks were placed aft of the frames, and aft of midships they were positioned forward of the 
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floors. The first futtocks were always located on the same side as the chocks, meaning that at 
midships, there is a single first futtocks between two floors. On the port side, the vessel is 
preserved to the third futtock. Frames were connected with simple butt joins except for the head 
of the first futtock and the heel of the third futtock that were reinforced with a chock. The system 
of cross chocks and frames that was used allowed for greater deadrise (Walker 2006: 63, 67). 
 
Figure 4-8: The frame assembly method on Princess Charlotte (Walker 2006: 66). 
 
The six frame sets furthest aft differ from the others, since the deadrise increased towards 
the stern the floors were modified to fit this structure. The cross chocks increased in sided 
dimensions and were notched on the after face and the floors were notched on the forward face 
and were attached with four large bolts. These floors do not cross the keel, but rest their heels on 
the deadwood. The cant frames in the bow were attached to the stem timbers with 1 in. (2.5 cm) 
diameter iron bolts (Walker 2006: 67-69). 
The keelson consisted of five white oak timbers that ran from the stemson to the 
deadwood knee at the stern that were flat scarfed together and bolted in place. It measured 12 5/8 
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in. (32 cm) molded and 12 in. (30 cm) sided. The keelson was not notched to fit over the floors. 
A rider keelson was positioned atop the keelson, made from four smaller white oak timbers that 
measured 5 ½ in. (14 cm) molded by 12 in. (30 cm) sided. The rider was fastened to the keelson 
with iron spikes driven down from either side of the centerline. Although the rider keelson hides 
the bolting pattern of the keelson, it was clear that a bolt was driven in place through each cross 
chock into the keel. The keelson does not curve up at the bow, but ends at the stemson. The 
upper surface of the rider keelson was notched for deck beam stanchions. The markings indicate 
that these were inserted after the deck beams were already in place (Walker 2006: 70). 
The mainmast and foremast steps were removed from the wreck in 1938 by Ronald 
Way’s salvage team. Both were saddle type mast steps that were notched to fit over the keelson 
and the outboard edge was angled to accommodate for the lateral shape of the ship (Figure 4-9). 
The mast steps were made from one solid piece of wood that measured 12 in. (30 cm) square 
with four fish plates with four 1 in. (2.5 cm) diameter bolts between each pair and four vertical 
bolts. The mast steps were fastened in place with four vertical bolts to the frames (Walker 2006: 
73; Jonathan Moore pers. comm.). 
 
Figure 4-9: Plan and profile views of the mainmast steps salvaged from Princess Charlotte in 1938 (Moore 2006: 68). 
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The majority of the ceiling planking on the port side is still intact. At midships, there are 
16 white oak strakes between the keelson and the clamp. They measure between 8 5/8 in. (22 
cm) and 12 5/8 in. (32 cm) wide and 1 in. (2.5 cm) thick. The external hull planks are butt joined 
and attached to the hull with 7 ½ in. (19 cm) long spikes driven diagonally, two per frame. At the 
turn of the bilge, the hull planking measures 12 in. (30.5 cm) wide and 3 in. (7.6 cm) thick; while 
at the stern, the garboard and the two adjacent strakes are 20 in. (51 cm) wide and narrow 
slightly forwards (Walker 2006: 76-78). 
Princess Charlotte was constructed of white oak, except for two samples from a hull 
plank and the false keel that were of chestnut (Moore 2006: 62). There was a lack of fasteners 
noted on the wreck as the chocks between the first and third futtocks were often not bolted or 
spiked, but held by ceiling planking or the clamp. This fits the lack of iron fasteners that were 
noted in the Kingston yard during the construction of Princess Charlotte and Prince Regent 
(Walker 2006: 97). This indicates that, where possible, the best resources, such as white oak 
were employed; but often the shipyard, located in a frontier region, was limited by lack of 
supplies such as iron fasteners. 
HMS Prince Regent 
 The wreck of HMS Prince Regent lies approximately 0.24 mi. (0.38 km) from HMS 
Princess Charlotte, tucked further in Deadman Bay. The only archaeological recording 
conducted on this wreck was conducted by Jonathan Moore with the aim of measuring the 
dimensions of the wreck, taking measurements of timber and fastener scantlings, and recording 
the frame assembly method. A detailed archaeological recording project, like that conducted on 
HMS Princess Charlotte, has yet to be conducted on this wreck (Moore 2006).  
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The wreck consists of an unbroken hull section that is present from the forefoot to the aft 
face of the sternpost with a total length of 160.7 ft. (49 m). The wreck is heeled to port and, 
therefore, better preserved on the portside where it is mostly buried in the sediment. On the 
portside, the wreck survives to the turn of the bilge, while the starboard side is only intact to the 
heads of the floor cross chocks. At least 108 alternating floor and first futtock positions are 
apparent along the hull. The hull is fastened with iron bolts joining the structural components and 
frames, and nails or spikes to attach the planking (Moore 2006: 50). 
The stern assembly consists of the sternpost, inner sternpost, and deadwood. Three 
gudgeons and gudgeon straps are attached to the sternpost, and a cast iron pintle stop is bolted to 
the sternpost under the upper gudgeon. The inner sternpost is only partially intact, with two small 
transoms attached that rested atop the deadwood. There is no evidence of a large knee connecting 
the inner sternpost with the aft end of the keelson. The base of the sternpost and the aft end of the 
keel are buried, but the top of a third rudder gudgeon was discovered with some probing. The 
bow demonstrates a poor state of preservation, as only a small section of the forefoot and an iron 
horseshoe plate remain articulated at the bow (Moore 2006: 50, 52). 
The frames on the portside are mostly covered by the ceiling planking, silt, and other 
debris. The limber strake on the portside runs the length of the keel and is offset 11 in. (0.28 m). 
The eroded frame ends are visible at the turn of the bilge. Unfortunately, the wreck did not 
survive to the point of the orlop deck, where the deck beams would have joined with the clamp, 
waterway, and other reinforcing timbers. The lower framing consisted of three components: 
cross chocks for both the half-floors and first futtocks; half-floors; and first futtocks. The cross 
chocks are still articulated with the keel and keelson, but all of the starboard half-floors, first 
futtocks, and planking have collapsed to the lakebed. The floor cross chocks alternate with the 
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first futtocks in order to create double frames. The cross chocks and first futtocks show no 
evidence of limber holes; and with the tight spacing of the frames, bilge water must have 
collected in the hold. There are no surviving cant frames (Moore 2005: 52). 
The keelson is mostly flat, with only a gentle deadrise at the stern and little rise at the 
stem. It consists of five timbers, of which the longest is approximately 36 ft. (11 m) long. All 
were joined by a diagonal hook scarf except for that located at the mizzenmast step, which was 
joined by a plain diagonal scarf. A rider keelson was located above the keelson joined by a flat 
scarf. A 19.2 ft. (5.85 m) section between the fore and main mast steps is no longer present 
(Moore 2006: 50).  
Three masts steps were located along the keelson that were all made in an unusual 
method. They were not made as saddle type mast steps, with timbers that fit over the keelson, but 
rather from the timbers of the keelson and rider keelson. Each step is delineated by a fore-aft 
break in the rider keelson with a fore-aft timber on either side bolted to the molded sides of the 
keelson and rider keelson (Figure 4-10). Large bolsters on either side of the step provided 
additional support. All three mast steps are 11 in. (27.9 cm) wide, or the width of the keelson. 
Aft of the main mast step is a small, rectangular step located in the rider keelson that likely 
served as a step for a deck beam, bulkhead stanchion, or the capstan. The ceiling planking near 
the main mast step is similarly mortised for stanchions for the shot locker or other bulkheads. 
Two bulkheads are located in these positions on the original lines plan of Prince Regent (Moore 
2006: 50). 
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Figure 4-10: The unusual mast step assembly of HMS Prince Regent constructed of a break in the rider keelson with fore 
and aft timbers on either side (Photo courtesy Jonathan Moore, Parks Canada). 
 
Of eleven wood species collected from the hull of Prince Regent, all were of oak. The use 
of straight grained wood alongside the crude construction of the bottom timbers indicates that 
this vessel was made quickly and that the shipwrights were not concerned with its longevity 
(Moore 2006: 52). 
HMS St. Lawrence 
 While the Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte were nearing completion, Sir James 
Lucas Yeo, commander of the British naval forces in the Great Lakes, heard news of new vessels 
on the stocks at Sackets Harbor (the Jefferson, Jones, and Superior) (Moore 2006: 10). Yeo’s 
response was to build a third vessel, a three-decked 102 gun ship, which would become the 
largest built at Kingston and the only Royal Navy ship of the line ever to be launched and 
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operated entirely in fresh water (Malcomson 2001: 112). The keel for HMS St. Lawrence was 
laid 12 April 1814. It was designed by William Bell, the master shipwright of the Provincial 
Marine dockyard at Amherstburg, who had arrived in Kingston in November 1813, and was 
completed by Thomas Strickland when Bell returned to England (Malcomson 2001: 114). 
 As St. Lawrence was being constructed, some fears arose as to its sturdinesss, since it was 
built with very few knees. Advertisements in the Kingston Gazette announce that the Navy Yard 
was searching for knees of oak, elm, or spruce (1814: 3). The drafts of St. Lawrence show sixty 
lodging knees on the orlop deck; however, no hanging knees appear on the original cross section 
plan, which shows the beams mortised and tenoned to the frames and resting on clamps. The 
deck was also depicted as supported only by a large shelf that was bolted to the frames and 
waterway. Bell stiffened the frame with three rows of carlines against each other, bolted to the 
frame (Figure 4-11). However, the vessel must have been deemed sturdy as it was launched and 
completed in a period of less than 10 months (Malcomson 2001: 112-114).  
The launch of St. Lawrence at Kingston on 10 September 1814 allowed Yeo command of 
the lake, although late in the war (Malcomson 2001: 115-116). This first rate ship was the largest 
on the lake, and has been compared in power to HMS Victory (Hitsman 1999: 251). Yeo did not 
attempt an attack on Chauncey’s fleet at Sackets Harbor, but with his control of the lake was able 
to transport troops and provisions to the army on the Niagara Peninsula. After two such voyages, 
St. Lawrence docked for the winter. Although both the British and Americans formulated plans 
for the 1815 sailing season, 1814 was the end of the naval conflict on the Great Lakes on account 
of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent on 24 December 1814, ending the War of 1812 
(Malcomson 2001: 116).  
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Figure 4-11: Cross section draft of HMS St. Lawrence shows the ‘kneeless’ system used in construction (National 
Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London, Regd No. 79). 
The vessel sat in ordinary in Navy Bay until 1832, when the British began their final 
withdrawal from the inland waters of Canada (Malcomson 1998: 326). At this time, ships that 
had not already been scrapped were disposed of in another manner. St. Lawrence was sold in 
1833 for £25 to a Kingston brewery to serve as a wharf (Malcomson 1998: 326, Moore 2006: 
23). Recording St. Lawrence became a part of the 1995-1998 photographic survey undertaken by 
Jonathan Moore for Preserve Our Wrecks. In 2006, Jonathan Moore continued research on the 
wreck (Moore 2006). 
 All that remains of St. Lawrence is a 105.35 ft. (32.12 m) long segment of one side of the 
lower framing that would have originally been positioned next to the keel and keelson ( 
Figure 4-12). This section consists of 35 square frames. At the east end of the site, exterior hull 
planking projects out from under the framing up to 6 ft. 10 in. (2.1 m). The surviving parts of the 
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frames include half-floors, first futtocks, and second futtocks. The recesses for chocks are visible 
at the terminal ends of some frames. The half-floor heels were attached to each other with a lap 
scarf and secured with four bolts with roves arranged in a diagonal pattern. The half-floor and 
futtocks are fastened with bolts with square shanks that were 1 ¼ in. (3.2 cm) thick. The first 
futtock heels would not have extended all the way to the keel, but would have terminated at the 
garboard strake. There is no evidence of limber holes within the half-floors or first futtocks. The 
frame spacing on the vessel measured 12 in. (30.5 cm) (Moore 2006: 70). 
 
 
Figure 4-12: The remains of one side of the lower framing of HMS St. Lawrence (Photo courtesy of Jonathan Moore, 
Parks Canada). 
 
Few longitudinal timbers from the wreck survive. All that survives is a part of the limber 
strake and one ceiling plank. The limber strake has a groove to accept the limber board. The 
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external hull planking that exists was fastened to the frames with ¾ in. (1.9 cm) iron nails. It is 
not possible to determine the orientation of the bow and stern based on the remaining frames, nor 
whether this section is from the port or starboard sides. Since all the frames are perpendicular to 
the original keel, this clearly represents a mid-section of the vessel (Moore 2006: 45-46).  
A total of five wood species samples were collected from the remains of St. Lawrence, all 
of which are white oak, except the half floor that is rock elm (Moore 2006: 48). This 
demonstrates that the shipwrights took care to use sturdy timbers for the parts of the vessels that 
would take the majority of the strain. An absence of limber holes indicates hasty construction 
and that the vessel was not intended for an extensive career (Moore 2006: 48).  
War of 1812 Vessel Attributes 
 The ships that were built and launched on the interior lakes for the War of 1812 were of a 
unique construction design. These were purpose built warships designed to sail on freshwater, 
which allowed the ships to be heavily armed, included a high degree of deadrise, but were still 
required to have a shallow draft. Large timbers and substantial framing was essential for these 
ships to meet in battle and carry their heavy armaments, unlike the earlier merchant vessels that 
needed to be strengthened before they were battle ready. Although the British opted to carry 
more carronades than long guns, due to their lighter weight, these vessels were still heavily 
constructed.  The majority of these vessels were built with double frames so that there was 
minimal space between the frames. Before the attachment of the planking, these ships must have 
already appeared very solid and durable. As the vessels operated on the fresh water lakes, this 
eliminated the need to carry fresh water in the hold while permitting the vessels extreme deadrise 
in order to be quick and weatherly but still carry heavy guns. The following table demonstrates 
the characteristics and scantlings of these War of 1812 vessels for easy comparison.
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Table 2: Characteristics of War of 1812 Vessels 
 Eagle Linnet Jefferson St. Lawrence Princess Charlotte Prince Regent  
Date 1814 1814 1814 1814 1814 1814 
Nationality American British American British British British 
Vessel function Warship Warship Warship Warship Warship Warship 
Length overall Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed 160.7 ft. 
Beam Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed 
Keel length 106 ft. 5 in. 85 ft. 108 ft. 9 in. (preserved) Not listed 121 ft. 4 in. Not listed 
Keel molded 18 in. 13.5 ft. 1 ft. 11 in. Not listed 16 in.  Not listed 
Keel sided 12 in. 8.25-3.75 in. 11.5 in. Not listed 12 in. Not listed 
Keel wood type Hard maple, oak Oak Oak Oak Oak Oak 
Keel notched No No No Not listed Yes Not listed 
Keelson length Not listed 44 ft. (preserved) 57 ft. (preserved), estimated total 109 
ft. 3 in. 
Not listed Not listed Not listed 
Keelson molded 14 in. 11.25-12.5 in. 21 in. Not listed 12 5/8 in. 14. ½ in. 
Keelson sided 12 in. 6-8.5 in. 10-10.5 in. Not listed 12 in. 11 
Keelson wood type Oak Oak Oak Oak Oak Oak 
Keelson notched No Yes No Not listed Yes Not listed 
Floor avg. molded 22 in. 9-10 in. 13.5-16 in. 18 in 16 in. 35 in. 
Floor avg. sided 8-10 in. 7-9 in. 9-9.5 in. Not listed 12 in. 13 ½ - 14 in. 
Futtock avg. molded Not listed Not listed 16 in 15-16 in. 13 ½ - 16 in. 17 in. 
Futtock avg. sided Not listed Not listed 7 1/8-9.5 in. 10-11 in. 4-7 in. 12 in. 
Frame spacing Approx.. 6 in. 18-24 in. on centers 5 in. 12 in. 1.5 in. 1-2 in. 
Frame wood type Not listed Not listed Maple, oak Rock elm Not listed Not listed 
Frames notched No No Notched to fit over keel Not listed Not listed Not listed 
External planking thickness Not listed Not listed 1.5-2 in. and 3-4 in. 2-2 ½ in. 3 in. 2 in. 
External planking wood type Not listed Pine Mostly oak and some white pine Oak Chestnut  Oak 
Ceiling planking thickness 1.5 in. 2 in. 2-2.5 in. 7-9 in. 1 in. 2-2 ½ in. 
Ceiling planking wood type White pine Not listed Oak, white pine Oak Oak Oak 
Number of masts Two Two Two Three Two Three 
Mast step type Saddle type Block on top of keelson 
(not saddle) 
Saddle type Not listed Saddle type Keelson and rider 
keelson 
Compass timbers No Yes  Not listed Yes No No 
Fasteners Iron  Iron, treenails Iron Iron Iron Iron 
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In both the British and American cases, the majority of the materials required to 
construct, ballast, and arm these vessels needed to be shipped to the shipyards from the 
industrialized cities on the Atlantic Coast, in Lower Canada, and even Great Britain. These 
limitations, along with a lack of seasoned timber supplies, forced the shipwrights to modify their 
construction techniques. While the British were able to locate oak for the construction of their 
vessels, the Americans used whatever timber species were available, and both used green wood. 
In England, a tree was aged one year for each inch of its thickness, but this was not possible 
when building vessels for war on the Great Lakes where reserves of wood were not stockpiled 
(Bamford 2007: 134). The British vessels Linnet, St. Lawrence, Prince Regent, and Princess 
Charlotte demonstrate the use of oak throughout their construction. The St. Lawrence 
demonstrated the use of rock elm for some of the frames. As St. Lawrence was one of the largest 
vessels built on the Great Lakes at the time and it was built near the end of the war after the 
shipyard in Kingston had already constructed several vessels, the oak supplies in the surrounding 
region were already greatly depleted, resulting in the use of other types of wood in the vessel’s 
construction. If more of the vessel survived, it could be possible to determine that other aspects 
of the construction did not require the strength of oak and were constructed from rock elm or 
spruce, the wood species specified in the advertisement in the Kingston Gazette (1814:3). One 
piece of deadwood and all the external planking on Linnet was constructed from white pine 
rather than oak. 
While the American shipwrights also employed oak in the construction of their vessels, 
these stores must have been greatly exhausted as hard maple was used alongside oak for the keel 
of Eagle, as well as for the frames of Jefferson. Hard maples are heavy, strong, and stiff. They 
have good shock resistance, moderate shrinkage, and grow up to 100-125 feet in height. While 
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hard maple was more commonly employed in furniture, it was often used in ship construction as 
well (Mitchel 1994: 82-82). White pine was used for the ceiling planking of Eagle and Jefferson 
as well as some of the frames of Jefferson. White pine was a moderately soft, light, yet strong 
wood. The species was a preferred wood for furniture construction as it was inexpensive and 
easy to work, which may account for its use in ceiling planking. Ceiling planking needed to be 
strong, durable, water resistant, and able to bend and fit the ships curves (Mitchel 1994: 92, 66). 
As white pine was easily worked, strong, and readily available in the forests surrounding the 
Great Lakes, it made for an ideal wood for planking. 
Linnet clearly employed the use of compass timbers, which were used for all of the 
floors. It is also likely that compass timbers were also employed for knees throughout the vessel 
which no longer remain. While knees were also employed on the Princess Charlotte for the knee 
of the head and the stern deadwood knee and it is likely for other portions of the vessel that no 
longer remain. St. Lawrence employed the use of compass timbers as the advertisement in the 
Kingston Gazette specifically sought knees of oak, elm, or spruce. Likewise, the drafts of St. 
Lawrence show sixty lodging knees on the orlop deck. However, the lack of adequate compass 
timbers required the shipwrights to fashion curved pieces from straight grained old growth 
timbers fastened together with bolts and metal plates which necessitated the limited use of knees 
in vessels such as St. Lawrence. The modified strengthening techniques employed on St. 
Lawrence indicate that care was taken to ensure that the vessel was sturdy for sail and battle. No 
knees were employed at all in the construction of Eagle or Jefferson. The lack of knees in the 
American vessels demonstrate hurried construction and possible disregard for the sturdiness of 
these vessels, as they were constructed hastily for the purpose of only a few battles. 
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Linnet is the only War of 1812 vessel that demonstrated the use of treenails, while iron 
fasteners were employed in the construction of the other lake warships. Treenails are driven 
through planking and frames to ensure a tight fit. While they created a secure joint, treenails 
were also time-consuming to fashion and install. When speed of construction was imperative and 
iron was available, iron fasteners were likely used to accelerate construction; therefore, treenails 
were seldom used during the War of 1812. 
The shape of the keel of these vessels are very similar to those from before the War of 
1812 that sailed on the Great Lakes, but the keels are deeper than they are wide. Surprisingly, 
although the vessels built during the war were much larger than the merchant vessels built before 
the war, the dimensions of the keel are not significantly larger. The keels of all of these vessels 
were made from strong oak. The smallest of the vessels, Linnet, had a keel that was made from a 
single timber, while the other vessels had keels composed of between two to three timbers 
scarfed together.  
The average size of the frames was comparable between the vessels. All employed the 
use of square frames; however, the Princess Charlotte used a system of cross chocks and frames 
that allowed for greater deadrise. Many of the frames on Eagle were unfinished with some 
surfaces that were the original tree surface. This greatly differed from the other American vessel, 
Jefferson, which displayed a high level of craftsmanship with finished timbers that showed 
evidence of a skilled carpenter. Clearly, more care was taken in the construction of Jefferson. 
These vessels displayed tight frame spacing, the most extreme exhibited by Princess Charlotte 
with less than 1.5 in. between the frames. The heavy construction of these vessels was a result of 
their purpose as warships. 
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The keelsons of these vessels all measured slightly smaller than their keels. British 
shipwrights tended to follow the conventions set out by Sutherland to notch the keelson to fit 
over the floors (1711: 26-27). Notches are not evident on the keelsons of the American warships 
Eagle, Jefferson, and the gunboat Allen (Emery 2003) from 1812 but are present on the British 
Linnet, Princess Charlotte, and the gunboat Radcliffe (Amer 1986: 81). In the case of the 
Princess Charlotte, both the keel and keelson showed evidence of notching for the frames. 
Jefferson’s hull was strengthened by notching the frames to fit over the keel.  
The majority of mast steps on these vessels were of the saddle type, which was a very 
strong step since the wood grain ran perpendicular to the force enacted upon it. Two exceptions 
were noted, that of the mainmast step of Linnet and all of the steps from Prince Regent. The 
mainmast step of Linnet consisted of a wide block that was bolted to the keelson. Unlike a saddle 
mast step, it did not extend on either side of the keelson, and likely could not take the same force 
as the saddle type step. The mast steps on Prince Regent were made in an unconventional 
fashion, with large bolsters on either side of the keelson to support the mast. This was likely a 
quick way to fashion a mast step that would have allowed the vessel to be quickly armed for 
battle. 
The American vessels demonstrate hasty construction methods in order to quicken the 
launch of these ships, such as roughly hewn timbers as well as chocks, wedges, and other filler 
pieces that were added to compensate for insufficient molded or sided dimensions indicating 
improper measurements before cutting and shaping timbers. The British vessels built in Kingston 
do not show the use of limber holes, with the tight spacing of the frames water would have 
collected in the bilges, while the Linnet, built at Ile-aux-Noix, demonstrated some limber holes. 
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Jefferson was also lacking limber holes. This indicates a lack of concern for longevity of these 
vessels, since they were only intended for the war.  
 The construction of these purpose built warships during the War of 1812 was the product 
of the function for which they were built as well as the logistical difficulty in procuring supplies. 
These vessels were only intended to survive the period of the war and needed to be constructed 
quickly in order to gain supremacy on the lakes as command depended upon the size of the fleet 
and its potential to overpower the enemy. Early in the war, the importance of a strong naval force 
to control the waterways was deemed essential. Throughout the course of the war, both the 
British and the Americans increased the size and armament of their ships built on the lakes in 
order to maintain naval parity or gain ascendancy, since naval power was determined not through 
fleet interaction but fleet intimidation. 
  
CHAPTER 5 : DETAILS OF POST- WAR OF 1812 VESSELS 
The War of 1812 was inconclusive and a stalemate was officially recognized when the 
war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent on December 24, 1814. After the war, the 
Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 was signed between representatives Richard Rush of the United 
States and James Bagot of Britain. Though not a formal treaty, it limited the number of active 
armed vessels on the Great Lakes. British and American warships were placed in ordinary and 
soon showed signs of dry rot. Consequently, they were broken up, hauled up on land, or sunk. 
While naval operations slowly came to an end on the Great Lakes after the War of 1812, the 
unprecedented immigration to the region encouraged trade and commerce. The war had greatly 
hindered commercial activities along both sides of the border and, especially, across the lakes. At 
the end of the war, there were few merchant vessels on the lakes, since many had been 
commandeered for naval use (Ford 2009: 140).  
With the need for more ships for commercial use, shipbuilding moved away from the 
naval yards. During the commercial boom from 1820 to 1860, almost every port, river, or bay 
along the lakes had a shipyard (Van Gemert 1972: 292). Passenger and cargo vessels soon 
outnumbered military vessels. While the majority of shipwrights on the Lakes in the early 19th 
century were trained in naval yards, it had already been established that schooners were better 
suited to the lakes than the typical square rigged naval vessels. Great changes in technology 
following the War of 1812 revolutionized ship construction on the Great Lakes. While sail 
vessels multiplied, steam transportation was introduced in 1816. By the 1850s, most large vessels 
constructed were steam (Ford 2009: 176). Shipbuilding forever changed on the Great Lakes with 
the opening of the Welland Canal in 1829, which allowed for the first navigation between Lake 
Ontario and the Upper Lakes. Merchants sought vessels that would fit the dimensions of the 
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locks, 110 ft. by 22 ft. (33.5 m by 6.7 m) and a distinct type of canal schooner developed 
(Jackson 1997: 42; Monk 2003). 
Archaeologically documented sailing vessels on the Great Lakes built immediately after 
the War of 1812 period are limited. The Tecumseth and Newash were constructed on Lake Erie 
following the peace after the War of 1812 and prior to the restrictions set in place by the Rush 
Bagot Agreement in 1817 (Gordon 2009). During the commercial boom from 1820 to 1860, 
sailing vessels dominated on the Great Lakes waters. Few records exist which describe the 
design and construction of these vernacular craft that were constructed in almost every port, river 
or bay along the lakes and archaeology serves as a tool for understanding the construction of 
these regional craft. The Millecoquins wreck, excavated near the mouth of the Millecoquins 
River in northern part of Lake Michigan, likely dates to the early 1830s (Whitesides 2003). The 
Griffon Cove wreck, located in Georgian Bay, dates to between 1840 and 1860 (Hundley 1980).  
Many of the wrecking events on the Great Lakes took place along the shoals and near 
shorelines, and were quite often salvaged shortly after the wrecking event. Vessels that 
foundered in the middle of the lakes did so in depths that often exceeded several hundred feet. 
Shipwrecks located in these depths are beyond the range of recreational divers and require costly 
search and support equipment to locate and document them. Recently, several vessels that date 
from after the War of 1812 have been discovered, but have yet to be systematically recorded. 
These include the Tiller Wreck near Port Dalhousie on Lake Ontario (Garrington 1997), the 
schooner Orcadian near Sodus Point, New York (Kennard 2006), and the schooner Milan near 
Oak Orchard, New York (Kennard 2005). Further study of these vessels would greatly aid in 
understanding the construction techniques used on vernacular sailing vessels and schooners on 
the Great Lakes.  
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HMS Tecumseth and Newash 
 At the end of the war, ships remained essential on the upper lakes for the transportation 
of men, supplies, and news. Word of peace did not reach Fort Michilimackinac, at the upper end 
of Lake Huron, until nearly five months after the Treaty of Ghent was signed (McDouall to 
Forster, 15 March 1815, in Wood 1920: 532). While the entire Royal Navy squadron on the 
upper lakes had been captured at the Battle of Lake Erie, in the fall of 1814, the British captured 
two American schooners used for carrying supplies and renamed them Huron and Sauk. 
However, two vessels were not sufficient for carrying provisions and stores; therefore, 
Commodore Edward William Campbell Rich Owen, Commodore James Lucas Yeo’s 
replacement on the Great Lakes at the end of the war, resolved to build a small number of 
transport vessels for service on the upper lakes. With the authorized closure of the shipyard at 
Penetanguishene on Lake Huron, the shipwrights returned to Kingston and E.W.C.R. Owen 
decided instead to construct two new schooners on Lake Erie, Tecumseth and Newash (Gordon 
2009: 13).  
 A plan for the two schooners was drafted by Robert Moore, the assistant shipwright at 
Kingston, and a party of shipwrights departed for Lake Erie. The shipwrights selected the 
location of Street’s Creek along the Niagara River, near the mouth of the Chippawa River. This 
site was only nine miles from the town of Queenston on Lake Ontario, enabling supplies to be 
easily transported. The keels of Tecumseth and Newash were laid in the middle of May 1815 and 
were launched nearly three months later on 13 August 1815. They measured 70 ft. 6 in. (21.4 m) 
in length on their decks and 24 ft. 5 in. (7.4 m) in beam. In addition to transporting stores, it was 
critical that the two schooners were also capable of serving as warships in the event that 
hostilities with America resurfaced. The schooners were designed to carry four guns each, two 
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24-pounder guns and two 32-pounder carronades, all carried on the deck. Tecumseth, Newash, 
Huron, and Sauk were the only royal authority on the upper lakes. They were used not only for 
transportation of goods, but also for enforcing revenue laws on Lake Erie (Gordon 2009: 14, 26, 
28). 
 The Rush-Bagot Agreement rendered Newash and Tecumseth inoperable, since even 
without their 24-pounder guns, the hulls were larger than 100 tons. The vessels were therefore 
laid up in ordinary, stripped of their guns and equipment, and left at anchor on 18 June 1817 in 
Penetanguishene Bay on Lake Huron. By 1819, Tecumseth and Newash were already showing 
signs of dry rot when Commodore Robert Barrie visited Penetanguishene. By the 1820s, both 
vessels were rotten and sinking at their moorings. A survey conducted in 1827 noted that 
Tecumseth and Newash were “completely rotten” and that Newash was “on the beach.” In 1831, 
the hulls were included on a list of naval stores to be auctioned, but neither were sold and they 
remained in the bay. The establishment at Penetanguishene officially closed in 1834 (Gordon 
2009: 81-86) 
 On 29 August 1953, Tecumseth was removed by a dredge from Penetanguishene harbor. 
It was originally believed that this was the wreck of Scorpion, an American built schooner that 
was captured by the British in 1814, and renamed Confiance; however, it was determined to be 
too large, but the dimensions did correspond with those of Tecumseth and Newash. The wreck 
was determined to be Tecumseth through evidence of the rig, since Newash had been re-rigged as 
a brigantine and its foremast removed. At that time, the wreck was labeled and displayed 
outdoors on the grounds at the former naval depot at Penetanguishene, where a museum called 
Discovery Harbour was established. In 1977, wood samples from the wreck were sent to the 
Canadian Conservation Institute (CCI) for analysis. The condition of the vessel was not good, as 
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it had been exposed to the elements for over 20 years; the deterioration of the improperly 
conserved wood resulted in warping and splitting. Likewise, exposure to the elements resulted in 
damage from microorganisms. While studies were undertaken shortly after the vessel was 
removed from the harbor, a detailed archaeological study of Tecumseth was not conducted until 
June 1997 by a team of students from Texas A&M (Gordon 2009: 88-95). The Texas A&M team 
conducted a non-disturbance survey on the remains of Newash in situ at the bottom of 
Penetanguishene harbor the following summer. The remains of Newash were located in 6 to 12 
ft. (1.83 to 3.66 m) of water, listing to the port side (Figure 5-1). Zebra mussels covered some of 
the wreck, particularly the iron fasteners (Gordon 2009: 99). 
 
Figure 5-1: Plan of Newash remains (Gordon 2009: 96). 
 Tecumseth’s keel was made of a single piece of unseasoned white oak that measured 55 
ft. 9 ¾ in. (17.02 m) long (Figure 5-2). It was sided 10 in. (25.41 cm) and molded 13 in. (33.03 
cm). Newash’s keel was almost completely buried in the sediment and measurements could only 
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be taken near the bow. It was sided 8-10 in. (20.3 to 25.4 cm) and molded 13 ¾ to 16 ½ in. (34.9 
to 41.9 cm). No false keel was observed near the bow; however, two grooves along the bottom of 
the keel may demonstrate its existence and several iron bolts extended below the keel, which 
may have been used to attach the false keel (Gordon 2009: 101-102). 
 
Figure 5-2: Plan of Tecumseth remains (Gordon 2009: 97). 
 Tecumseth’s stem was joined to the keel with a boxing scarf, a complex joint that 
indicates great care in construction. The stem only partially survived to a length of 13 ft. 4 in. 
(4.07 m) in length and was made from compass timber. The gripe was attached to the keel 
forward of and below the stem and was made from straight grained timber. Only the lower 8 ft. 9 
in. (2.67 m) of the gripe remained. It was sided 10 in. (27.9 cm) and molded 18 ¼ in. (46.37 cm) 
at its greatest depth. Reinforcing the joint of the gripe and keel were two ½ in. (1.27 cm) thick 
iron horseshoe plates attached with five iron bolts, placed on either side of the keel. The upper 
ends of the plate were bolted to the stem. The joints of the stem and keel and the gripe and keel 
128 
 
were offset so that they did not directly overlay each other. The deadwood was only accessible 
near the bow and was molded 3 in. (7.62 cm) (Gordon 2009: 102-108). 
 Tecumseth’s sternpost was attached to the keel with a mortise and tenon joint reinforced 
with two iron fishplates attached with six round bolts. The rabbet in the keel continued up the 
forward corners of the sternpost. Ceiling planking obscured the sternpost and stern knee that 
were visible on the original construction draft. The after sternpost was beveled on each side to 
allow for the rudder. Two gudgeons survived that were placed 6 ft. 2in. (1.88 m) apart. Only one 
gudgeon could be located on Newash’s sternpost (Gordon 2009: 106-108). 
 The frame assembly methods were comparable on both Tecumseth and Newash. The first 
futtocks were placed aft of the floors forward of the midship frame, and forward of the floors aft 
of the midship frame. The first futtocks met at the centerline but did not cross it. The interior and 
exterior planking of Tecumseth remained intact; however, some of the planking had eroded or 
been torn away, allowing access to the framing. There were sixteen square frames, and an 
indefinite number of cant frames in the bow and half frames at the stern. A sample taken from 
one frame in 1976 identified it as white oak, while some of the frames studied in the 1950s were 
noted to be of pine. The frames averaged 9.10 in. (23.12 cm) molded and 10 in. (25.4 cm) sided. 
The frames were placed on 30 in. (79.22 cm) centers (Gordon 2009: 110). Roughly cut limber 
holes were cut into the bottom of all floors and first futtocks, with one hole on either side of the 
keel (Gordon 2009: 118).  
 Tecumseth’s white oak keelson consisted of two separate timbers hook scarfed together. 
It was sided 9 ¼ in. (23.5 cm) and molded 11 in. (27.9 cm). It was also hook scarfed to the 
stemson and sternson. It was notched to fit over the floors and fastened with 1.13 in. (2.86 cm) 
diameter bolts. The stemson was made of a piece of compass timber. Newash’s keelson was 
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made of two separate timbers scarfed together (Gordon 2009: 111). Tecumseth’s keelson 
displayed weathered shallow impressions for deck beam stanchions. Six deck beam stanchion 
mortises were found atop Newash’s keelson forward of the mainmast step, but there were no 
traces of stanchions aft of the mainmast step (Gordon 2009: 118).  
Evidence of the forward mast steps could not be found on either of the wrecks; however 
bolts remained on Tecumseth that indicated its location far forward in the bow (Gordon 2009: 
112). Since Newash was re-rigged as a brigantine and the foremast moved, the original location 
would have been equivalent to that of Tecumseth. The original drafts of the Tecumseth and 
Newash show the foremast stepped so far forward as to be in the lower portion of the stemson 
(National Maritime Museum 1815) (Figure 5-3). The extreme location forward of the foremast 
was presumably to compensate for the steeper rake of the schooner’s masts. 
 
Figure 5-3: Admiralty lines plan of Tecumseth and Newash showing the foremast stepped far forward in the lower portion 
of the stemson (National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London ZAZ6137). 
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The mainmast steps on both Tecumseth and Newash were mortises cut directly into the 
top of the keelson. On Tecumseth, this mortise was located 8.63 in. (21.9 cm) aft of the hook 
scarf. It measured 6.69 in. (16.9 cm) wide and 9 ½ in. (24.1 m) long. Dry rot prevented obtaining 
accurate depth measurements. The mainmast step was reinforced with an iron plate on either 
side. Newash’s mainmast step differed slightly from that found on Tecumseth. The width of the 
keelson remained uniform on Tecumseth; however, on Newash the keelson widened where the 
mainmast step was located. The enlarged portion of the keelson measured 5 ft. 8 ¼ in. (1.73 m) 
long and 11 ½ in. (29.22 cm) sided. The mortise measured 8 ½ in. (21.6 cm) wide and 10 ¼ in. 
(26 cm) long. At its forward end, the mortise measured 4 ¾ in. (12 cm) deep, and sloped to 5 in. 
(12.7 cm) at its after end. There was no evidence of reinforcing iron plates on the sides of the 
mortise (Gordon 2009: 91, 112-115). 
Observations made in 1953 indicate that Tecumseth was constructed without hanging 
knees, but instead with an enlarged clamp and waterway to stiffen the vessel. The clamp and 
waterway no longer survive on Tecumseth, and disarticulated timbers surrounding Newash may 
represent these internal bracing pieces. As smaller vessels, Tecumseth and Newash may not have 
required the internal reinforcement of knees (Gordon 2009: 122). 
Tecumseth’s ash garboard strake measured 12 in. (30.49 cm) wide and 2 in. (5.08 cm) 
thick, although these may have warped and shrunk due to exposure to the elements since the 
construction draft indicated that they were originally 2 ½ in. (6.35 cm) thick. Oak and pine were 
used for the remainder of the exterior planking, which were fastened to the frames with ½ in. 
(1.27 cm) square spikes and treenails (Gordon 2009: 126).  
Tecumseth and Newash were constructed during a time of uncertain hostilities on the 
Great Lakes. The War of 1812 had just ended when their construction was ordered, yet the 
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certainty that hostilities would not be renewed that followed the Rush-Bagot agreement had yet 
to come. They were not purpose built warships like those built during the War of 1812, but a 
hybrid of warship and the merchant. Their construction demonstrates a shift in the paradigms 
that influenced ship construction following the war. 
Millecoquins Wreck 
 The Millecoquins wreck was discovered in the spring of 1990 by two residents of 
Naubinway, Michigan in the Millecoquins River, approximately 1.5 miles from Naubinway. The 
Millecoquins River is located on Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and flows into Lake Michigan 
approximately 50 miles west of the Straits of Mackinac. The wreck lies on the west bank of the 
river approximately 328 ft. (100 m) inland from the present Lake Michigan shoreline and is 
oriented generally east-west. The wreck is well preserved, as it remained intact below the sheer 
as well as the interior arrangement. Furthermore, still present are large portions of the ship’s 
cargo, equipment, and crew’s personal items. Three seasons of investigations were carried out on 
the Millecoquins wreck: a preliminary survey by John Halsey and Patrick Labadie in 1990, and 
two seasons of excavations conducted by East Carolina University in 1991 (Figure 5-4) and 1994 
(Whitesides 2003: 18-19). 
 
Figure 5-4: Plan of the Millecoquins wreck after the 1991 excavations (Whitesides 2003: 24). 
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 The overall length of the Millecoquins wreck measured 62 ft. (18.8 m) in length and 17 
ft. 5 in. (5.3 m) in beam, with a maximum draft of 7 ft. (2.1 m). The white oak keel measured 12 
in. (30.5 cm) molded and 8 in. (20.3 cm) sided. These measurements were taken at the bow 
where the keel transitioned into the forefoot and are believed to represent the maximum molded 
dimensions. Where the forward end of the keel meets the stem, the stempost measured 5 in. (12.7 
cm) sided and widens to 8 in. (20.3 cm) sided at the forefoot. It is molded 10 in. (25.4 cm) at the 
rabbet (Whitesides 2003: 27). 
 The only surviving pieces of the upper stern transom included the outer sternpost and two 
horizontal transom timbers. The lower transom timber was directly atop the deadwood or a 
deadwood knee. No measurements were stated for the deadwood timbers. The only portion of the 
sternpost that was accessible for measurement was just above the upper transom. Here, it 
measured 5 in. (12.7 cm) sided and 10 in. (25.4 cm) molded with a concave aft face to accept the 
rudder. A “VII” draft mark was carved on the sternpost and two gudgeon straps were located 
below this mark (Whitesides 2003: 27-28). 
 The framing on the Millecoquins wreck consisted of square frames throughout the hull 
and cant frames in the bow. The floors measured 6.5 in. (16.5 cm) sided and 9.5 in. (24.1 cm) 
molded and were spaced 11 - 12 in. (27.9 – 30.4 cm) in their centers. Only a single floor timber 
was located in the bow and stern of the vessel. The second futtock was scarfed to the floor with a 
lipped joint. At the maximum beam, several of the frames were tripled, instead of the typical 
double framing pattern. The cant frames in the bow consisted of single frames, and in the stern 
the double frames transitioned to single or half frames (Whitesides 2003: 28). 
 The white oak keelson was sided 7 in. (17.7 cm) and 8.5 in. (21.5 cm) molded and runs 
the entire length of the vessel; however, it is unclear if this was a single timber. The keelson was 
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notched to fit over the floors. Forward, the keelson is attached to the stem by the forefoot. In the 
stern, it was believed that a stern knee would have originally attached the keelson to the transom 
timbers, but none of this was visible since the ship is completely intact to the deck but burried 
(Whitesides 2003: 28). 
The ceiling planking was present the full length of the vessel and covered the frames 
from the keelson to the clamp. It ranged in thickness from 1 – 2.5 in. (2.5 – 6.3 cm) in thickness. 
The ceiling planking was fastened to the frames with iron spikes and there were indications of 
blue paint near the spike heads. The ceiling planks were originally loosely fit and tightened with 
wedges placed between the seams. The exterior hull planking was mostly inaccessible due to the 
fact that the hull was buried in the sand. The planking that was recorded varied in thickness from 
2.25 – 3 in. (5.7 – 7.6 cm) (Whitesides 2003: 28-29). 
 Two mast steps were present on the vessel. The foremast step is a saddle type mast step 
which measured 2 ft. 2 in. (65 cm) long and 5 in. (12.7 cm) wide that was notched to fit over the 
keelson with a mortise to accept the mast and located 6 ft. (1.8 m) aft of the stem. An 1833 
United States penny was located under the foremast, likely placed there when it was first 
stepped. The mainmast was also a saddle type step, notched to fit over the keelson and mortised 
to accept the mainmast. Only the starboard section of the mainmast step was uncovered, which 
revealed that it extended 2 ft. (0.6 m) from the centerline and measured 15 in. (38 cm) in width 
(Whitesides 2003: 29-30, 33).  
 Artifacts uncovered from the Millecoquins wreck led researchers to conclude that the 
vessel was involved in the Great Lakes commercial fishing trade, supplying communities around 
upper Lake Michigan (Whitesides 2003: 33). This vessel likely represents a typical sailing 
merchant vessel for the region and time period of the second quarter of the 19th century. 
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Griffon Cove Wreck 
 The Griffon Cove wreck was discovered in 1955 in a small cove on Russel Island in Lake 
Huron, within the boundaries of Fathom Five National Marine Park, Canada. The remains were 
originally believed to be the famed 17th century vessel Le Griffon built by René Robert Cavelier, 
Sieur de La Salle that was lost somewhere between Green Bay and the Niagara River. One of 
many claims to locating the well-known shipwreck, further investigations disproved the vessel’s 
anticipated identity. Instead, the wreck represents a sailing vessel typical of those found on the 
Great Lakes in the mid-1800s. Artifacts recovered from the wreck, specifically ceramics, 
indicate a date between 1840 and 1860 (Hundley 1980: 2, 80, 99). 
In 1955, some timbers were removed from the wreck. It was not until 1978 that a team 
from Texas A&M photographed, drew, and catalogued the ship’s timbers (Figure 5-5). A scale 
model was constructed to aid in understanding the vessel’s construction. Archaeological 
investigations at the wreck site were conducted by the Fathom Five National Marine Park staff 
from June to September 1978. These included a site survey of the surrounding inner and outer 
coves, as well as the adjacent shoreline, followed by excavation of the wreck site. Alongside 
these excavations, students from Texas A&M returned to the wreck to examine and photograph 
the keel, stem, stern knee, and floor timbers (Hundley 1980: 2, 26-28).  
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Figure 5-5: Plan and profile of Griffon Cove Wreck (Hundley 1980: 91). 
 
During recovery of the wreck in 1955, the keel broke into two pieces likely at the 
location of a bolt hole. One section measured 18 ft. (5.4 m) and the other 24 ft. 8 in. (8.27 m) in 
length. It measured a maximum of 10.25 in. (25.9 cm) molded and 6.25 in. (15.8 cm) sided. It is 
likely that the white oak keel was made from a single timber that measured approximately 42 ft. 
(12.6 m) in length. The top of the keel was notched to receive a total of thirty floor timbers. 
These notches varied from 1.3 to 2.5 in. (3.2 to 6.4 cm) in depth and were approximately 5.2 in. 
(13.2 cm) in length. A hole for an iron bolt no longer present was located in the center of each 
notch that would have secured the frames. There was no evidence of a rabbet in the keel; 
however, where a rabbet would be expected, there were slight indentations at various points 
alongside the keel likely caused by abrasion of the garboard strake along the keel. On the 
underside of the keel are six holes for 0.75 in. (1.8 cm) square iron bolts that were spaced 4 to 5 
ft. (1.2 to 1.5 m) apart that would have fastened the shoe to the keel (Hundley 1980: 34, 39, 61).  
Three holes were located in the side of the keel, two of which went completely through. 
These were likely to facilitate launching and hauling up of the vessel by placing iron bars 
through the keel. Similar bars were also found on Nancy and Tecumseh, built in the Georgian 
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Bay area. This technique was employed in the Tobermory area of Georgian Bay into the 20th 
century (Hundley 1980: 66). 
The stem assembly consisted of a stempost and a gripe. The stempost measured 4 ft. 8 in. 
(1.4 m) in length, 10 in. (25.3 cm) molded, and 8 in. (20.2 cm) sided. Four small notches along 
the side of the stempost indicate the attachment points for the half frames. A deteriorated rabbet 
is present forward of where the stempost was scarfed to the keel and secured with four iron bolts. 
The gripe measured 35 in. (88.5 cm) long on the interior face and 41 in. (1.03 m) on the exterior 
face. The gripe is tapered from the head to heel and from the inside edge that rests against the 
stem knee to the leading edge (Hundley 1980: 42-45). A mortise was located on the stempost 
that may have supported a stanchion, bit, or foremast (Hundley 1980: 70). 
The stern assembly consisted of a stern knee scarfed to the keel and a sternpost bolted to 
the knee. There was no evidence of any other timbers, such as deadwood timbers, in this portion 
of the vessel, indicating this was a small vessel of simple construction. The stern knee was made 
from compass timber and measured 4 ft. 2 in. (1.25 m) in length and was molded 8 in. (20.2 m). 
Four notches and nail holes alongside the knee indicate where the frames were attached. The 
surviving portion of the sternport measured 4 ft. 8 in. (1.4 m) in length, was molded 4.5 to 5.3 in. 
(11.3 to 13.4 cm), and was sided 5 to 10 in. (12.5 to 25.3 cm). The sternpost was fastened to the 
knee with a single iron bolt; it was not mortised to the keel as was common on larger vessels. A 
rabbet was present in the sternpost and a row of nails indicated where the external planking 
terminated. The rabbet was approximately 2 in. (5.1 cm) deep (Hundley 1980: 46-49). A notch 
on the after side of the sternpost appears to be one of the points for attaching the rudder 
hardware. Two gudgeons would have held the rudder in place, however, there is no evidence for 
the location of another gudgeon just above the keel (Hundley 1980: 71). 
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As indicated by the notches in the keel, the Griffon Cove wreck had thirty square frames 
that consisted of one floor timber and two futtocks. A total of 27 floor timbers, 37 futtocks and 5 
broken frame ends were recovered from the wreck site. The frames in the bow and stern were not 
canted. The floors were bolted to the keel with 0.5 in. (1.2 cm) iron bolts along the centerline and 
spaced at 1 ft. (30 cm) intervals. All the floors measured 3.5 to 4 in. (8.8 to 10.1 cm) molded and 
sided. On either side of the keel, limber holes were cut that measured 1 in. (2.5 cm) deep and 4 
in. (10.1 cm) wide. The futtocks were fastened to the floors with iron nails in one or two 
locations (Hundley 1980: 49, 72).  
Two segments of the keelson were recovered. One section is 8 ft. 5 in. (2.4 m) in length, 
molded 7.5 in. (18.9 cm), and sided 3 in. (7.5 cm). A 4.5 in. (11.3 cm) by 9 in. (22.7 cm) 
rectangular hole was in the keelson 13 ft. (3.9 m) forward of the stern knee. Hundley suggests 
that this may not represent the mainmast step since it is too far aft in the vessel, but may instead 
represent a mortise stanchion that supported a small after deck. The other piece measured 6 ft. 10 
in. (2.05 m) in length with a maximum molded dimension of 8.5 in. (21.5 cm) and sided 
dimension of 3 in. (7.5 cm). The keelson was bolted to the keel between every other floor. To 
avoid splitting the keel, the fasteners were driven consecutively through the portside, center, and 
starboard side. The keelson likely terminated 56 in. (1.4 m) or 5 frames forward of the stern 
knee. Evident here is a crack in the side of keel that may have been caused by hitting rocks or a 
grounding, since it lacked additional strength from the keelson (Hundley 1980: 42, 62). 
Small nail holes on the inner and outer faces of the futtocks indicate that the ceiling and 
external planking were also attached with nails. Only a few floor timbers had nail holes in their 
inner planking, likely because a limber board existed for clearing the bilge water. Fourteen 
planks or fragments were recovered from the Griffon Cove wreck. Intact nails indicate that the 
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original plank external thickness was 1.5 in. (3.7 cm). Three fragments of the garboard strake 
were identified. The edge that abutted the keel is beveled (Hundley 1980: 49-52). 
Reconstructive modeling of the vessel indicated that the total length of the Griffon Cove 
wreck was 44 ft. 9 in. (13.42 m) and the extreme breath was 14 ft. 7 in. (4.37 m). The depth of 
the hold was approximately 3 ft. (0.9 m) with an estimated draft of 2 ft. (0.6 m), indicating this 
was a small vessel (Hundley 1980: 112). 
 The Griffon Cove wreck represents a small sailing vessel that was typical of vessels on 
Georgian Bay and Lake Huron in the mid-1800s. Hundley concluded that based on the vessel 
remains alone, it was impossible to determine the origin and period from which the vessel was 
constructed due to the fact that this vessel represented a vernacular sailing vessel for which there 
exists little documentary evidence of the techniques used and their evolution over time. He 
further suggests that investigation and publication of more vessels from the Great Lakes would 
make it possible to more closely define the construction techniques used for local merchant craft 
(Hundley 1980: 79). 
Post-War of 1812 Vessel Attributes 
Vessels that were constructed after the War of 1812 contrasted sharply from the purpose 
built warships; however, their construction methods did not simply return to that of the merchant 
vessels of the pre-War of 1812 period. After the war, vessels were built to be simple and 
utilitarian. Many of the shortcuts employed during the war were carried over as they proved not 
to harm the sailing qualities of the vessels, such as the use of green timber and lack of compass 
timbers or knees. The following table displays the characteristics of these post-War of 1812 
period vessels. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of Post-War of 1812 Vessels 
 Tecumseth Newash Millecoquins wreck Griffon Cove wreck 
Date 1815 1815 Circa 1830 1840-1860 
Nationality British British American British 
Vessel function Hybrid merchant/warship Hybrid merchant/warship Merchant Merchant 
Length overall 70 ft. 6 in. 70 ft. 6 in. 62 ft.  44 ft. 9 in. 
Beam 24 ft. 5 in. 24 ft. 5 in. 17 ft. 5 in. 14 ft. 7 in. 
Keel length 55 ft. 9 ¾ in. Not listed Not listed 42 ft. 
Keel molded 13 in. 13 ¾ -16 ½ in. 12 in.  10.5 in. 
Keel sided 10 in. 8-10 in.  8 in. 6.5 in. 
Keel wood type White oak Not listed White oak White oak 
Keel notched No  Not listed No Yes 
Keelson length Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed 
Keelson molded 11 in. Not listed 8.5 in. 7.5-8.5  in. 
Keelson sided 9 ¼ in.  Not listed 7 in. 3 in. 
Keelson wood type White oak Not listed White oak White oak 
Keelson notched Yes Not listed Yes No 
Floor avg. molded 9.1 in. Not listed 9.5 in. 3.5-4 in. 
Floor avg. sided 10 in. Not listed 6.5 in. 3.5-4 in. 
Futtock avg. molded Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed 
Futtock avg. sided Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed 
Frame spacing 10 in. Not listed 11-12 in. on centers 1 ft. 
Frame wood type Not listed Not listed Not listed White oak 
External planking 
thickness 
Not listed Not listed 2.25-3 in. 1.5 in. 
External planking wood 
type 
Oak and pine Not listed Not listed Not listed 
Ceiling planking 
thickness 
Not listed Not listed 1-2.5 in. Not listed 
Ceiling planking wood 
type 
Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed 
Number of masts Two  Two Two One 
Mast step type mortise mortise Saddle type Mortise 
Compass timbers yes Not listed Not listed Not listed 
Fasteners Treenails and iron Treenails and iron Iron  Iron 
140 
 
The vessels built after the War of 1812 were designed to be simple and functional and did 
not display the additional craftsmanship in ornamental detail that the vessels did prior to the war. 
All of the vessels had plain utilitarian bow arrangements, much like those seen during the War of 
1812. Vessels built prior to the war typically had elaborate figureheads embellishing their bows. 
These detailed bows can be seen on Nancy, Hamilton and Scourge, and was likely present on the 
Earl of Moira. Likewise, the privateer Defense demonstrated decorative trim throughout the 
vessel.  
Several features of Tecumseth and Newash demonstrate that, while they were constructed 
quickly, it is not reminiscent of the hurried construction typical of some of the War of 1812 
period warships. One of the greatest constraints on shipwrights during the War of 1812 was time, 
as ships were required immediately. Consequently, corners were cut during construction in order 
to quickly launch and prepare vessels for sailing. The fact that Tecumseth and Newash did not 
have hanging knees to strengthen the hull may not indicate hurried construction. While several of 
the lake warships did have these reinforcing compass timbers, many of the vessels did not have 
knees but some other configuration for internal support, such as that of carlines bolted to the 
frame on the St. Lawrence. The reason for lack of hanging knees on Tecumseth and Newash may 
have been that the shipwrights determined that these smaller vessels were not under the same 
stress as a larger ship and would not need as much reinforcement (Gordon 2009: 130).  
Indicative of care and unhurried construction was that fact that treenails were employed 
alongside iron spikes to fasten the hull planking on Tecumseth and Newash. The Millecoquins 
wreck and Griffon Cove wreck only employed the use of iron fasteners, indicating that these may 
have been constructed in a hurried manner or the shipwrights may have believed that the forces 
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enacted on the smaller vessels did not require the strength of treenails and iron fasteners were 
sufficient. 
During the war, vessels were built of green wood since there was no time to allow 
timbers to season. Likewise, Tecumseth and Newash were constructed of green wood; however, 
this was likely due to the fact that timber reserves were depleted during the war. By the time that 
both schooners were built, shipwrights had been constructing vessels of green wood for a few 
years and, knowing that these vessels would not be subject to the strains of heavy deck loads and 
long sailing careers, determined that green wood would not be a problem in their construction. It 
is unclear whether or not the unseasoned wood was used in the construction of the Millecoquins 
wreck or Griffon Cove. Due to the fact that the Millecoquins wreck may have been constructed 
far from the epicenter of ship construction during the War of 1812, it may have benefitted from 
stores of seasoned wood.  
Since all of these vessels operated on the upper lakes, their keels were deeper than they 
were wide, which may have improved their sailing abilities despite the shallow drafts that may 
have enabled them to clear the shallows of the St. Clair River and enter Lake Erie. The keels of 
all of these vessels were made from strong oak. The keel of the Griffin Cove wreck was notched 
to strengthen the join between the frames and the backbone of the vessel. 
Once the war was over, it was no longer necessary for shipwrights to construct warships 
that were built to withstand heavy fighting. Warships were constructed of heavy, solid timbers 
with little spacing between frames. Although Tecumseth and Newash were constructed as 
merchant vessels that could be armed in the case of hostilities, they did not demonstrate the same 
heavy framing of the War of 1812 period vessels. The two schooners were built with frames of 
modest size with comparatively wide spaced frames (Gordon 2009: 131). The type of robust 
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construction exemplified in the Great Lakes warships was, in fact, a hindrance to speed on the 
lakes, which is unfavorable for merchant vessels that wish to make good time. Likewise, the 
Millecoquins wreck and Griffon Cove wreck were constructed of much lighter framing methods 
and spacing between was approximately 1 ft. on the centers. The average size of the frames was 
comparable between the vessels. All employed the use of square frames; however, the Griffon 
Cove wreck did not use cant frames in the bow or stern, likely due to its much smaller size.  
The keelsons for these vessels generally measured approximately the same dimensions as 
that of the keel, or slightly smaller. The exception is the Griffon Cove wreck which had a 
significantly smaller keelson, especially in its molded dimension. The keelsons of the Tecumseth, 
Newash, and Millecoquins wreck were all notched as noted in the standards set out by Sutherland 
(1711: 26). 
Mast steps on these vessels consisted of a simple mortise cut directly into the keelson on 
Tecumseth, Newash, and the Griffon Cove wreck. The simple mortise cut mast step on 
Tecumseth was reinforced with metal plates on either side of the step and the keelson was 
actually widened at the location of the step on Newash to provide additional strength. A saddle 
type step was employed on the wreck of the Millecoquins wreck, indicating that the shipwrights 
took care to ensure that the point mast was strong to harness the power of the wind. 
The vessels constructed after the war demonstrate that the War of 1812 subtly influenced 
the development of ship construction on the Great Lakes. Construction techniques did not 
entirely return to the way they were prior to the war; likewise, they were influenced by the 
knowledge and techniques gained through several years of hurriedly building ships in these 
frontier regions with lack of supplies. 
  
CHAPTER 6 : THE NAVY BAY WRECK: A CASE STUDY 
In order to determine if the characteristics outlined in the previous chapters can aid in 
identifying the period of origin of a vessel, these attributes will be applied to the Navy Bay 
Wreck, an unknown shipwreck in Kingston, Ontario. By reason of its location in Navy Bay, the 
former center of operations for naval vessels on Lake Ontario and headquarters for the Royal 
Navy on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain, it is believed to relate to these former naval 
facilities. The wreck may relate to the period of the Provincial Marine, the War of 1812, or the 
post-war era. Indeed, the career of the vessel might have straddled all of these periods. 
In 2002 and 2004, the Underwater Archaeology Service (UAS) of Parks Canada conducted 
a submerged cultural resources study of Fort Henry National Historic Site (NHS) which 
inventoried resources from Navy Bay, Deadman Bay, and parts of Kingston harbor (Figure 6-1). 
A side-scan sonar survey of Navy Bay in 2002 revealed a wreck along the west shore, now 
known as the Navy Bay Wreck (Parks Canada provenience number: 66M14A1). Jonathan Moore 
of the parks Canada Underwater Archaeology Unit and Steve Flaherty a local Kingston diver 
first dived the wreck in 2004 in order to photograph and measure the wreck. From these first 
findings, a preliminary list of possible candidates was constructed (Moore 2008: 38). In 2006, 
Jonathan Moore suggested to the author the further survey and identification of the Navy Bay 
Wreck as part of a Masters thesis. 
The Navy Bay Wreck is located next to the shoreline, near present day athletic fields, in 
approximately 8 feet (2.4 m) of water. It is heeled to port and lies approximately 35° to the 
shoreline with the bow facing northeast. The majority of the vessel is covered in zebra and/or 
quagga mussels. The wreck survives from the forefoot to the aft face of the heel timber. Most of 
the port side is buried under silt, and the starboard side appears intact to the head of the first 
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futtocks. The wreck measures 61.0 feet (18.6 m) in length and its measured half-breadth from the 
keelson to the outer edge of the remaining port side framing was 10.98 feet (3.35 m). This would 
generate a complete hull breadth of 21.98 feet (6.7 m) (Moore 2008: 38).  
 
Figure 6-1: Location of submerged cultural resources in Deadman Bay, Navy Bay and off Points Frederick and Henry. 
14A1 marks the Navy Bay Wreck.  The full Parks Canada provenience number is 66M14A1 (Moore 2006: 12). 
The fieldwork required for documenting the Navy Bay Wreck was completed from June 
1-9, 2008. Water temperatures were chilly, ranging from 53-57°F (12-14°C), entailing 2-3 dives 
per day that ranged between 30-45 minutes each. Volunteers from the Kingston Dolphin Scuba 
Club and members of Preserve Our Wrecks Kingston assisted with the recording of the Navy 
Bay Wreck. Some of the volunteers were Nautical Archaeology Society trained in archaeological 
recording techniques, though most were not. However, this did not play a factor in the recording 
since the mapping of the wreck was done using the software Site Recorder 4, and so this was a 
new type of recording system for all those involved.  
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Site Recorder 4 is a Geographic Information System (GIS) and Information Management 
System (IMS) designed for use in maritime archaeology and intertidal archaeology. Site 
Recorder allows for full 3D survey data collection and processing based on distance, depth and 
position measurements (3H Consulting n.d.). In order to take measurements of the wreck, an 
interlaced series of control points are required. Positions of wreck features are obtained by 
measuring the distance from at least two of these control points and a depth measurement. Once 
measurements are input to the program, it uses a least-squares adjustment to compute the 
optimum position of the survey points. These points can then be used for the frame for drawing 
the site plan. 
The first step to setting up this survey was to establish the control network. A total of 
nine control points were first established. Seven of these were stakes that were hammered around 
the periphery of the wreck and two were located at visible features along the keelson. 
Measurements were taken between each of the control points to enable the software to form the 
grid from which all other measurements were taken. Depth measurements were also taken. Since 
depth gauges do not provide sufficient detail, especially in such a shallow environment, another 
method for measuring depths was developed. Given the fact that the wreck is located in a rather 
sheltered position in Navy Bay with considerably calm waters, it was possible to rig a measuring 
tape with a float so that depth measurements could be taken at an accuracy of ±5 centimeters. 
Once the control network was set up, the survey progressed steadily. The wreck was 
divided into manageable sections which volunteer pairs were assigned to record by measuring 
features from two of the control points as well as depth (Figure 6-2). All measurements were 
input into the Site Recorder software after the daily dives to ensure the accuracy of each 
measurement. In this way, any measurements that were rejected by the program could be easily 
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checked the following day before starting measurements in new sections. The datum markers 
were surveyed using a total station in order to be tied into the map of RMC and Fort Henry NHS, 
to see the relation to other War of 1812 sites in the area. Once the survey was complete, the site 
plan generated by Site Recorder was used to create the final site plan (Figure 6-3). 
Detailed drawings were made of both the stem and stern assemblies as well as features 
along the keelson. Unfortunately time did not allow the retrieval of molded and sided dimensions 
for all of the timbers on the wreck. A total of eight wood samples were taken from the keel, stem 
post, stern deadwood, floor, futtock, keelson, ceiling plank, and external planking. They were 
analyzed by the Analytical Section at the Ontario Service Centre of Parks Canada, all of which 
proved to be white oak (Appendix A). Photos and video were taken of the site. 
 
Figure 6-2: Screen shot from Site Recorder showing datum markers (letters) and points measured (color coded for easier 
data processing). 
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Figure 6-3: Navy Bay Wreck site plan (Kopp 2008). 
 
The white oak keel measured approximately 60 ft. 8 in. (18.5 m) in length; but, 
unfortunately since is buried by sediment, measurements of its sided and molded dimensions 
could not be taken. The stem assembly consists of three components: the apron, stem post, and 
gripe. Only the heel of the stem and apron survive, and the grip is largely buried in the silt. The 
fourth timber appears to be a piece of stem deadwood; however, it is mostly buried in the silt. 
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Only a sliver of the sternpost survives, with no rudder irons attached to the heel. Three pieces of 
stern deadwood are present. 
The framing consists of 26 square frames, four disarticulated cant frames located at the 
stem on both the port and starboard sides, and Y-frames in the stern. The midship frame is 
located 32 ft. 9 in. (10 m) aft of the stem. As was typical of ship construction in the late 18th and 
early 19th century, the frames forward of the midship frame were constructed with the first 
futtocks fastened to the forward faces of the floor timbers, while frames aft of the midship frame 
were assembled with their first futtocks aft of the floors. Spacing between the frames averaged 
4.7 in. (12 cm). The vessel is iron fastened, and there is no indication of the use of treenails. 
The keelson is sided 7.2 in. (18.5 cm) and molded 6.8 in. (17.5 cm), there is no rider 
keelson. It is scarfed in two places, just aft of the stem and aft of the main mast step. It is 
fastened to the keel with iron bolts located between every other frame. Three features were 
located along the keelson. The furthest forward is the forward mast step, located 6 ft. 10 in. (2.1 
m) abaft the stem (Figure 6-4). It is a simple rectangular mortise cut directly into the keelson that 
measures 10.6 cm (4.2 in.) wide, 24.3 cm (9.6 in.) long, and 4.5 cm (1.8 in.) deep. The mast step 
is generally intact, except for erosion, and shows no sign of breakage from strain on the step. 
Chocks and buttresses might have originally existed as a part of this mast step assembly in order 
to reinforce the step, however, they are not present on the wreck. A loose wrought iron spike was 
found resting inside this mast step. Simple mortise cut mast steps appear to be typical of small to 
medium sized vessels constructed during the mid- to late-18th century. 
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Figure 6-4: Navy Bay Wreck foremast step (Kopp 2011). 
 
Another cut in the keelson is located 5.60 m (18 ft. 4 in.) abaft the forward mast step 
(Figure 6-5). This one has a square shape and measures 19.8 cm (7.8 in.) wide, 18.2 cm (7.2 in.) 
long and is 1 cm (0.4 in.) deep forward and 1.5 cm (0.6 in.) deep aft. This was likely the location 
of a pillar or stanchion for support of the deck. Upon consultation with Dr. Kevin Crisman of 
Texas A&M University, who has surveyed and excavated War of 1812 ships in Lake Champlain 
and the Great Lakes, he informed the author that this does not resemble a typical mortise for 
deck beam stanchions, which tend to be long, narrow, and sloped fore and aft (Kevin Crisman 
2009, pers. comm.). Indeed, the US brig Eagle had nine rectangular slots along the top of the 
keelson between frames 1 to 8 for the stanchions posts to support the deck beams. They were 
between 5.1 cm (2 in.) and 10.2 cm (4 in.) wide, and ranged in length from 15.2 cm (6 in.) to 
58.4 cm (23 in.). Each sloped in a forward or aft direction to a depth of about 2.5 cm (1 in.). 
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Clearly, these do not compare with the Navy Bay example; however, there was another notch 
located further aft on the keelson that was similar to the Navy Bay example. It measured 10.2 cm 
(4 in.) square and was very shallow (Crisman 1987: 147). While this notch better resembles the 
one seen on the Navy Bay Wreck, its purpose remains undetermined. Since it would have been 
an odd place for a capstan post, that possibility is ruled out although it could have been for a 
large stanchion at a main hatch opening. Dr. Crisman also suggested that another possibility, 
although lower probability, is a support stanchion under a pivot gun mounted between the masts 
(Kevin Crisman 2009, pers. comm.). 
 
Figure 6-5: Possible deck beam stanchion mortise on the Navy Bay Wreck (Kopp 2011). 
 
The main mast step assembly is positioned immediately forward of the aft keelson scarf. 
The step assembly consists of two blocks, the forward element measuring 1 ft. 3 in. (40 cm) long 
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and 7.9 in. (20 cm) wide, and was held in place with four iron bolts (Figure 6-6). This block is 
badly deteriorated, and the iron bolts are very corroded. The aft block is much smaller and 
measures only 7.9 in. (20 cm) long and 3.9 in. (10 cm) wide and was held in place with one iron 
bolt. It is assumed that these blocks would have held in place a saddle mast step similar to the 
arrangement seen on General Hunter. In the case of General Hunter, the two blocks were the 
same dimensions, and were held in place with two round and thee square spikes (Cassavoy 2005: 
30). The larger forward block on the Navy Bay wreck may have better withstood the strain 
placed upon it from the forward action of the mast. A small notch carved into the keelson which 
measures 0.8 in. (2 cm) long, 0.2 in. (0.5 cm) wide and 0.2 in. (0.5 cm) deep is located between 
these two features and runs along the keelson. The author speculates that this may have been a 
form of mortise and tenon, employing a biscuit tenon, to place the mast step prior to the two 
blocks being spiked to the keelson. An auger hole is located on the starboard side of this notch, 
this may be the location of a drift bolt when the mast step was placed in a different location.  A 
small coin-sized notch is also located in the middle of the two blocks. Evidence of burning was 
found along the port side in this area, which could possibly indicate the location of the stove, 
further investigation and possible excavation of the sediment on this side of the wreck would 
reveal more information. Another wrought spike was discovered on top of the sediment at this 
location. The evidence for a saddle mast step suggests a late 18th to early 19th century 
construction date.  
Although relatively little remains of the interior structure of the Navy Bay Wreck, two 
limber boards were still present along the starboard side of the vessel, as well as one portion of 
ceiling planking. Lower hull planking survives near the stern; however, it is buried by silt. At the 
bow, some hull planking survives. 
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Figure 6-6: Navy Bay Wreck mainmast step (Kopp 2011). 
 
A portion of the vessel’s hull also lies along the riprap shore off the port quarter. In this 
area, there are various timbers and two knees, possibly lodging knees, made from compass 
timbers. Wood samples were taken from this portion of the wreckage. It is indeed possible that 
more of the wreck lies buried under adjacent landfill. 
Based on the vessel remains alone that have been examined to date, it is very difficult to 
accurately date this wreck; however, some aspects of its construction suggest that it originates 
from the pre-War of 1812 period. The vessel was not likely a purpose built warship built during 
the war since it was not heavily framed. The vessels that were constructed during the war 
displayed minimal space between the frames in order to construct a solid vessel ready for war. 
Evidence that the vessel was not constructed after the War of 1812 is the fact that the placement 
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of the foremast is more indicative of a brig rather than a schooner, which were common after the 
war. The masts of schooners Tecumseth and Newash were stepped further forward, presumably 
to compensate for the steeper rake of the masts, however that of the Navy Bay Wreck is located 
notably abaft the stem (Dana Ashdown 2011, pers. comm.). However, inconsistent with the other 
wrecks that were built prior to the war, was the fact that they consistently employed the use of 
treenails, while the Navy Bay Wreck was iron fastened.  
Possible candidates for the identity of this ship based on its length and breadth compared to 
the historical record include the snow Duke of Kent (launched in 1802 at Kingston), the brig 
Charwell (ex-Earl of Moira) (launched in 1805 at Kingston) (Figure 6-7), and the schooner 
Brock (launched in 1817 at Kingston) (Moore 2008: 38; Malcomson 2001: 45, 139). The 
schooner Brock can be ruled out based on the above deduction that the Navy Bay Wreck was not 
constructed following the War of 1812. Both the Duke of Kent and Charwell are very good 
candidates for the identity of the wreck. The following chart summarizes the characteristics of 
these wrecks compared to that of the Navy Bay Wreck (Table 4). 
Table 4: List of characteristics of possible identities of the Navy Bay Wreck (from Moore 2006: 87) 
Vessel  Length Breadth Depth Draught Masts 
Navy Bay Wreck 61 ft. 21 ft. 11 
in. 
  2 
Duke of Kent unknown unknown unknown unknown 2 
Charwell (ex-Earl of 
Moira) 
70 ft. 6 in. 23 ft. 8 in. 7 ft. 8 ft. 6 in. 2 (previously 3) 
Brock 69 ft. 6 in. 22 ft. 3 in. 10 ft.  9 ft.  2 
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Figure 6-7: Lines plan of Earl of Moira (Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, LAC 0018023). 
Historical maps of the dockyard on Point Frederick that postdate the War of 1812 indicate 
where the vessels were moored or at anchor following the peace. An 1815 plan of the dockyard 
indicates that Charwell (ex-Earl of Moira) was anchored in the middle of Navy Bay to the south 
of the wharf and to the north of the slipways. The hulk of the Duke of Kent was moored adjacent 
to the spit of land that projected from the point, at the approximate current location of the Navy 
Bay Wreck. Today, the spit of land no longer exists as this part of the bay was filled in and is the 
current location of sports fields. By superimposing a map of the location of the Navy Bay Wreck 
onto the 1815 plan of the dockyard it is evident that the Duke of Kent is very close to the current 
location of the wreck (Figure 6-8).  
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Figure 6-8: Current location of the Navy Bay Wreck superimposed on the 1815 plan of the dockyard (United Kingdom 
Hydrographic Office, Taunton, England, 193 Ael in Moore 2006: 17, modified by N. Kopp 2012). 
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By the summer of 1815 the majority of these vessels had been laid up. A June 1816 plan of 
the dockyard shows the Duke of Kent resting in the same location, although Charwell was laid up 
in ordinary in the summer of 1815, there no indication of the location of Charwell on this plan as 
it was “hauled up in the mud, condemned” (Preston 1952: 90) (Figure 6-9). St. Lawrence, 
Princess Charlotte, and Psyche are all laid up in ordinary alongside the ‘wharf for heaving down 
ships’. At the time, Prince Regent operated with a smaller crew and is depicted moored 
alongside the other wharf with the smaller vessels Netley, Niagara, and Star. Montreal is shown 
moored in the bay (Malcomson 2001: 136; United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Taunton, 
England, 193 Ael in Moore 2006: 17).  
 
Figure 6-9: "Plan of Point Frederick with the Proposed Alterations for the Dock-Yard Establishment", Jun 1816 (United 
Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Taunton, England, B718 in Moore 2006: 18). 
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Interestingly, when the wreck plan for the Navy Bay Wreck is superimposed on the lines 
plans for the potential 285-ton brigs that were to be constructed on Lake Champlain in 1815, a 
marked similarity becomes apparent. Both the mast steps correlate, as well as the waterlines. A 
difference exists in that the Lake Champlain brigs had their masts stepped directly into their 
keelsons, whereas the Earl of Moira employed saddle mast steps (Dana Ashdown 2011, pers. 
comm.). Likewise, by superimposing the 1802 plan for the Earl of Moira on the plan of the Navy 
Bay Wreck, both the masts and the waterlines coincide (Figure 6-7).  
 
Figure 6-10: Wreck plan of the Navy Bay Wreck superimposed on the lines plan for Earl of Moira (Library and Archives 
Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, LAC 0018023 modified by N. Kopp 2012). 
 
This indicates that Earl of Moira is the most likely candidate for the Navy Bay Wreck. The 
original plans for Earl of Moira by Alexander Munn indicate that the vessel was originally 
intended to be set as a brig; however, the vessel’s dimensions were increased and it was given 
three masts when it was launched on 28 May 1805 (Malcomson 2001: 51). In March 1813, the 
vessel was rebuilt after several seasons of use and re-rigged as a brig (Malcomson: 2001: 70). 
The placement of the auger hole in the center of the mainmast step may be an indication of the 
1813 reconstruction. This may be the location of a drift bolt that previously secured a block for 
one of the three mast steps when Earl of Moira was rigged as a ship. The brig was renamed 
158 
 
Charwell on 22 January 1814, and was used from the end of the war until 1816 as a powder hulk, 
and was eventually sold for £21 in 1837 although the vessel was “rotten to the water edge” 
(Malcomson 2001: 136; Preston 1952: 98).  
This study demonstrates that tentative conclusions can be drawn about the differences 
between ship construction techniques over time. Applying these characteristics to an unknown 
vessel with the hopes of determining its origin is difficult without the aid of historical research. 
Comparison of the Navy Bay Wreck with the diagnostic shipbuilding characteristics from the 
three outlined periods did, however, allow for a tentative dating of the wreck. Likely more 
characteristics of the wreck could be compared after the excavation and recording of the portside 
of the vessel that is currently buried in sediment. Through this method of comparison, it was 
possible to eliminate the post-War of 1812 era for its construction period based on the features of 
the vessel that were observed, likewise that the vessel was likely not built during the War of 
1812. Some evidence exists for refitting or reconstruction of the vessel, which was known to 
have taken place on Earl of Moira. This historical research of the vessels that were launched and 
scuttled in this area greatly helped in confirming to which period the Navy Bay Wreck belonged, 
and the most probably identity of the wreck, attesting to the importance of historical research in 
any archaeological investigation. 
 
  
CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSIONS 
The main purpose of this study was to determine whether the War of 1812 lastingly 
influenced ship construction on the Great Lakes. With a limited number of archaeologically 
excavated shipwrecks examined from the three periods of before the War of 1812, during the 
war, and after the war, only tentative conclusions can be drawn about the impact that the War of 
1812 had on ship construction techniques on the Great Lakes.  
Pre-War of 1812 ship construction is characterized by deliberate craftsmanship as 
evidenced by the use of treenails throughout construction which were time consuming to form, 
but created a tighter join. However, this may have also been indicative of a scarcity of iron in 
these frontier regions (Rodgers 2011 pers. comm.). The majority of the vessels were carefully 
fashioned, with a high degree of skill, that maintain their tight fitting joints to this day. Good 
quality timber, mainly white oak predominates the timbers used for the construction of these 
vessels as this species was still readily available in the North American forests before the 
shipbuilding boom of the War of 1812 and later merchant sail period. Attention to detail in 
construction was viewed as important by the shipwrights. While not all followed Sutherland’s 
1711 treatise (Sutherland 1711: 26) for ship construction that indicated the keelson should be 
notched over the floors, notching of the keel or floors was also used, making it apparent that 
creating a stiffly constructed vessel was imperative. From the examples in this study, it is evident 
that shipwrights took great care in the vessels that they produced, intending them to be used for 
many sailing seasons. 
Furthermore, the great care in craftsmanship employed in the construction of these 
vessels is evidenced by the use of ornamental decorations, which were not essential to the sailing 
abilities of the vessel but contributed to the aesthetics of the vessel and the pride of the owners 
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and sailors, demonstrated a great deal of workmanship. Historical and archaeological evidence 
indicates that Nancy, Lord Nelson, Diana, and Earl of Moira all carried elaborate figureheads 
that announced the vessel’s name as it entered a port. The privateer Defence also demonstrated 
additional scrollwork that elaborated the appearance of the vessel. 
With the outbreak of war in 1812, both the Americans and British realized that gaining 
the upper hand in the conflict depended upon control of the Great Lakes, which depended upon a 
powerful inland navy. These purpose built warships were of a unique design as they were to sail 
on the Great Lakes during war, requiring the ships to be heavily armed yet possess shallow drafts 
for navigating the shoals. The necessity of war required that the vessels were launched quickly, 
resulting in a disregard for traditional shipbuilding methods and lack of concern with the type of 
woods that were employed. The British were able to locate more stores of oak in the scarcely 
populated region along the north shore of the Great Lakes, while the Americans were required to 
settle for whatever species of wood was available. The American shipwright Noah Brown 
exemplified this haste as he sacrificed the aesthetics of a fine vessel for the practicality of a 
warship. To the complaint of a craftsman, he allegedly replied “we want no extras – plain work 
is all that is required; they will only be wanted for one battle; if we win, that is all that is wanted 
of them; if the enemy are victorious, the work is good enough to be captured” (Malcomson 2001: 
90). It was possible that the vessels constructed during this period would be lost in battle; as 
such, the shipwrights were only required to meet the most basic requirements of standard ship 
construction. If the vessels were captured, there was no sense in supplying the enemy with a 
well-constructed vessel. Shortcuts aided in launching vessels faster in order to gain supremacy 
on the lakes.  
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As warships, these vessels demonstrated specific features. They were constructed with 
large timbers and substantial framing with little spacing. This was necessary for these vessels to 
be sturdy enough to carry heavy armaments, carronades or long guns. As materials were lacking 
such as naturally shaped compass timbers, shipwrights employed other techniques for 
strengthening these vessels. The lack of knees on St. Lawrence was corrected with the use of 
carlines bolted to the frames. While this shortcut alleviated the shortage in materials, care was 
taken to ensure the vessel was battle worthy.  Iron fasteners were employed throughout the 
majority of the War of 1812 examples, indicating a lack of time for manufacturing treenails. 
However, this indicates that there were sufficient supplies of iron to forge nails, spikes and drift 
bolts for the vessels. The majority of the mast steps on these vessels were the saddle-type mast 
step. This type of step had three main advantages: it did not weaken the keelson by cutting a 
mortise into the timber; it was very strong as the wood grain ran perpendicular to the force that 
was enacted upon it; and it could be easily repositioned to alter the rake of the mast or its 
location. 
After the War of 1812, shipbuilding moved away from the naval yards as passenger and 
cargo vessels soon outnumbered military vessels. It was determined that schooners were better 
suited to the lakes than the typically square rigged naval vessels. The advantages of the fore and 
aft rig of the schooner allowed for better headway into the wind, as a square rigged vessel would 
have greater trouble sailing against the wind. The fore and aft rig also allowed for the vessel to 
easily maneuver in restricted areas, which is important as the lakes geography presents several 
restricted spaces where a captain’s ability to tack may be limited. While schooners existed on the 
lakes before the War of 1812, vessels that were constructed after the war indicate that the war did 
indeed directly influence ship construction techniques on the Great Lakes, however, minutely. 
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Vessels constructed after the war contrasted sharply from the purpose built warships; 
however their construction design did not simply return to that of the merchant vessels of the 
pre-War of 1812 period. No longer were heavily built ships necessary, as these were a hindrance 
to speed, and frames returned to a modest size with comparatively wide spaced frames. After the 
war, vessels were built to be simple and utilitarian and did not demonstrate the ornamentation 
seen prior to the war. Both treenails and iron fasteners were employed in the construction of 
vessels during this time period, as the peace allowed the shipwrights more time to carefully 
manufacture treenails. Green timber and the lack of compass timbers or knees were employed in 
ship construction, as stores of wood were exhausted after the shipbuilding race of the War of 
1812, and since experience gained during the war indicated that green timber and lack of 
compass timbers did not weaken the vessels. Had the war not taken place, shipwrights may have 
adhered more strongly to construction treatises such as that by Sutherland (1711). Shipwrights 
gained a great deal of knowledge from the many vessels that were constructed quickly during the 
war, and found that these shortcuts did not harm the sailing qualities of the vessels.  
The second aim of this thesis was to compare these diagnostic attributes with the Navy 
Bay Wreck, located in Kingston, Ontario, to attempt to determine when it was constructed and to 
explore its original function. Tentative conclusions were drawn about the differences between 
ship construction techniques over time, which determined that the Navy Bay Wreck most likely 
was constructed in the period prior to the War of 1812. The vessel was not likely a purpose built 
warship built during the war since it was not heavily framed. Likewise, the placement of the 
foremast is more indicative of a brig rather than a schooner, which were common after the war. 
As the masts of schooners were stepped further forward, presumably to compensate for the 
steeper rake of the masts, however that of the Navy Bay Wreck is located notably abaft the stem .  
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Historical research alongside the archaeological analysis aided in determining the Earl of 
Moira as the most likely candidate for this vessel from a selection of three vessels based on 
analogous length and breadth measurements. When the wreck plan for the Navy Bay Wreck is 
superimposed on the 1802 plan for the Earl of Moira, both the masts and the waterlines coincide. 
The original plans for Earl of Moira indicate that the vessel was originally intended to be set as a 
brig; however, the vessel’s dimensions were increased and it was given three masts when it was 
launched. The vessel was later rebuilt after several seasons of use and  re-rigged as a brig. 
Placement of an auger hole in the center of the mainmast step of the Navy Bay Wreck may be an 
indication of this 1813 reconstruction. This may be the location of a drift bolt that previously 
secured a block for one of the three mast steps when Earl of Moira was rigged as a ship. The 
possibility for the excavation of the portside of the Navy Bay Wreck in the future would greatly 
assist in the positive identification of the Navy Bay Wreck as Earl of Moira. 
While the War of 1812 had significant political and social implications, the impact on 
ship construction on the Great Lakes was not as substantial. The War of 1812 did not completely 
revolutionize ship construction on the Great Lakes, as did the introduction of the steam engine; 
nor did it change the size or shape of vessels that were built, as did the construction of the 
Welland Canal. The war’s impact on ship construction was much smaller than those influential 
events; however, it created a ripple of change in ship construction techniques in the early 19th 
century. 
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APPENDIX A: NAVY BAY WRECK WOOD SAMPLES REPORT 
 
If you receive this via electronic mail, the hard copy will follow by the normal route.
If you would  like to discuss this report, please call the author or John Stewart 
at (613) 993-2125.
     SHORT ANALYTICAL REPORT SHEET
ANALYTICAL SECTION
ONTARIO SERVICE CENTRE
PARKS CANADA
CLIENT: Jonathan Moore
LAB. NO.     2008-540 to 547   PROV. NO.    66M14A1-1 to 8       
      
QUESTION: Wood identification
ANSWER: 
All the samples were identified as white oak (Quercus spp). There are many species in this group
which cannot be differentiated anatomically. Identification was done with a transmitted light
microscope. It was not possible to determine whether the wood is of North American or European
origin.  
Provenience No Lab No Description Slide no
_________________________________________________________________________
66M14A1-1 2008-540 Stem 21089
66M14A1-2 2008-541 Sternpost 21091
66M14A1-3 2008-542 Keel 21093
66M14A1-4 2008-543 Keelson 21095
66M14A1-5 2008-544 Frame, Floor 21098
66M14A1-6 2008-545 Frame, Futtock 21100
66M14A1-7 2008-546 Ceiling Plank 21102
66M14A1-8 2008-547 Hull Plank 21104
Analyst:  Louis Laflèche    DATE: October 2,  2008   
  
 
 
